# Claude Code Said ‘Don’t Ask Again.’ Then It Leaked Your Secrets to GitHub

URL: https://securitytable.ai/claude-code-said-don-t-ask-again-then-it-leaked-your-secrets-to-github/
Published: 2026-11-18
Duration: 2515 seconds
Season: 4
Episode: 28
Hosts: Chris Romeo, Izar Tarandach, Matt Coles

## Show notes and chapters

Click “Yes, and don’t ask again” in Claude Code and it saves the exact command you approved, password and all, into a local settings file that keeps turning up in public GitHub repos. We start by admitting we all run auto mode, then argue over who is actually at fault: Izar says the harness should recognize a credential when it asks for one, Matt wants to know why a secret ever lands in a plain text file, and Chris can’t figure out how a model that happily explains key rotation never noticed it was leaking keys. From there we hit SSHole, an OpenSSH authentication bypass with its own logo and domain that almost nobody heard about, and the OpenCode Console breach, where one hosted service holding everyone’s provider keys became one very expensive basket. We wrap with OpenAI’s Daybreak, whether AI belongs in forensics, and Izar’s remarkably generous grading policy. Also on the menu: a birthday song for Matt, a vegan restaurant, and billboards only San Francisco could love. Rotate your keys.

Mentioned in this Episode:  
➜ [Claude Code’s ‘don’t ask again’ button has a secrets-spilling problem](https://www.csoonline.com/article/4247336/claude-codes-dont-ask-again-button-has-a-secrets-spilling-problem.html)  
➜ [OpenSSH flaw lets attackers log into password-disabled Linux accounts](https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/openssh-flaw-lets-attackers-log-into-password-disabled-linux-accounts/)  
➜ [OpenCode hack exposes API keys amid AI distillation attacks](https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/opencode-hack-exposes-api-keys-amid-ai-distillation-attacks/)  
➜ [OpenCode Console Breach: Concentrated Provider Keys at Risk](https://labs.cloudsecurityalliance.org/research/csa-research-note-opencode-console-provider-key-breach-20261/)  
➜ [OpenAI Daybreak](https://openai.com/daybreak/)

Chapters:  
00:00:00 - Cold Open: Happy Birthday, Matt  
00:00:42 - Izar's Pandemic Harmonica  
00:02:03 - AI Billboards in San Francisco  
00:03:05 - The "Sorry We Leaked Your Code" Billboard  
00:03:45 - OWASP San Francisco Recap  
00:04:28 - Movie Night in Izar's Hotel Room  
00:05:59 - Should OWASP Host a Movie Night?  
00:06:27 - Comic Con Needs a Cybersecurity Panel  
00:07:07 - The Vegan Restaurant Experience  
00:08:56 - Wild Seed and Mac and Not Cheese  
00:10:03 - Article Intro: Claude Code's Don't Ask Again Leak  
00:10:20 - Confessions of Auto Mode Users  
00:11:42 - How the Secrets End Up on GitHub  
00:12:47 - AI Memory: Everything Goes Everywhere  
00:14:02 - Why Didn't the AI Catch It?  
00:15:43 - Model Problem or Harness Problem?  
00:16:44 - Harnesses That Get It Right  
00:17:11 - The Real Fix: Rotate Everything  
00:17:59 - AI Compatible Password Vaults  
00:19:04 - Domain Name Detour  
00:20:18 - Article Intro: SSHole, the SSH Flaw Nobody Heard About  
00:22:22 - SHA 256 Password Hashes in 2026?  
00:22:52 - Security Theater and Podcast IMDB Pages  
00:24:07 - Article Intro: OpenCode Console Breach  
00:24:30 - Kalshi, Vegan Beer, and Croutons  
00:25:46 - One Console to Rule Them All  
00:27:00 - Threat Modeling a Key Vault  
00:28:06 - A Better Design for Stored Keys  
00:29:49 - Unpacking the Distillation Attack  
00:33:17 - Key Takeaways: 1.4% of Console Users  
00:35:15 - Daybreak and AI for Forensics  
00:37:17 - Izar the Forensics Professor  
00:38:53 - EnCase and Chain of Custody  
00:39:43 - Closing: Everybody Gets an A  
00:41:44 - Outro

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## Transcript

**Matt Coles (0:08)**: It's a very important day today.

**Izar Tarandach (0:11)**: Happy birthday to you, happy birthday to you, happy birthday dear Matt, happy birthday to you and many more.

**Matt Coles (0:22)**: Speech, speech, speech.

**Izar Tarandach (0:24)**: Oh, he's going to speech for the next 35 minutes. That's true.

**Matt Coles (0:29)**: The best part of that was the pitch thing that was very—

**Izar Tarandach (0:35)**: You took the time to do it right.

**Matt Coles (0:38)**: Well, a rare song from Izzar. Thank you, Izzar.

**Izar Tarandach (0:41)**: I always wanted to learn this. I bought it during COVID and I said, I'm going to watch YouTube tutorials until I get it.

**Matt Coles (0:49)**: And your family was like, no, get out of the house.

**Izar Tarandach (0:53)**: You need to get out of the house. Let's put it in two words. I didn't.

**Chris Romeo (0:58)**: You did manage to pretend like you were creating a note which would somehow set your pitch or whatever for the whole song. So that was, it was a nice touch. It was like a, it was like something I would see on a sitcom episode.

**Matt Coles (1:11)**: Thank you for not bringing that to, thank you for not bringing that to San Francisco.

**Izar Tarandach (1:15)**: Wait, it didn't?

**Chris Romeo (1:16)**: Try that again. See if you can, see if you can make the note and then let me hear you. Let me hear your opening line.

**Izar Tarandach (1:22)**: And many more.

**Chris Romeo (1:24)**: Okay, maybe I'm wrong.

**Matt Coles (1:25)**: That was close. That was close.

**Chris Romeo (1:26)**: Maybe I'm wrong.

**Matt Coles (1:27)**: I still thank you for not bringing that to San Francisco with you.

**Izar Tarandach (1:30)**: Hey, I still have a kazoo somewhere.

**Matt Coles (1:33)**: Thank you for not bringing that everywhere.

**Chris Romeo (1:36)**: That would've been really funny to see Izar out in front of the hotel with like a guitar case open and he's playing his harmonica.

**Izar Tarandach (1:43)**: Hey, it's San Francisco. I'm gonna make a lot of money.

**Matt Coles (1:46)**: Yeah, you would.

**Chris Romeo (1:47)**: He's dressed like an artist, a starving artist.

**Matt Coles (1:50)**: Wearing a lightsaber,

**Chris Romeo (1:52)**: has a lightsaber. Wait, wait, wait, wait.

**Izar Tarandach (1:54)**: You mean jeans and black t-shirt?

**Matt Coles (1:57)**: Yeah.

**Chris Romeo (1:57)**: Yeah.

**Izar Tarandach (1:57)**: How would somebody know if it's a starving artist or somebody coming from the OWASP conference?

**Chris Romeo (2:03)**: Did you guys get as much of a kick out of all the advertisements in San Francisco as I did?

**Matt Coles (2:08)**: Oh my God. Yes. Especially the, especially that one, open a can of customers.

**Chris Romeo (2:11)**: Open a can of customers. That was just disgusting. I'm talking about all the AI. Okay, so set the stage. We, we're walking down the street, we turn over and look at this sign that's, I don't know, on an electric box or something. And it literally says, open a can of customers. And it's like a, it's like a sardine tin with, with, with the little twisty thing open. And there's like 6 customers sitting inside this packed

**Matt Coles (2:39)**: in sardine cans. It's like sardines.

**Chris Romeo (2:41)**: Yeah. That was, that was just weird. I'm sorry. Now the funny thing is that I said at the time, We, we, it's gotten us to talk about it 3 times though,

**Matt Coles (2:50)**: right? I have no idea who it's for.

**Chris Romeo (2:52)**: I don't know who it's for either, but they did capture our attention,

**Matt Coles (2:55)**: right? Right.

**Chris Romeo (2:56)**: By creating such a crazy thing. But every time I look up at a billboard, it's like, we're the new AI for, uh, AI drones.

**Matt Coles (3:06)**: When I was, what, on, on the ride back to the airport, I saw a a sign that said, sorry, sorry, we, we, sorry, we forced you to grind LeetCode.

**Chris Romeo (3:17)**: And it was like, I saw that one too. The LeetCode caught my attention. I was driving, I was going down to the airport. I look, I was like, did that say LeetCode?

**Izar Tarandach (3:28)**: I just went around like this, like, no, away, away. Don't, don't want to see it. What was it that I saw that under Salesforce AI for I don't remember, but it was something ridiculous.

**Matt Coles (3:41)**: It was just AI everywhere.

**Chris Romeo (3:43)**: AI, AI, AI everywhere.

**Izar Tarandach (3:46)**: Should we tell people what we're talking about? Why we—

**Chris Romeo (3:48)**: Probably. I mean, we don't usually just travel to a giant city and walk around and look at advertisements. We're usually there for other things.

**Izar Tarandach (3:56)**: Yeah, we out of budget for that. But, uh, yeah, we went to, uh, OASP San Francisco and it was fun and there were a lot of presentations. And debates and panels and lots of nice, lots of cool vendors and

**Chris Romeo (4:11)**: hijinks. There were also hijinks.

**Izar Tarandach (4:13)**: Hijinks. Very— there were low jinks, there were hijinks, movies

**Matt Coles (4:17)**: brought to you, brought to you by your favorite Frontier model.

**Izar Tarandach (4:20)**: Indeed. Nights of around, around the table.

**Matt Coles (4:23)**: Always look on the bright side of life, right?

**Izar Tarandach (4:25)**: Indeed.

**Chris Romeo (4:26)**: I still have this— I— when you first said like you were watching movie, a movie in your hotel room I still had this view of 7 or 8 people sitting on a single bed. I'm like, what is he doing? He's having a movie night in a hotel in a tiny little 600 or 400 square foot room.

**Matt Coles (4:47)**: Okay.

**Izar Tarandach (4:48)**: So let me tell all the geeks out there what the secret is. Whenever you're arriving at a hotel that has a conference, meaning it's full as whatever, You make a reservation well in advance, but you arrive 15 minutes before the conference actually starts when everybody's already there and everybody has a room. So chances are that you get an upgrade, which is what happened in my case. I got an upgrade to a room with a room. My room had a room and one of the rooms had a balcony.

**Chris Romeo (5:19)**: Wait, you had a balcony?

**Matt Coles (5:20)**: He had a balcony and a couch. He had actually a couch.

**Chris Romeo (5:23)**: Like you could open the door and go out on the balcony.

**Izar Tarandach (5:26)**: Yes. Yes.

**Matt Coles (5:27)**: But San Francisco, you know, in the first row. Yeah.

**Chris Romeo (5:30)**: Wow.

**Izar Tarandach (5:30)**: Yeah, it was, I had two TVs, not one, two. I could watch two videos at the same time. But, uh, yeah, no, we had, uh, Life of Brian, we had War Games, and we had, uh,

**Matt Coles (5:40)**: Quest for the Holy Grail.

**Izar Tarandach (5:42)**: The Holy Grail. Yeah. So

**Matt Coles (5:45)**: it was a, uh, it was a, what's the, what's the word? Uh, indoctrination for, for people who haven't been indoctrinated into security movies.

**Izar Tarandach (5:54)**: Which incredibly do exist. But, uh,

**Matt Coles (5:57)**: at a security conference, no less.

**Chris Romeo (5:58)**: Yeah.

**Izar Tarandach (5:58)**: Yeah. And so I'm thinking about perhaps OWASP needs to make this official and have a movie night.

**Matt Coles (6:04)**: Yes. Just not in Nizar's hotel room.

**Izar Tarandach (6:06)**: No, just not in my room. Cause this probably is not going to happen again.

**Chris Romeo (6:09)**: I've seen other conferences that did movie nights. That was pretty well.

**Matt Coles (6:13)**: DEF CON.

**Chris Romeo (6:14)**: Will, does DEF CON do

**Matt Coles (6:15)**: it? Oh, I don't know if they still do, but I think they used to.

**Chris Romeo (6:19)**: Okay. I'm thinking smaller events that if I've seen that do movie, a movie night, one of the nights, it's usually well attended. So good idea.

**Izar Tarandach (6:27)**: I think that OWASP needs a movie night and Comic-Con needs a cybersecurity panel.

**Chris Romeo (6:33)**: Yeah, 100%.

**Matt Coles (6:35)**: Or a privacy panel.

**Izar Tarandach (6:37)**: Yeah. Hey, we had the cartoon characters in our panels.

**Matt Coles (6:43)**: When was the last time you were at Comic-Con?

**Izar Tarandach (6:45)**: Me?

**Matt Coles (6:46)**: Yeah.

**Izar Tarandach (6:46)**: Never.

**Chris Romeo (6:48)**: He made it sound like he was a regular. I was like intrigued too. I'm like, wow, he's really into Comic-Con.

**Izar Tarandach (6:54)**: No, I am my own Comic-Con.

**Matt Coles (6:56)**: PAX East, PAX East is coming up if you really want something that's a little bit closer, but—

**Izar Tarandach (7:00)**: Yeah, let me think for a second though.

**Chris Romeo (7:04)**: He really considered it, folks, in case you're not watching the video. Like, he really—

**Izar Tarandach (7:07)**: You will get me to a vegetarian restaurant before you get me to Comic-Con.

**Matt Coles (7:12)**: You've been to, you've been to at least one.

**Chris Romeo (7:14)**: I have too.

**Izar Tarandach (7:15)**: And you saw how it ended.

**Matt Coles (7:16)**: We'll have to post the picture for everyone to see.

**Izar Tarandach (7:19)**: Yes. I did pull a, uh, I tell you again, I don't want to go to a vegetarian restaurant. Faith's in there.

**Matt Coles (7:29)**: For the viewers at home, it wasn't a vegetarian restaurant. It was a full vegan restaurant.

**Izar Tarandach (7:34)**: Yes. Yes. Yes. I think it was part of the Smell of Faith chain of restaurants.

**Chris Romeo (7:43)**: So what did you do? Just eat like a piece of kale?

**Matt Coles (7:45)**: He didn't eat that. He didn't even eat that. He sat there.

**Izar Tarandach (7:48)**: I approached it as an anthropological experience.

**Matt Coles (7:51)**: Where is that experience?

**Izar Tarandach (7:51)**: Actually, two anthropological experiences. One was watching the natives as they ate the foliage, and the other one was for how long can I hold my breath.

**Chris Romeo (8:01)**: The foliage.

**Matt Coles (8:03)**: We were dining outside on the patio.

**Izar Tarandach (8:06)**: Thank God.

**Chris Romeo (8:07)**: How long can I hold my breath?

**Izar Tarandach (8:10)**: No, the good thing of eating on the patio in a restaurant like that is that if the food takes too long to to arrive, you can just like reach for the next tree and get something.

**Chris Romeo (8:23)**: And you can reach him at Izar Terendás. You'll find him in many places.

**Izar Tarandach (8:30)**: Nothing against it. Nothing against it. It's all good.

**Matt Coles (8:34)**: At least, at least there wasn't a strong smell of urine on the street that you had to hold your breath for. Also,

**Izar Tarandach (8:39)**: I wouldn't know.

**Chris Romeo (8:43)**: He's debating which one would be worse.

**Izar Tarandach (8:45)**: I wouldn't know.

**Chris Romeo (8:47)**: Well, let's see. Urine's not quite that bad.

**Izar Tarandach (8:51)**: I can't believe it's not cheese. That must be a, it must be a brand.

**Chris Romeo (8:56)**: So I, I also, uh, attended, I did not go to a vegan restaurant. I went to, what did I go to? Uh, would you call that a vegetarian restaurant?

**Matt Coles (9:05)**: What? Wildseed?

**Chris Romeo (9:06)**: Yeah. I

**Matt Coles (9:07)**: think that's a vegan restaurant.

**Chris Romeo (9:08)**: Was it?

**Matt Coles (9:09)**: Yeah.

**Chris Romeo (9:09)**: Oh, I've been to one too. Wildseed didn't smell bad though. Did this go?

**Matt Coles (9:13)**: No, 'cause it's a, 'cause we were, we were dining inside and,

**Izar Tarandach (9:18)**: and, and nobody ordered cheese.

**Chris Romeo (9:22)**: Oh, okay.

**Matt Coles (9:23)**: There was cheese.

**Izar Tarandach (9:25)**: Yeah, it's the mac and cheese that's not mac and not cheese.

**Chris Romeo (9:29)**: We should talk about security. 'Cause yeah, I'm about to, I'm about to go on a rant here and it's probably gonna get me in trouble. So let's talk about something about security since this is the AI Security Table and not the

**Matt Coles (9:40)**: Oh, we should probably talk about AI too while we're at it.

**Chris Romeo (9:43)**: We should, but we should probably just, this is not really the Izar, Matt, and Chris travel show.

**Izar Tarandach (9:50)**: Although could be, could be different

**Chris Romeo (9:52)**: show. We'd probably have a different audience.

**Matt Coles (9:54)**: We did use AI to find all these places.

**Izar Tarandach (9:56)**: We did.

**Chris Romeo (9:57)**: We did. We did. That's true. Us and, you know, there were some 10,000 other people. Okay. So first up is an issue, or I should say an issue,

**Matt Coles (10:09)**: an issue.

**Chris Romeo (10:10)**: Claude Code's Don't Ask Again file leaks secrets to GitHub.

**Matt Coles (10:16)**: Don't ask, don't tell.

**Chris Romeo (10:17)**: Sounds like a problem. So the way I understand this, do you guys use auto mode for Claude Code? Okay. Be honest. Be honest. I do. I do because I'm lazy and I don't want to deal with—

**Matt Coles (10:30)**: How many times do you want to hit the button?

**Chris Romeo (10:31)**: I don't. I did that. We all did that for like one day. You're like, man, man, man, man, you're doing this.

**Izar Tarandach (10:37)**: Oh, wait. You, you, you guys didn't buy the, the bird?

**Chris Romeo (10:41)**: No, I actually sat there and hit the keyboard.

**Izar Tarandach (10:43)**: There's that pecker bird that just goes.

**Chris Romeo (10:46)**: So at least we're all being honest. We're on, we're using auto mode. Like anybody who says, oh no, I review every command. I'm like, no, you don't. Stop lying in public.

**Izar Tarandach (10:57)**: First of all, you don't understand every command to be able to review.

**Chris Romeo (11:00)**: True.

**Izar Tarandach (11:01)**: And second, no, you don't.

**Chris Romeo (11:02)**: Plus if it says recommended next to it, I'm like, Dope.

**Izar Tarandach (11:06)**: Please. Like, it's like going to the movies.

**Matt Coles (11:08)**: Okay. So forget, forget prompt injection. You need recommendation injection for the first. Yeah.

**Chris Romeo (11:12)**: That's all you gotta do is put recommended. I'm like, yes, delete that hard drive.

**Matt Coles (11:17)**: Give me all your crypto.

**Izar Tarandach (11:19)**: I wasn't using it anyway.

**Chris Romeo (11:21)**: Production database. We don't need it. We're going to a text file. Okay. So Claude Code's Don't Ask Again file leaks secrets to GitHub. So the way I understand this. You, if you, if you aren't in full let 'er rip mode, like the three of us are using. YOLO.

**Matt Coles (11:40)**: Actually, exactly.

**Chris Romeo (11:41)**: There is a YOLO mode.

**Matt Coles (11:42)**: I guess we'll have to, we'll probably need to take a quick look at this. Does it happen in bypass mode?

**Chris Romeo (11:49)**: It happens, I think, in the mode below auto.

**Matt Coles (11:52)**: Right. So you have to, you have to take action. You have to give it permission.

**Chris Romeo (11:56)**: Yes. You have to say, don't ask. Okay, it'll pop up that prompt that says, yes, do that and don't ever ask me again, or, and then it gives you the option, ask for the session

**Matt Coles (12:06)**: or whatever.

**Chris Romeo (12:06)**: And so I think what's happening here, the way I understand it, is people are selecting yes, don't ask again. It stores the command, and if that command has some secret or password attached to it in any way, it gets appended to a local settings file for Claude. That file in many public repo instances has not been excluded and it gets uploaded to a public repo. Password key has been exposed. I think Appear.io found, I think it was like around 2,000 or something, 2,300, something like that of these in public repos.

**Izar Tarandach (12:42)**: And Darian—

**Matt Coles (12:42)**: 1,379.

**Chris Romeo (12:44)**: That's roughly what I said, 2,300.

**Izar Tarandach (12:46)**: Yeah. Uh, ballpark. And Darian likes the rub. Why is anybody surprised? Because we keep talking about AI memory, right? These agents, they need memory. Where does that memory go? It goes into a file.

**Matt Coles (13:01)**: Right. But why did, why didn't it go to an encrypted file? Why didn't the harness that was running the, the model not have security?

**Izar Tarandach (13:09)**: Because for the LLM, everything is the same thing. You're right in saying that the harness should have some security. The harness should know, oh, this goes into a an encrypted file or not. But what we have here is everything goes everywhere because everything needs to read everywhere because everything is memory. Used to be that in Linux everything was a file. And now it turns out that every file is memory. It's the new paradigm. So everything gets written everywhere. And then everything gets checked in everywhere. Because before AI, sorry, developers were checking in .envs and secrets and whatnot. And it's not new. All the time.

**Matt Coles (13:51)**: All the time.

**Izar Tarandach (13:52)**: And it's not new.

**Matt Coles (13:52)**: Yeah, because you would store all your project files together. Everything would go together with Git into your Git repository so you could move it from computer to computer or from developer to developer.

**Chris Romeo (14:02)**: Well, now we expect the cloud provider or the AI providers to be better than this. Because I've, I don't know if you guys have had this happen. I've had this, this situation happen where the Claude agent came back and said, oh, I accidentally exposed your password to something. And my bad. It'd

**Matt Coles (14:22)**: be funny if it was in voice mode again and it really went,

**Izar Tarandach (14:25)**: oh no.

**Chris Romeo (14:26)**: It does have some emoting that though.

**Izar Tarandach (14:31)**: Oops. It was really nice because it also told you how to rotate the password.

**Chris Romeo (14:35)**: Yeah, but the point is it knew that it happened. So why didn't it know this happened?

**Izar Tarandach (14:42)**: Have you noticed that the turning thing with the nice verbs and everything? I haven't seen any of it say screwing up. And it happens all the time.

**Chris Romeo (14:52)**: Well, you can edit your Claude.

**Matt Coles (14:54)**: I think I made a mistake.

**Chris Romeo (14:56)**: Claude is completely editable now. As a developer, you can configure it.

**Izar Tarandach (15:00)**: Why should I edit?

**Chris Romeo (15:01)**: You can change the messages.

**Izar Tarandach (15:03)**: Why should I add it? It's doing by itself.

**Chris Romeo (15:05)**: True.

**Izar Tarandach (15:05)**: It is coming and fast.

**Chris Romeo (15:07)**: But why didn't they find it though? Why didn't they find this scenario?

**Izar Tarandach (15:11)**: Why would it?

**Chris Romeo (15:12)**: Because it's everything. No, it obviously has knowledge of other scenarios where passwords are involved and keys are involved.

**Matt Coles (15:20)**: You expect it to know all of the security rules upfront?

**Izar Tarandach (15:23)**: No, wait, it only knows post facto.

**Chris Romeo (15:27)**: Post facto, that sounds fancy. What does that mean? After?

**Izar Tarandach (15:30)**: After it happened.

**Matt Coles (15:31)**: After the fact.

**Izar Tarandach (15:33)**: It has to read the shitty thing in order to see that it was shitty. It's yet, it's not yet predicting that the shitty thing's about to happen.

**Chris Romeo (15:43)**: So do you think this is happening in deterministic code? Is this bug a deterministic code problem? Or is this just—

**Izar Tarandach (15:50)**: No, this is bad design at the deterministic code, I think.

**Matt Coles (15:54)**: Well,

**Chris Romeo (15:56)**: because the model's not even involved. This is just a bug in the client, in the harness itself.

**Matt Coles (16:01)**: This is the harness. This is the harness running, asking the user for perm— actually, it's, it's the harness asking permission from the user to cache. And then it's the cache mechanism that's screwing up.

**Izar Tarandach (16:14)**: The caching, yeah. The caching I don't have a problem with is where it's caching that I have a problem with.

**Chris Romeo (16:19)**: Right.

**Matt Coles (16:19)**: Right. But so at the time of, at the time of caching, does it know it's a secret?

**Izar Tarandach (16:24)**: It should because it's, it's asking you for a credential.

**Chris Romeo (16:27)**: No, not necessarily. It may be using a credential that's already it's already on the machine, or it can pull from your local vault or something.

**Matt Coles (16:37)**: It pulled a credential from Git in the first place. It's already broken.

**Izar Tarandach (16:44)**: Look, at the end of the day, there are some harnesses out there, some mechanisms that do the right thing. They have a deterministic, let's call it, filter, right? That gets the command that's going out. It has a holder for the password. And then it injects the right password in the right holder. So yes, some people are doing it right.

**Matt Coles (17:04)**: But not, apparently not any of the Frontier models.

**Izar Tarandach (17:08)**: None of the Frontier harnesses.

**Matt Coles (17:10)**: Right. Sorry.

**Chris Romeo (17:11)**: So I guess the takeaway from this is just set your harness to auto mode and let it rip. And then you won't get stuff cached.

**Matt Coles (17:20)**: No, no. The, the real solution is set your .gitignore to star.

**Izar Tarandach (17:25)**: That is very smart, but wait a minute.

**Chris Romeo (17:29)**: What about my source code, Matt? Come on.

**Izar Tarandach (17:32)**: The real solution is to spend the last hour of the day rotating all your passwords.

**Matt Coles (17:39)**: Just in case.

**Chris Romeo (17:39)**: I do that anyway. You guys don't do that every day?

**Matt Coles (17:41)**: Well, wait. So you have to have, you have to have your AI prompts say, write me stuff. Make no mistakes. Rotate all my keys.

**Izar Tarandach (17:50)**: Yep.

**Chris Romeo (17:51)**: And then write that down.

**Izar Tarandach (17:53)**: By rotate, we do not mean ROT13.

**Matt Coles (17:56)**: Yeah, that's

**Izar Tarandach (17:57)**: right.

**Chris Romeo (17:57)**: So there are password vaults now starting to become part of the AI ecosystem. So Grokbot has its own password vault.

**Izar Tarandach (18:06)**: Yep. And there are password managers that are giving you AI-compatible password vaults.

**Matt Coles (18:13)**: Yeah. Just write your MCP server to KeePass or something and you'll be fine.

**Izar Tarandach (18:17)**: But you see, what's the sign that you are working the right way? As soon as your client or whatever goes up, it asks you for a master password for a vault. If it's not asking, you got a problem.

**Matt Coles (18:30)**: I, I have yet to use a harness that does that. Which one are you using?

**Izar Tarandach (18:35)**: No, I didn't say that mine is. I said that if it isn't, it's a problem.

**Chris Romeo (18:39)**: It's a, it's a command line harness called ezar.

**Izar Tarandach (18:45)**: Yeah. Hey, that's a great name for a harness.

**Chris Romeo (18:47)**: I know.

**Matt Coles (18:47)**: It's really, it's short, easy to type on the command prompt.

**Chris Romeo (18:51)**: I might create my next—

**Izar Tarandach (18:52)**: and you can always say Ezar the shit.

**Chris Romeo (18:53)**: My next company might be called ezar.com.

**Izar Tarandach (18:57)**: There is already one actually.

**Matt Coles (18:59)**: Ezar.net.

**Izar Tarandach (19:00)**: I tried to buy it and my bank account said no.

**Chris Romeo (19:04)**: That's quite the racket these days. The domain name. I know I'm going off completely on a tangent, but it's, it's a crazy racket now.

**Izar Tarandach (19:13)**: Didn't the guy that, that got mcdonalds.com get a million for it?

**Chris Romeo (19:17)**: That

**Izar Tarandach (19:17)**: was back in the day.

**Chris Romeo (19:18)**: Yeah.

**Matt Coles (19:19)**: That was ages ago.

**Chris Romeo (19:20)**: Yeah. 15 years ago. So

**Matt Coles (19:21)**: is everyone switching over from .ai to .si?

**Chris Romeo (19:26)**: Is there a .si yet?

**Izar Tarandach (19:27)**: Is there?

**Matt Coles (19:28)**: There is because I think it's a country domain.

**Chris Romeo (19:31)**: Uh,

**Izar Tarandach (19:32)**: Singapore is SG. Silesia. Is it a country, Silesia?

**Chris Romeo (19:38)**: I think that's an element.

**Izar Tarandach (19:40)**: No, that's selenium.

**Chris Romeo (19:42)**: I haven't seen any .si.

**Izar Tarandach (19:44)**: While Matt looks for the domain, I just want to slip something here under the radar.

**Matt Coles (19:50)**: Slovenia.

**Izar Tarandach (19:50)**: This past week. What?

**Matt Coles (19:53)**: No, go ahead.

**Izar Tarandach (19:54)**: No, not Slovenia.

**Matt Coles (19:55)**: Oh, Slovenia. Yeah, it's a country code for Slovenia.

**Izar Tarandach (20:00)**: Does that mean that we are about to invade Slovenia?

**Matt Coles (20:03)**: No, it means you're gonna— It means you're gonna get the domain. It means you're— It means your phishing and ransomware filter from your, you know, McAfee or whatever is going to stop, block everything, every access to your AI tools.

**Izar Tarandach (20:18)**: Ooh,

**Chris Romeo (20:19)**: perfect.

**Izar Tarandach (20:21)**: Nice. So the thing that I wanted to just quickly address, last week something very interesting happened.

**Matt Coles (20:29)**: Oh, I was wrong.

**Izar Tarandach (20:32)**: Oh, apart from everything else interesting that happened.

**Matt Coles (20:35)**: So I just have to say, I just have to say for, for the benefit of McAfee, cuz I just called them out and I didn't, I didn't call 'em out. I was making a joke. But according to a 2020, 2010 research by McAfee, Slovenia, SI is the 10th most secure TLD.

**Izar Tarandach (20:50)**: Of course it is. 'Cause nobody knows it exists.

**Chris Romeo (20:53)**: That's not bad.

**Matt Coles (20:55)**: Yeah, that's not bad.

**Izar Tarandach (20:57)**: So last week, we had another one of those brand flaws appear. And it was one to do with SSH. And it was as bad as any string over 256 characters became a valid root password. That's a feature, not a bug. Have you heard about it? No, have you heard about it?

**Chris Romeo (21:16)**: Yeah.

**Matt Coles (21:17)**: Yeah, huh?

**Izar Tarandach (21:17)**: You did?

**Matt Coles (21:18)**: It's the gift that keeps on giving, apparently.

**Izar Tarandach (21:20)**: Yeah. But you know what? Most people haven't heard about it, even though it has its own logo and mark and domain and everything.

**Matt Coles (21:29)**: AI found it?

**Izar Tarandach (21:30)**: Probably. But why haven't people panicked about it?

**Matt Coles (21:35)**: It's not AI.

**Izar Tarandach (21:35)**: As they did with other ones, because it's not AI.

**Chris Romeo (21:39)**: PHP shell.

**Izar Tarandach (21:41)**: Yeah. So,

**Chris Romeo (21:43)**: well, no, it was, it was, no, no, no, it was, there were some constraints on it as well. It wasn't just a wide open SSH.

**Izar Tarandach (21:50)**: No, it has to be compiled on specific, it was a particular, a specific library.

**Chris Romeo (21:54)**: A library had to be included. It was, it was not like a standard distribution.

**Matt Coles (21:59)**: Mm-hmm.

**Chris Romeo (22:00)**: SSHD.

**Izar Tarandach (22:02)**: It's used in a, in a, in quite a bunch of, uh, Docker images that are out there.

**Matt Coles (22:07)**: Right.

**Izar Tarandach (22:07)**: So it is out there. Right.

**Matt Coles (22:10)**: And, and this is the, uh, this is the vulnerability name that we cannot name on the air.

**Chris Romeo (22:15)**: Indeed.

**Izar Tarandach (22:16)**: It's the one that shall not be named.

**Chris Romeo (22:18)**: We want, we want E for everyone. Yeah, I mean, but let's, I mean, looking at the SSH thing you just described there, Izhar, the year is 2026. If you're SSHing into a container that's running in your production environment, you got bigger problems than just a particular vulnerability.

**Matt Coles (22:39)**: Yep. But also who uses SHA-256 to hash their passwords on Linux?

**Chris Romeo (22:44)**: What else do you use?

**Izar Tarandach (22:45)**: Yeah.

**Matt Coles (22:47)**: Aren't there better algorithms out there than ChatGPT-6?

**Izar Tarandach (22:52)**: You know what bothers me there, Chris, with that?

**Chris Romeo (22:54)**: What?

**Izar Tarandach (22:54)**: He used the word production. You know who else uses the word production for an important thing?

**Chris Romeo (23:00)**: Who?

**Izar Tarandach (23:01)**: Theater. So if this whole thing is a theater, then why are we actually caring about it?

**Chris Romeo (23:07)**: That's true. A lot of what we do here is theater.

**Izar Tarandach (23:10)**: Sure. Delete the whole thing. This is theater. We'll just stand another one.

**Matt Coles (23:15)**: We're not a podcaster, we're actors.

**Izar Tarandach (23:17)**: Exactly.

**Chris Romeo (23:18)**: Acting.

**Matt Coles (23:21)**: And scene.

**Chris Romeo (23:22)**: Can we, can we put an, can we make an IMDb page if you just have a podcast?

**Matt Coles (23:27)**: Why not?

**Izar Tarandach (23:28)**: Wait, don't we have one?

**Chris Romeo (23:30)**: I wanna get famous.

**Matt Coles (23:31)**: This is a persona.

**Chris Romeo (23:33)**: Wow. I didn't realize this. I've been acting for 10 years.

**Izar Tarandach (23:38)**: If, if people in a certain other industry have IMDb pages, I don't see why we can't.

**Chris Romeo (23:43)**: I think we gotta get that done.

**Matt Coles (23:44)**: We don't, it's not like we make stuff up or anything,

**Izar Tarandach (23:47)**: right?

**Chris Romeo (23:48)**: We do hallucinate, as we've said on multiple episodes.

**Matt Coles (23:52)**: That means every AI can also have an IMDb page.

**Izar Tarandach (23:54)**: Sometimes even the birds.

**Matt Coles (23:56)**: By that measure,

**Chris Romeo (23:58)**: why don't we make an IMDb page for Carl?

**Izar Tarandach (24:01)**: On it.

**Chris Romeo (24:02)**: Yes. Before we release him into the world, that way he can collect his credits. Okay. So that's the Claude code issue. The second one was this OpenCode console breach exposes shared OpenAI, Anthropic, and Google API keys. One console.

**Matt Coles (24:20)**: I'm seeing a pattern here. If it has the word code in it, it's going to get breached or broken or has a flaw in it somewhere.

**Chris Romeo (24:30)**: I think we should place some bets on Kalshi or whatever that thing's called.

**Matt Coles (24:35)**: Or one of the prediction markets.

**Chris Romeo (24:36)**: Yeah. Yeah, we should.

**Izar Tarandach (24:38)**: Doesn't Kalshi sound like something you would eat at a vegan restaurant?

**Chris Romeo (24:41)**: 100%. Did you, is that what you ate?

**Izar Tarandach (24:43)**: I got a bowl of khao soi.

**Chris Romeo (24:44)**: Is that what you ordered at the vegan restaurant?

**Izar Tarandach (24:46)**: I don't know, but it does sound like it.

**Matt Coles (24:48)**: Maybe that's what happened, yeah.

**Chris Romeo (24:49)**: Oh no, you didn't order anything. You just sat there apparently with your arms folded.

**Izar Tarandach (24:53)**: I ordered the air to stop moving and it didn't.

**Chris Romeo (24:58)**: Do they, wait, wait, did they have vegan beer?

**Izar Tarandach (25:01)**: Uh, isn't all beer vegan?

**Chris Romeo (25:03)**: I don't know.

**Izar Tarandach (25:04)**: What animal goes in a beer? Yeast.

**Matt Coles (25:08)**: I don't know. Does yeast go in beer?

**Chris Romeo (25:11)**: Wait, so beer is vegan?

**Izar Tarandach (25:13)**: Isn't

**Matt Coles (25:13)**: it? Unless it has yeast in it.

**Izar Tarandach (25:15)**: Wait, wait, wait, wait, wait. I always thought all my life that beer counted as salad. Isn't it?

**Matt Coles (25:21)**: Beer is bread.

**Izar Tarandach (25:22)**: Yeah, yeah.

**Matt Coles (25:23)**: Bread's not vegan.

**Izar Tarandach (25:25)**: But bread stands by the side of salad, so it counts as salad. So it's bread and salad.

**Chris Romeo (25:30)**: It's a weird argument.

**Matt Coles (25:32)**: Where it sits on the table is irrelevant here.

**Izar Tarandach (25:34)**: It's a crouton. It's a crouton. It's

**Chris Romeo (25:36)**: also an argument you make in college to justify the fact that you're having a beer at 9 o'clock in the morning.

**Izar Tarandach (25:42)**: Right.

**Matt Coles (25:43)**: Having some bread.

**Chris Romeo (25:44)**: All right. So the issue here is that there is one console to rule them all. And it has all the keys. I guess when I started thinking about this, I'm like, how is this different than a cloud provider? Don't we have the same problem in a cloud, in AWS or Azure?

**Matt Coles (26:01)**: If you have a, it's actually, if you have a multi-cloud provider, so if you have, uh, one of those cloud, if you have a multi-cloud connector, right, that's managing access to multiple cloud servers, it's the same, same thing.

**Chris Romeo (26:16)**: So all the keys are stored in that one place,

**Matt Coles (26:18)**: right? It's a one, it's a, it's your single point of failure. We should threat, we should have threat modeled this. Right? But we do. Don't put your, don't put all your keys in one basket, so to speak.

**Chris Romeo (26:28)**: That's what I was thinking before we started was don't put all your keys in one basket.

**Izar Tarandach (26:32)**: But we do.

**Matt Coles (26:33)**: Right. And on top of that, it's not a local basket, right? It's a managed service basket.

**Chris Romeo (26:40)**: It's probably distributed around the world.

**Izar Tarandach (26:43)**: Yes, but it's, I, I, I'm crossing my fingers here and really, really hoping for good things. It's heavily encrypted, right?

**Matt Coles (26:50)**: Yeah, but it was a distillation attack. Yeah.

**Chris Romeo (26:54)**: So why do we do this to ourselves? Why do we create services?

**Matt Coles (26:58)**: Somebody doesn't threat model.

**Chris Romeo (27:00)**: So what are the, what are the threats when we have all of the keys in one place? What could possibly go wrong?

**Izar Tarandach (27:09)**: The keys go to other places,

**Matt Coles (27:11)**: right? Keys go to other places. Somebody discovers the keys. Somebody uncovers, recovers, or regenerates the keys. You're not your keys, not your crypto, right?

**Izar Tarandach (27:22)**: The question is if the keys are exposed somewhere in clear text.

**Matt Coles (27:26)**: Oh, because it ended up in a config file after being— yes.

**Izar Tarandach (27:32)**: And potentially they can end up somewhere public. Are they even keys anymore?

**Chris Romeo (27:38)**: So why are they not? Why didn't they design this better? It seems like there's a design pattern

**Izar Tarandach (27:44)**: which

**Chris Romeo (27:44)**: where

**Izar Tarandach (27:46)**: It's 2026. We are like well into the AI harness

**Chris Romeo (27:52)**: age. Yes.

**Izar Tarandach (27:53)**: Age. And now you're asking why people didn't design things securely? Remember the S in MCP?

**Chris Romeo (28:00)**: Remember?

**Izar Tarandach (28:01)**: It was a couple of months ago. I

**Chris Romeo (28:02)**: remember. It is. It is. It's there. It's hidden. It's silent.

**Matt Coles (28:05)**: It's silent.

**Chris Romeo (28:06)**: It's silent. But isn't there a design pattern for this type of open code console that says, I should, I as the user should have something that only I store that unlocks the vault inside of your console.

**Izar Tarandach (28:23)**: Look, even if we're not talking passwords, okay, even if you're just talking even privacy, or if you're talking just being nice to other people, if you're implementing something that gets a lot of information from someone and purports to save it for future use, Be nice and create some place where only that thing can, can, can read it. And nobody running through the file system would easily find it or no other process that something else started could easily find it.

**Chris Romeo (28:54)**: That's what I'm saying. Public, like some type of public-private key combo where I have the private key and I can unlock these credentials that are sitting in your console. When I begin my session and then they're available and then when I log out, the door closes again and I'm like

**Matt Coles (29:13)**: a password manager.

**Chris Romeo (29:14)**: Yeah. But why are these keys all available? If,

**Izar Tarandach (29:19)**: because it has to be easy, otherwise it's slow and the agent gets confused.

**Chris Romeo (29:23)**: Did AI build OpenCodeConsole? I'm going to try to dissolve, try to figure that out here.

**Izar Tarandach (29:29)**: I'm going to put some money down and say yes. What's this new icon in my Google Mail thing?

**Chris Romeo (29:35)**: My crack researchers are now working on who wrote OpenCode.

**Izar Tarandach (29:41)**: Ooh, I got something called Studio on my Google Workspace. I am so not turning this on.

**Matt Coles (29:48)**: Yes, and do not ask again. So, so this was a distillation attack. So the keys were recovered, right?

**Izar Tarandach (29:56)**: So wait, run, run us through that. How, how did it happen?

**Matt Coles (29:59)**: I'm looking. So

**Izar Tarandach (30:02)**: we look,

**Matt Coles (30:03)**: so the service of the service collects credentials. You, you use the service to collect, to store credentials for easy access to your multi-AI environment.

**Izar Tarandach (30:17)**: Okay.

**Matt Coles (30:20)**: The, so, so they, the attackers, I'm just reading through the an article talking about the breach itself. So they broke into a legacy system. A company was already retiring, but had not yet retired.

**Chris Romeo (30:36)**: Who?

**Matt Coles (30:38)**: So whoever the attacker was against OpenCode, the intrusion exposed provider keys saved inside a console workspace, not the open source command line tool itself. So it attacked the managed service.

**Chris Romeo (30:51)**: But it's unencrypted.

**Matt Coles (30:52)**: Well, it may have been encrypted. I haven't gotten there yet. It said the attackers were attacking the system for 40, 48 hours straight before getting in. So it was a brute force assault. There was a legacy system that was going to be decommissioned, but still had credential, live credentials. And it was a distillation attack. So you basically, in a distillation, in an AI distillation attack, You're attempting to create a replica of, of a, of a target system. And if you can basically reproduce the outcome, you have the model, right? So you, you're constructing the model,

**Izar Tarandach (31:35)**: you're constructing a black box that's given the same input, gets the same, uh, gives the same output,

**Matt Coles (31:40)**: right?

**Izar Tarandach (31:40)**: Yeah.

**Matt Coles (31:41)**: So they basically brute force the keys. Calling it a distillation attack is kind of weird. It's, it's basically they They generated the keys. That's a, that's a rainbow table. I don't understand.

**Izar Tarandach (31:56)**: Uh, but where, where's the speed here? What, what, why, what was the length of this keys? What, what was happening here? I'm confused.

**Matt Coles (32:02)**: It doesn't, well, how big is an API key to, uh, to Anthropic?

**Izar Tarandach (32:07)**: Those are, those are long.

**Matt Coles (32:09)**: So, and actually, here we are. Security researchers have pushed back, back on this framing that it was a that it was a distillation attack. Several analysts say the incident looks like conventional credential theft.

**Izar Tarandach (32:23)**: Yeah.

**Matt Coles (32:24)**: Uh, readers should treat distillation attack as OpenCode's own characterization, not a verified fact. Of course, this was probably written by AI, but you know what I mean.

**Izar Tarandach (32:34)**: You know what was funny?

**Matt Coles (32:35)**: So basically either the credentials were stolen or somebody cracked a credential because it was encrypted and they were able to do like a rainbow attack against it. Traditional security has not died just because AI exists.

**Izar Tarandach (32:50)**: Yes. And I was going to add that we are here outraged at the lack of secure design of harnesses while just going to any DevOps, DevSecOps person laptop and look at their shell history and you're going to get as many passwords as you just want because people have put passwords in command lines forever. So, yeah, been there, done that.

**Chris Romeo (33:14)**: I know.

**Matt Coles (33:14)**: So

**Izar Tarandach (33:15)**: you, you raised the history.

**Matt Coles (33:17)**: Key takeaways of this event. The open code breach exposed stored provider keys for 1.4% of console users.

**Chris Romeo (33:25)**: It's not bad.

**Matt Coles (33:26)**: It's not bad. So if this was a decommissioning, decommissioned system or a system that was soon to be taken offline, they were transitioning keys, but they hadn't moved them all over. Attackers reached a legacy system. They were in the process of retiring but hadn't actually retired. So why this is important, OpenCode, you're just, they were just a bit too slow on the retirement process.

**Chris Romeo (33:47)**: How do you retire 98.6% of keys from a decommission, a system you're decommissioning?

**Matt Coles (33:54)**: You move, you move the key, you either transfer or reproduce the keys on a different system, right?

**Chris Romeo (33:58)**: So like, you think they're in the process of of this thing running through some script that was decommissioning it while it got popped?

**Matt Coles (34:05)**: No, they're probably doing it in batches. You won't want to do all of them at once in case the new system fails, right? You don't want to lose

**Chris Romeo (34:11)**: everything. Yeah, but you're already 98.6% of the way done.

**Matt Coles (34:15)**: Yeah.

**Chris Romeo (34:15)**: Why 1.4% left?

**Matt Coles (34:17)**: Maybe there was an old algorithm or something. Maybe, and that may be part of this, right? Maybe it was an old algorithm that they hadn't, couldn't easily do a migration. I don't know what that would be, but Maybe, uh, OpenCode's distillation and label— distillation attack is their description of it, but, but really it sounds like it's either credential theft or a, or a rainbow table, right? Offline cracking or something like that. Affected developers reported unauthorized change— unauthorized charges from several hundred dollars to $1,700.

**Chris Romeo (34:51)**: Ooh, pricey.

**Matt Coles (34:53)**: Well, if you're a starving artist in a basement doing your open source project, that could be a lot.

**Chris Romeo (34:59)**: Well, some of the AI keys thefts have been hundreds and hundreds of thousands of dollars charged.

**Matt Coles (35:06)**: Yeah.

**Chris Romeo (35:06)**: In very short amounts of time.

**Matt Coles (35:07)**: So 1.4% of their user base at $1,700 a piece could be, it's pretty sizable, I suppose.

**Chris Romeo (35:14)**: Hmm. That could be.

**Matt Coles (35:15)**: And then it looks like Daybreak helped them Uh, OpenAI's Daybreak program helped OpenCode resume its own investigation after safety filters blocked it. So here's another instance where the people are turning to AI to do investigations and the AI systems are blocking it because of cybersecurity. It's

**Chris Romeo (35:35)**: becoming such a common pattern, but I've—

**Matt Coles (35:39)**: it's a, it's a self-fulfilling pattern too. AI is used to break a system, but AI can't be used to do forensics on the said system.

**Chris Romeo (35:47)**: Yeah, but the, the point that I've seen repeated that, that people are refusing to do is you have to join these programs in advance of an incident. If you're Anthropic and OpenAI, both have cyber-related programs that you can join. You can, they, they make you like send your driver's license, prove identity. They, they actually check your CV basically to confirm that you have some legitimate use of, of their tools. But once you get into the program, then you're, you're able to access all those things, right?

**Matt Coles (36:19)**: And so what you, and then you get the unfiltered versions, right? The ones without the cybersecurity filters.

**Chris Romeo (36:24)**: What peop— what, what's happening now though is somebody has an incident, they go on social media and blast the Frontier provider. Oh, their models are, their guardrails are blocking us. And it's like a simple one-line question. Are you in their cyber capabilities program? And the answer is almost always no. No. Well, there you go. You gotta enroll. You can enroll while the incident's happening. I'd recommend enrolling in advance so that when you have an incident, you jump to the cyber-capable model and you're able to—

**Matt Coles (36:54)**: Yeah, but there's so many ways you could think about this. Should you be using AI to do your forensics for you? Yeah.

**Chris Romeo (37:03)**: Have you ever done forensics? I have. Yes, you should.

**Matt Coles (37:08)**: If only we had somebody who taught forensics available to answer that.

**Chris Romeo (37:13)**: Who, Iza taught forensics?

**Matt Coles (37:14)**: He's not paying attention.

**Chris Romeo (37:15)**: I know he's not paying attention.

**Izar Tarandach (37:16)**: No, I'm trying to read the X thread of one of the developers of OpenCode. And, but yeah, I did. I did for a couple of years there at Boston University.

**Matt Coles (37:29)**: And if you had access to AI, would you use it?

**Izar Tarandach (37:32)**: Hell yes.

**Chris Romeo (37:33)**: Yes.

**Matt Coles (37:34)**: What happens if it hallucinates?

**Chris Romeo (37:36)**: Who cares?

**Izar Tarandach (37:37)**: Can you go and check? Look, at the end of the day, forensics done, done right follows the same rules as an investigation from, uh, uh, an agent of the court, meaning you have to have a chain of custody. You have to be able to point back to where you came from with the evidence. You have to show that the evidence was not adulterated between collection and presentation. So, ooh, look at me with all this fancy words. But, uh,

**Matt Coles (38:01)**: you should teach a course.

**Izar Tarandach (38:02)**: Right. But, uh, the thing is that the, the tools that are, were back then, and we're talking a ton of years here, I am sure that the tools, that the same tools nowadays already do use AI because at the end of the day, it's, it's pattern matching most of the time,

**Matt Coles (38:19)**: right?

**Izar Tarandach (38:19)**: You're, you're looking for stuff and of course with crypto, everything changes and whatnot, but even finding something encrypted is already a kind of evidence. Sorry, Matt, you were saying?

**Matt Coles (38:29)**: I was just saying you should be using maybe more traditional machine learning as opposed to—

**Izar Tarandach (38:34)**: Probably, yes.

**Matt Coles (38:35)**: Full AI.

**Izar Tarandach (38:36)**: But at the end of the day, the big thing is pattern recognition. And sometimes you do have to write the occasional piece of code to decode some format that you found that doesn't immediately have a decoder. So it probably helps there as well. But to make a long story short, yeah, hell yeah.

**Chris Romeo (38:53)**: Did you, uh, did you teach NCASE?

**Izar Tarandach (38:57)**: Indeed. NCASE was one of the tools of the time. Yeah.

**Chris Romeo (39:01)**: May have been a user of that in the past.

**Izar Tarandach (39:04)**: NCASE was, was back then was a good thing. Yeah. Well, I don't know if now, I'm assuming today it is.

**Matt Coles (39:09)**: It did all the evidence collection and storage and.

**Chris Romeo (39:12)**: Yeah. Yeah. It gave you that chain of custody.

**Matt Coles (39:14)**: Yep.

**Chris Romeo (39:14)**: That court, the courts recognized.

**Matt Coles (39:17)**: Yeah.

**Izar Tarandach (39:17)**: But it, it was fun that in the, in the first years that I was teaching is when smartphones came. To be. So I went from decoding SIM cards to figuring out embedded file systems. And I had this small, I don't know if I can say the brand, but one of the first smartphones that wasn't an Apple smartphone. And I got to reverse engineer a lot of stuff in there and it was a lot of fun.

**Chris Romeo (39:43)**: Very cool.

**Matt Coles (39:44)**: Good times.

**Chris Romeo (39:45)**: All right, well, we're out of time for today before Izar admits a crime. We want to, again, with a chain

**Matt Coles (39:52)**: of evidence.

**Chris Romeo (39:53)**: And now that we, we, now that Matt and I have some basic forensics knowledge from Isar's lecture, we're ready to extract his computers.

**Izar Tarandach (40:00)**: Yeah, that was basically 50% of my class. You're welcome.

**Chris Romeo (40:04)**: Perfect.

**Izar Tarandach (40:05)**: And it was a master's level too. So

**Chris Romeo (40:07)**: when's the final exam so we can get our credit?

**Izar Tarandach (40:10)**: I didn't have a, a final exam. I asked people to write papers.

**Chris Romeo (40:14)**: You didn't just hand them a hard drive and say—

**Izar Tarandach (40:17)**: No, I had that spiel on the first day of class. Okay, all of you have an A. Anything you can do now is to lose that A. So work with me and I'll work with you.

**Matt Coles (40:28)**: You're one of those professors.

**Izar Tarandach (40:29)**: I'm one of those. Yeah, yeah, yeah. I'm one of those. I had lots of fun. No, wait, that was when I taught security development. Yeah, I don't know. It was a long time ago.

**Matt Coles (40:39)**: He blocked it from memory.

**Chris Romeo (40:40)**: What a sham. You all have an A.

**Izar Tarandach (40:45)**: I couldn't be bothered. I couldn't be bothered to check exams. No, seriously. What's an exam in forensics? Am I going to give them a CTF? Well, what, what, what?

**Chris Romeo (40:55)**: Give them a hard drive.

**Matt Coles (40:58)**: Decode this, this file structure.

**Chris Romeo (40:59)**: Yeah. Hand them a, hand them a hard drive and say, do you know how much hard drives cost back

**Izar Tarandach (41:04)**: in the day?

**Chris Romeo (41:05)**: You were at academia. You had budget.

**Izar Tarandach (41:08)**: And that means that I would have to create the problem in the first place.

**Chris Romeo (41:11)**: Ooh, sorry, you have to do like 30 minutes of work.

**Izar Tarandach (41:16)**: I don't create problems on purpose.

**Matt Coles (41:19)**: Wait, wait, wait, wait, wait. Hold on. That's, that statement is not,

**Chris Romeo (41:23)**: not anymore. Uh, all right. Well, that's enough madcap fun for one week, folks. Thank you for joining the AI Security Table. Next week we'll be back with some other madcap fun and these are—

**Matt Coles (41:39)**: Don't do it.

**Chris Romeo (41:39)**: It's going to sound us out.

**Matt Coles (41:42)**: Don't quit your day job.

**Speaker D (41:44)**: Thanks for joining us at the AI Security Table. Subscribe, rate, review, and follow wherever you listen. New episodes every week. AI Security on the Table.
