# More Cowbell: Security and Speed in Agile

URL: https://securitytable.ai/more-cowbell-security-and-speed-in-agile/
Published: 2025-10-01
Duration: 2917 seconds
Season: 3
Episode: 16
Hosts: Chris Romeo, Izar Tarandach, Matt Coles

## Show notes and chapters

We’re diving into the relevance and execution of threat modeling within agile development environments. We dissect the claims, explore the true integration of agile practices with threat modeling, and address the misconceptions and challenges commonly faced. Check out the episode to find out if threat modeling is indeed slowing down agile processes or if it can be seamlessly integrated for better security outcomes.

[The Problem With Threat Modeling in Application Security: Too Slow, Too Theoretical, Not Agile](https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/problem-threat-modeling-application-security-too-slow-martin-cissp-8n5ye)

  

  
  

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## Transcript

**Chris Romeo (0:09)**: That's what this podcast needs is more cowbell, right?

**Izar Tarandach (0:14)**: Everything needs more cowbell.

**Matt Coles (0:18)**: You don't have a sound effects panel in here somewhere?

**Izar Tarandach (0:21)**: That's what I'm getting.

**Chris Romeo (0:22)**: She's downloading it, folks. Just hit— just stand by. Isar is collecting his sound.

**Izar Tarandach (0:29)**: Wait, it's gonna be funny.

**Chris Romeo (0:31)**: He's having, he's bot coding it right now. AI is creating an app.

**Matt Coles (0:36)**: He's, he's gonna need somebody to clean. He's gonna need somebody to clean that up though.

**Izar Tarandach (0:39)**: So my AI is on it.

**Chris Romeo (0:43)**: Have you heard anybody say that yet in conversation?

**Izar Tarandach (0:46)**: What?

**Matt Coles (0:46)**: What?

**Chris Romeo (0:47)**: My AI is on it.

**Izar Tarandach (0:48)**: No, but I have told people to have their agent talk to my agent.

**Chris Romeo (0:53)**: And it's an entirely different thing. It's not a Hollywood thing.

**Izar Tarandach (0:57)**: No, no, no, no, no, no, not that kind of agent. Not that kind of talent.

**Chris Romeo (1:01)**: Right. You guys don't have agents for the podcast here?

**Izar Tarandach (1:04)**: Wait, that's an option?

**Chris Romeo (1:06)**: That's why your contracts were so easy to negotiate at zero.

**Izar Tarandach (1:11)**: That could be an option.

**Chris Romeo (1:14)**: Yeah, that thing I tricked you into signing.

**Izar Tarandach (1:16)**: I thought the hot dogs were free.

**Chris Romeo (1:20)**: That was a 100-year deal.

**Matt Coles (1:24)**: I'm not just a podcast host, I'm also a sponsor.

**Chris Romeo (1:26)**: That's right. Oh, well, hey folks, you just joined us. What seems like an existing conversation where 3 people were riding in the car together for a really long time and it almost ran out of things to talk about. But welcome to this. Oh wow, I heard something coming in there, but he'll stop.

**Izar Tarandach (1:44)**: We have cowbell.

**Chris Romeo (1:46)**: Hit the cowbell. You want to do it?

**Izar Tarandach (1:48)**: No, that's not a good cowbell.

**Chris Romeo (1:50)**: It's not bad, but I mean, it doesn't, it doesn't really hit the right rhythm that we're looking for, you know.

**Matt Coles (1:56)**: Ain't got no big time.

**Chris Romeo (1:58)**: Well, I'm hoping Christopher Walken will accept our request to be on the show at some point in the future.

**Matt Coles (2:05)**: We need some star power.

**Chris Romeo (2:07)**: Yeah, other than Izar. I mean, we've got Izar.

**Izar Tarandach (2:11)**: I'm getting old.

**Chris Romeo (2:13)**: Yeah, it's true. He is. He's got like a couple more gray hairs from last week. Yeah, well, I guess we should officially introduce ourselves after a few minutes of discussion on the Security Table. I'm Chris Romeo, joined by Izar Tarandash, Matt Coles. Welcome to the Security Table. So let me set up what we're about to talk about here. There's a little article that got posted on LinkedIn. And it's called "The Problem with Threat Modeling and Application Security: Too Slow, Too Theoretical, Not Agile." And so I thought we would kind of walk through this and maybe unpack it a little bit, maybe offer a little bit of commentary along the way. But I guess, what's y'all's reaction to this at a high level when you hear this, you see the title stated as is?

**Izar Tarandach (3:10)**: I, I, I think that it's a very proper comment. I think that it's very well placed. I think that it's very well, uh, developed. If this was 2001, the gloves have been removed.

**Matt Coles (3:28)**: Love it. No, seriously.

**Izar Tarandach (3:38)**: I mean, not even 2000, I'll give a couple more years. Like I'll say, yeah, 2000, I don't know, 17, 18. But I think that, you know, things have evolved a bit, especially in the last few years. Approaches have changed, tools have gotten better, people have gotten better, the acceptance of threat modeling has gotten better. So, I would say that this is an argument that is valid only if you want it to be valid.

**Chris Romeo (4:07)**: So it's also, it's also some interesting clickbait.

**Matt Coles (4:11)**: It, it, yes, it is to get people fired up.

**Chris Romeo (4:13)**: Like, I mean, I've created articles like this too, just to get people riled up. It's, you know, it's fun.

**Izar Tarandach (4:17)**: Yeah.

**Matt Coles (4:18)**: Now I'm going to give him a little bit of benefit of the doubt. I want to hate this article, but I'll give a little bit of benefit of the doubt here. If you think about it, threat modeling is, does require manual effort today for the most part, right? AI threat modeling is still in this, in its infancy. We haven't quite figured out how to make it effective. And, or, or, or it happens really too late, right? Because you look at code and if you're looking at code, you're not looking at design. And so you really want, you really wanna make this happen early, well, what are you working with? Now you're working with, you know, large text documents and functional specs and things like that. But by and large, threat modeling is done on a whiteboard or using the Microsoft Threat Modeling Tool or using PyTM, where some manual effort is required. Now, does that make it too slow for an agile development effort? I, thinking on that. And I think we have, uh, you know, good evidence in the industry overall to, to, that indicates that, but there is manual effort involved in threat modeling. In fact, the Threat Modeling Manifesto almost certainly requires it in some place, right? Not necessarily model construction, but certainly model interpretation and dissemination of results.

**Izar Tarandach (5:48)**: So I agree with everything that you said, but I want to turn this a bit on its head and ask a different question. If it is slow, why is it so bad to slow things down every now and then?

**Matt Coles (6:04)**: I mean, isn't velocity everything?

**Izar Tarandach (6:07)**: Uh, I don't know, perhaps, uh, going to market faster is is everything, but I think that we are seeing the blast now from this fastest fade of creating prototypes and turning them into products and just releasing them in the wild. And if we take that as the extreme of going too fast, and we say that certain threat modeling methodologies are the extreme of going too slow, isn't there a golden thing in the middle that says, you know what? It's just the right amount of slow. It's just the right amount of stop and think before you do and regret. And I think that it could be said, it should be true actually, that threat modeling is the moment when you stop and think before you go out and regret.

**Matt Coles (6:56)**: Well, and you don't even have to stop and think. You can run the activities in parallel. True. You just want to Towards the, towards that decision point of where you say, is this ready to go out the door? Include threat modeling as part of that, is it ready?

**Izar Tarandach (7:15)**: But then you get into this, is this threat modeling or is this an architectural review thing, right? We want to do it before so that we can stop big things from happening rather than saying we identify big things and we want to fix them in the next. Version. And I know that what I'm saying is completely unattainable nowadays, but it happens sometimes in many places. That's why I'm saying again, it can be slow, it can be not agile if you decide to make it so. But if you decide to make it faster and agile and evolutionary, the tools are there to do it. And by tools, I mean the processes, the people, The techniques, the tools, that there is a huge body of work out there saying that, yes, you can do this thing. Bearably slow.

**Matt Coles (8:10)**: Well, I kind of want to unpack that a little bit. I know Chris is a huge advocate. I think, Chris, you're a huge advocate of this, of agile development practices and speed. But what is agile development really? Nobody, can somebody explain that to me? Because I know what an agile development process is, but what does it mean to be agile? Because that might help us understand if threat modeling is agile or not.

**Izar Tarandach (8:43)**: It's building the car as you careen down the hill.

**Chris Romeo (8:50)**: Taking small chunks, taking small bites at a time. How do you eat an elephant? You know, small, tiny bites at a— over a period of time. So that's, that's what, how I think about it because, and, and when you contrast it with where we came from, we went in a waterfall model, we went through this big, let's plan, do requirements. Architect, code, test, and then 2 or 3 years from now, we'll see how we did by stacking it all together. Agile is the answer to what everything that's wrong with what we were doing in the waterfall world, which is let's make things run. Things should be, we should be able to run whatever it is that we're working on at every, whatever our sprint interval is, you know, every 2 weeks, 3 weeks, 6 weeks, whatever. When we put all the, when all the code comes back together, it has to work. For us to be successful.

**Matt Coles (9:48)**: And so, how do you design in that agile process?

**Chris Romeo (9:53)**: In my world, or my view of the world, I have adopted what Izar Tarendas started saying about 10 or plus years ago, which is threat model every user story. Because I think it's the logical smallest unit that we can engage with that still is attainable, but yet is not too big where people can get lost or they can get, or they can just miss whole classes of threats because the scope was just too complicated. So I'm a threat model user story guy.

**Matt Coles (10:29)**: So who does, I'm walking you through a scenario here, obviously towards a goal. Who does the threat modeling of that user story? Is it the developer who picks up that story, or is it the person who creates the story or somebody else?

**Chris Romeo (10:47)**: I mean, in a perfect world where I'm aiming organizations towards is the developer does that modeling process.

**Matt Coles (10:59)**: Okay.

**Chris Romeo (11:00)**: In reality today, I see some, I see very few where the developers have completely embraced or taken on the threat modeling steps. I see some where the champions have gotten that call from the security team. I see others where the security team is still working on it, they're still doing the threat modeling. But for me, the only way that you can scale this, and to, you know, some of Sean's points about, you know, it's too slow, it doesn't meld with organizational processes, yeah, if you don't get it to the point where the developers are doing it, When you have the developers doing it, now you've got enough resources. And once they start to get experience in doing threat modeling, it shouldn't take multiple days to do a threat model for a user story. It should take an hour or two if you got the right tooling that rock drive, you know, walks you through the process and helps you fill in the knowledge gaps that you have, for example.

**Matt Coles (11:58)**: And is it a subtask then as part of a story that you would do threat modeling?

**Chris Romeo (12:04)**: I see it as more as part of the process versus a subtask on the story itself, because it's kind of a meta thing, right? Like, if you have a subtask of something on the thing, it's not as important as something that sits above and equal to the thing.

**Matt Coles (12:21)**: So it's part of understanding the story that has to be implemented.

**Chris Romeo (12:25)**: Yeah, which is, which is really valuable for developers to do. If they actually understand what they're supposed to be building versus just starting to code, which I mean, some people do that. They're just like, let me code something, but you don't understand. And so, yeah, that's another hidden benefit of threat modeling, right? Is that it causes you to have to pick something apart and really understand what it's calling for.

**Matt Coles (12:49)**: And if you're looking at two stories and you have two developers working on each, one on each story, and they're doing their own threat modeling, and there's a, a connection between them. There's some facility for making that connection, right? Yeah.

**Chris Romeo (13:04)**: Yeah.

**Matt Coles (13:05)**: So, and that establishes a, a broader understanding across the development team.

**Izar Tarandach (13:09)**: And, and, and that's why in, uh, continuous threat modeling, even though the developers are tasked with doing that threat model, there is the idea of a threat model curator who gets the results of those, uh, uh, story threat models. And finds those links that you mentioned. So that's the place where you have like a bubble up and you get the commonalities of two stories and you say, oh, now I have an opportunity here to design common solutions for these mitigations, right? But, uh, I, I, I really liked the way that, uh, Chris addressed it, but I've started looking at it at, uh, from the point of view of responsibility. right? We'd like to describe the eureka moment when the architect is describing the design in a session, in a threat modeling session. But then the new programmer in the team, the most junior guy in the room, or lady, raises their hand and says, yeah, that was the design, but because of limitations and this and that and the other one, we had to implement it actually this way, right? So the person who's going to do that decision to change the design because of the limitations or whatever other constraints, that person is actually taking responsibility for a change in design that is not formal. It's not documented up the chain to be reflected in the design document if it exists or not. So if that is the person who's responsible for the threat model for every story, what you get in the end is that The threat model becomes the source of truth about the system that's being threat modeled. So you have a transference of responsibility from the architects that had the big idea and suggested how it would be implemented to the person who's actually implementing and is hitting, getting hit by reality in the face and having to dance with that thing until it works securely, hopefully. And that's what actually gets documented, right? So I've been looking at it mostly from the point of view of responsibility. And what's interesting to me here is that in the last few years, been thinking about privacy threat modeling. And in there, I see an inversion. I see the responsibility being on the person who actually creates the story because they are the ones who have the bigger view of the whole system and can think about privacy threats that somebody closer to the code probably would not be able to.

**Matt Coles (15:41)**: Because you need a more systemic view for privacy than you do for, for security. Yes. So I have a few more questions and, and just a comment. One might think of maker-checker, uh, kind of discussions here on your, uh, the person who's re-architecting the thing at the local level is going to also threat model at the local level. But that may also be just taking responsibility, which is, which is good for each developer if they have the skills to do it, as opposed to if they don't have the skills, they're, they're likely to just pass it without really thinking about it.

**Izar Tarandach (16:19)**: But that, that's where the, that's where the thing with, uh, uh, moving fast comes, comes in, right? To, to paraphrase the, the. The common wisdom, you should go fast, but only as fast as you can. And, or as you should. And, well, no.

**Matt Coles (16:43)**: So many questions on that, but go ahead.

**Chris Romeo (16:45)**: No, no.

**Izar Tarandach (16:46)**: What I mean by that is you want to go fast, sure, go fast, but you have to recognize when you have to stop for air, right? Just keep going at, at a maximum speed and you're going to hit the wall at maximum speed. You have to recognize that sometimes you have to stop and get your bearings or get some air or something like that. And that's the moment when you realize that, hey, I need to do something in here that perhaps I don't know enough. And now I need to have some education. Now I need to have some training. Now I have to talk to someone. Now I have to ask someone. Now I have to have a dialogue with an LLM, right? Reach out to a book, reach out to an LLM, reach out to a person. But at some point, that slowing down is what's going to enable you to down the road go much faster.

**Matt Coles (17:40)**: So if I understand correctly, in Agile, there's a notion of a spike.

**Izar Tarandach (17:48)**: The sprint spike.

**Matt Coles (17:49)**: Sprint spike.

**Izar Tarandach (17:50)**: Yeah.

**Matt Coles (17:51)**: Is a spike a good place to do threat modeling?

**Izar Tarandach (17:54)**: Microsoft used to think that, yes, it was, because that was their approach to, uh, uh, agile threat modeling, right? They would say, oh, you, you have your normal agile sprints, and every now and then you have a security spike where you stop everything and you only do security, you only do threat modeling, you only do mitigation and all that good stuff. And still it, it, it left gaps, right? Why? Because now you are playing again with the context switching. You're telling people work for a month on as many stories as you can, spend as many story points as you can. And then we are going to stop and say, oh, remember the story that you did 6 ago? Let's talk about threat modeling that night, or let's talk about the one that you're going to do in a month. And people can only context switch so much, even if they live deep inside one system, right? So I find that separating people from the threat modeling with a time delta and ask them to be as effective as they can. Is at most aspirational. I don't even know if Microsoft still does that, by the way.

**Matt Coles (19:17)**: What are your thoughts on this, having run a few, you know, agile development shops? What's your thoughts on that?

**Chris Romeo (19:24)**: As far as the spike, you mean?

**Matt Coles (19:26)**: Yeah, the value of spike in threat modeling.

**Chris Romeo (19:29)**: Yeah, I mean, I always, the way that the teams that I've worked with used spikes were different. It was more of a research-style task. So, when they weren't ready to design or fully design and code something, they would use the spike as a way to go do some research into various libraries or frameworks or methodologies that they could use to solve the problem that we had without actually building it. It was more like a research thing. So, I think the The threat modeling process has to be tied directly to the user story, because if you think about it, that is the unit of work for modern development teams now. So, there's a Jira ticket in a lot of different places, and there's, you know, other tools other than Jira, Azure DevOps, and other things, but Jira is kind of the unique, the standard thing that we say, right? But each user story has a Jira ticket associated with it, the developer grabs the Jira ticket, they comment on it, they work it, they change statuses. So why not put the threat model right in the Jira ticket if that's what— if you're using Jira? So it's— so that's why I land on let's use the user story to house the threat modeling context and records of what we've done because that is the standard unit of measurement for development teams today.

**Matt Coles (20:57)**: And just to bring this conversation into the newest new realm of, of agentic and vibe coding, or AI tool-assisted coding, that still holds whether you're talking about a human individual pulling a ticket, a story off of the, off the backlog, or an agent pulling a story off the backlog, right? They have to think of, they have to understand what the story means. They have to think about what it, what it, how it would translate to code, at which point they can do threat modeling, at which point they can look at that story and say, this is going to affect X, Y, and Z parts of a system, or take input or send output, and can do threat modeling, correct?

**Izar Tarandach (21:44)**: I don't know if they can do threat modeling. I, I, I have in the past few months played with it a bit, and I, I have gotten good value on, uh, So, sorry, I wasn't talking about the agent itself.

**Matt Coles (21:54)**: I was talking about the process, the thought process of pulling the strings.

**Izar Tarandach (21:57)**: Oh, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah. That there, there definitely is something there.

**Matt Coles (22:03)**: So if a human is using a coding assistant, before they even ask the code to be written, or maybe while they have the code starting to be written, they could be doing threat modeling.

**Izar Tarandach (22:16)**: Who's they in this scenario?

**Matt Coles (22:17)**: The human. Initiating the process of pulling a story off the backlog?

**Izar Tarandach (22:24)**: There, I'm having a bit of a difficulty seeing good things because, and this comes as no criticism, but just an observation of what I've been seeing lately. Those people who are interested in adding security in at that stage, they are basically farming the threat modeling out to the LLM or to the agent, right? So they're saying, this is the story, threat model it for me. And by the way, after you finish that, code accordingly. And, um, I just don't think that LLMs are completely there yet. I don't think that the agents and AI-based tools are in there yet. That's why I so much liked the, the, the Vici approach to infuse AI in the process, but not make AI take ownership of the process. So, could it work? Yes. Is it guaranteed to work every single time? I don't think that that's where we are right now.

**Matt Coles (23:33)**: So what you're saying is the tooling available in an agile development process may be lacking. It's not a matter of slowing down the developer. It's a matter of the tools are not yet capable.

**Izar Tarandach (23:49)**: So this is where I was going before, right? I've been playing with inverting the idea and rather than having the LLM answer my questions, have the LLM ask me contextually important questions for the threat modeling, right? So I, I think that the LLM is much more— it's much better equipped to ask those questions than to answer mine because—

**Matt Coles (24:20)**: so let's unpack that a bit. So sorry, just to— for our, our listeners' benefit here. So you take a user story It's a couple lines of text, some description of what needs to be done, or what, what feature is being implemented, or some task that needs to be performed. You pass it to the LLM, and you have it take a critical look at it, and understand, be able to understand it in some dimensions.

**Izar Tarandach (24:48)**: So I've been trying to approach this from the point of view of a developer who is not a security person. So leading the LLM down to asking basic questions about what's the security value of the story. Does it even have any? Right? So things like, I need to update some part of the documentation. Hey, do you see any kind of security value in this thing? Well, unless the documentation is about a security function that needs you know, tokens and whatnot and this and that and the other. No, I don't see it. So can you give me a bit more detail about, about what documentation is being updated? So by having, by giving the LLM the leeway to ask me questions back until it thinks that I hate to say until it thinks, but until it has like enough context to go on. Or for me to feel that, for me to think that actually what I'm getting back has given me enough to understand what's happening. I find that that's more useful.

**Matt Coles (26:04)**: Do you capture the conversation in some log somewhere? Like part of the story?

**Izar Tarandach (26:08)**: I had a bunch of— I was just trying out things. I wasn't actually doing it as a process. But, uh, I, I got part of them in a, in a LinkedIn article a couple of weeks ago. And, uh, it's, it, you know, it's fun. I, I, I, I compared it to playing tennis with the wall, right? Is it a tennis match? No. But is it going to make you sweat and run around and perhaps work some part of your game? Sure. Interesting.

**Chris Romeo (26:44)**: Well, let's, we should go back to this article a little bit. Yep.

**Matt Coles (26:47)**: Because there's a lot of, well, so that line of question was to sort of demonstrate that Agile has built within it the ability to do threat modeling without slowing down the process.

**Chris Romeo (27:00)**: The two-layered—

**Izar Tarandach (27:01)**: Yeah. Without slowing down too much. Right. Let's be honest.

**Matt Coles (27:05)**: Too much. Right.

**Izar Tarandach (27:06)**: Yeah, it will add, it will add points.

**Matt Coles (27:10)**: It'll add a point to story. It'll add a point to story if you're doing story points.

**Chris Romeo (27:14)**: Nothing's free, right?

**Izar Tarandach (27:16)**: Nothing's free. What you get out of it is much more than losing that point in there. Yeah, let's go back to the article. What else we have in here? Okay.

**Matt Coles (27:25)**: Oh, no, by the way, while you guys were talking, I've been looking for the Security Boulevard article that is like the linchpin of this, of this of this article that we're looking at, and it doesn't exist. Oh, it gets, it gets, it gets better than that, Matt.

**Chris Romeo (27:38)**: I've been doing some research myself here. So the Security Boulevard article appears to not exist. So it appears to be an AI hallucination when the article is being generated.

**Izar Tarandach (27:49)**: Wait, wait, wait, wait. Do you guys exist? Am I imagining this whole thing?

**Matt Coles (27:54)**: I don't know. Do we? Wait, how would you know?

**Izar Tarandach (27:58)**: Am I dreaming of electric sheep?

**Chris Romeo (28:01)**: You can only hope. But then it gets better. So, I had ChatGPT track down the academic paper for me and scour it. And it was interesting because it said, and I quote, the paper does say that threat modeling is not part of daily sprint work for the team studied. However, it does not explicitly say not one team fully integrated threat modeling into their sprints in the strictest possible sense. I did not see a sentence that states that absolutely no team ever did it every sprint. So this is like a restatement of some academic research that nobody— and people do this, they think nobody's ever going to go look at the original source. They haven't met people like us. WolfLifeBlog security people.

**Matt Coles (28:50)**: Who actually reads articles anymore? Doesn't the LLM automatically do it for you and summarize it?

**Chris Romeo (28:56)**: That's true.

**Izar Tarandach (28:57)**: That's true. Yeah, that's it. Who, who reads the, the article nowadays? My LLM.

**Chris Romeo (29:01)**: Yeah. So I'm not, so I don't know about this Security Boulevard article. I don't know about this academic research now, but I mean, 37% of organizations had a formal documented threat modeling process. That's SANS CTI survey. I can, I can see that. That, that tracks with what I see is about the number of companies that are doing threat, that I think are doing threat modeling in some capacity now. 37% feels like about where we are right now in the industry.

**Matt Coles (29:29)**: So I wanna, I just stumbled up while searching for the Security Boulevard article that is the Phantom article. I did stumble upon somebody who, and I'll give props to this guy. I put it in the link in the chat for you guys. For making threat modeling work in an agile development process. And it's a 5-step, 5-step process for integrating threat modeling in agile development. Start small. Pick a feature. What can go wrong?

**Izar Tarandach (29:59)**: I heard that before.

**Matt Coles (30:01)**: Use simple frameworks like STRIDE or the 4-question framework. Run a 30-minute whiteboard session with the dev and security teams.

**Izar Tarandach (30:09)**: Oh, that's where it goes wrong. Okay.

**Matt Coles (30:13)**: Track outcomes and then automate where possible. Yes. Now this was completely, totally written by an AI because of common spelling errors and other grammar errors.

**Chris Romeo (30:24)**: And the use of emoji style headers.

**Matt Coles (30:29)**: Okay.

**Izar Tarandach (30:29)**: But sidestep here.

**Matt Coles (30:31)**: Well, converting Mark down to LinkedIn.

**Izar Tarandach (30:33)**: I mean, dude, if you haven't, if you haven't added. To your LLM guiding file or setting, whatever it is, do not freaking use emojis. Okay? Please do yourself a favor. Okay? You are not Egyptian. You are not building pyramids. Stop writing hieroglyphs. Right? That stuff has gone from the world like 3,000 years ago. Do not bring it back. It's not useful. Close parenthesis.

**Matt Coles (31:05)**: Unicode, the bane of Unicode, the bane of our text, text files.

**Izar Tarandach (31:11)**: Right? No. If you can't say it in 8 bits, you shouldn't be saying it here.

**Matt Coles (31:19)**: Right?

**Izar Tarandach (31:19)**: So here's the thing. Step 1, start small. Awesome. Step 2, use simple frameworks. Awesome. Step 3, collaborate. Run the 30-minute whiteboard session with devs, product, and security. I'm assuming security people. Now, here's where the devil raises its head, right? What is the investment and cost of a 30-minute whiteboard session with Dev, Product, and Security?

**Matt Coles (31:50)**: Now, just think— It's a spike, isn't it?

**Izar Tarandach (31:52)**: No, no, just think in terms of hunting these people down. Finding time in their calendars. Okay, finding time in their calendars. Getting everybody up to speed in 30 minutes.

**Matt Coles (32:07)**: Don't you do this during sprint planning? This is where everyone's like sitting in a room, right?

**Izar Tarandach (32:10)**: And getting something out of it in 30 minutes. So you were doing so well until you didn't.

**Chris Romeo (32:20)**: Yeah, but I mean, this is one of the patterns.

**Izar Tarandach (32:23)**: The plane was flying great until it crashed.

**Chris Romeo (32:25)**: This is one of the patterns we put in the Threat Modeling Manifesto.

**Matt Coles (32:29)**: Get everyone together. Common understanding.

**Chris Romeo (32:31)**: Diverse viewpoints. Diverse viewpoints is what we described it as.

**Izar Tarandach (32:35)**: Yes, but we weren't specifically talking about agile there. Okay? We're talking about functional. We were talking about getting the most out of it. Now, am I saying—

**Matt Coles (32:52)**: Why is this not going to work?

**Izar Tarandach (32:53)**: Because of schedules? This one? Because of the amount of investment that you're going to put into getting those 30 minutes.

**Chris Romeo (33:02)**: Man, hold on, hold on. Versus what you're going to get out of it. Throw in the flag. Flag has been thrown. These companies, these poor people spend 8 to 9 hours a day in meetings already. So nobody cares about how much it costs for any particular meeting. You can't have meetings from 8 AM until 6 PM.

**Izar Tarandach (33:21)**: I'm not talking costs in terms of money. I'm thinking me as a security person. Okay.

**Matt Coles (33:28)**: Yeah.

**Izar Tarandach (33:30)**: I work in a big corporation. I have a lot of different teams that I have to work with. I can count in the fingers of a very small hand the amount of times that I went into Slack and I said, can we meet? And everybody was available. And 30 minutes later, we had an answer. I'm saying the cost in time, in context switching again, in figuring out who has to be in there, who's available, who isn't. There is a whole thing to get 30 minutes out of people. If you're going to get 30 minutes out of people per feature, then you are multiplying that.

**Matt Coles (34:18)**: And a feature is a collection of stories, right?

**Izar Tarandach (34:21)**: Yeah.

**Matt Coles (34:22)**: Could be. Yeah. I'm a big fan of this actually. I'm a big fan of on a per-feature basis, cuz it's not quite as small as a, as a story. It's more as a collection of things, I guess, to Chris's earlier, you know, to the discussion earlier where the developer may have a local knowledge of the story, but the collection of t— of that team is going to understand the feature. And the feature will give you enough context for a threat model. And if you do sprint planning and you have everyone in the room anyway, then making security and threat modeling as part of that sprint planning, at least to, at least to provide direction to developers, hey, when you're working on your story, make sure you update this model that, that the security team put together, because we did some backlog grooming perhaps before. Before the feature actually came up to be implemented.

**Izar Tarandach (35:14)**: You know what, you convinced me, but not for general threat modeling. For privacy threat modeling, definitely, because that view of the feature is important in privacy. To be able to see the whole process, to be able to see how everything clicks together and what data is being collected and how and how from UI to backend and back up things happen. For security, I would say that aspirationally it's a great idea. Practically, I, it's hard for me to see it happening.

**Chris Romeo (35:56)**: I think the scope can grow with a feature. I've seen features with T-shirt sizes associated with them. So like you have an XL feature, which is basically what we would call a subsystem in the old days.

**Matt Coles (36:12)**: Right.

**Chris Romeo (36:12)**: Right. Like, so that's why I've always stuck to the user story. Like, I mean, and if someone's like, well, we, we batched together a bunch of user stories because they were similar and they were working towards the same goal. Okay, great. I don't have a problem with that. Right. But you do run the risk of the scope getting too large, and we all know that results in threat models that just don't have the amount of detail that we would like to see.

**Matt Coles (36:41)**: So there has to be a happy medium. But either way, we're, I think we're still continuing to prove here that agile does not stop you from doing threat modeling. Agile can benefit from threat modeling, and agile can integrate threat modeling. It doesn't slow you down in a meaningful way.

**Izar Tarandach (37:00)**: And the other way around too. So the threat model can benefit from Agile and Agile can benefit from the threat model, right? Yeah. As you said, the importance is to find the happy medium and that changes from organization to organization, even many times from team to team.

**Matt Coles (37:17)**: Right. Or over the life of the team, because as we know about Agile, your velocity and your ability to take on work evolves over time.

**Izar Tarandach (37:26)**: There you go.

**Chris Romeo (37:26)**: Yeah. Let's, let me address another section of this because in the analyst's weigh-in section, Forrester, I'm just going to paraphrase, Forrester says fewer than 4 in 10 organizations use systematic threat modeling at scale. That tracks with the SANS survey previously. And, and once again, I don't see any reason to not believe that based on my experience. Gartner reports fewer than 1 in 5 enterprises have adopted AI-enabled threat modeling tools. Okay. I can see that. That makes sense too. But none of this makes the argument for why threat modeling doesn't work. This is like, let me just throw a bunch of facts together from various reports that'll make it sound like I'm making an— this isn't part of the argument.

**Matt Coles (38:12)**: Somebody who doesn't adopt it is not doing it. There's no indication of why they don't do it.

**Chris Romeo (38:17)**: Yeah, exactly. So, um, so if we keep scanning through here, threat modeling still matters. So now his conclusion is threat modeling still matters.

**Matt Coles (38:32)**: It's a schizophrenic result here.

**Izar Tarandach (38:35)**: I don't know. My, my, my thing is that when when we reach the, the conclusion, right? I believe strongly in formal risk management.

**Matt Coles (38:50)**: You know what? With threat modeling as— with in-depth threat modeling at its core.

**Izar Tarandach (38:54)**: Yeah. More and more I'm learning to separate the things, the threat modeling from the risk management.

**Matt Coles (39:01)**: Oh, 100%.

**Chris Romeo (39:03)**: Different disciplines.

**Matt Coles (39:04)**: So threat modeling should inform risk management, but not be part of risk management.

**Izar Tarandach (39:09)**: Yes. And should definitely not be confused with. And many people do.

**Matt Coles (39:15)**: And so the very next line, actually, is where I think we're— I'm having the most issue with this. For this to work, it must be baked into everyday processes throughout the delivery and operations ecosystem. That's threat intelligence, not threat modeling.

**Chris Romeo (39:31)**: Hmm.

**Izar Tarandach (39:32)**: Interesting.

**Matt Coles (39:32)**: If we're— if we're doing operations, if we're doing delivery and operations, we've already written the thing and are ready to ship it. That's not threat modeling, not in the traditional sense.

**Izar Tarandach (39:43)**: Wait, that means that every stakeholder team needs to examine and update their operating methods, embedding modeling into their workflows rather than treating it as an additional step.

**Matt Coles (39:56)**: So make threat modeling part of your delivery, your story process, your definition of done. Wouldn't that slow you down?

**Izar Tarandach (40:08)**: But how does that work with delivery and operations ecosystem? I'm having a problem catching the whole thought here.

**Chris Romeo (40:19)**: All that's missing is the use of digital transformation.

**Izar Tarandach (40:23)**: And blockchain somewhere.

**Matt Coles (40:25)**: Blockchain.

**Chris Romeo (40:27)**: Don't forget quantum. Quantum will save the day for threat modeling.

**Izar Tarandach (40:31)**: These blocks are the chains that tie us to the past. The, the real—

**Matt Coles (40:36)**: evolving without evolving these processes. Yes, exactly. You were just on that, right? Threat modeling will remain a theoretical exercise instead of the foundation of secure design.

**Izar Tarandach (40:47)**: So basically he's advocating for threat modeling every feature or story or—

**Matt Coles (40:55)**: well, or doing a design, doing a, doing an actual design as part of the process. So there's a fundamental problem there. If you can't do threat modeling and you're doing a, you're doing story, story by story where you're building the thing as you go, are you really doing secure design fundamentally? Are you? If you do, where do you do it? You probably do it outside the sprint, by the way, right? You do it as part of your backlog generation, right? Where you define those features and you define those stories and you have a concept in mind of what this thing will look like, right? You don't start with implement this feature and design evolves in the, in In the classic Agile approach, does anybody do a classic Agile, pure Agile, where nothing happens unless it's customer deliverable?

**Chris Romeo (41:58)**: No. No way. It's not possible.

**Izar Tarandach (42:03)**: I can't stop thinking about 13, 14 years ago when Matt and I took a class to be certified Scrum Masters.

**Chris Romeo (42:13)**: Yes.

**Matt Coles (42:13)**: Oh, so bad.

**Izar Tarandach (42:14)**: So much. Spent the whole, I think, week, right?

**Matt Coles (42:21)**: Yeah, it was a week-long class, boot camp or something.

**Izar Tarandach (42:24)**: Looking at each other and saying, why don't they have anything about security here? We were the only security people in there, right? And we came out with the idea of the security toolbox, which was the root of a lot of the work that we did later on. But I remember clearly, we are sitting in the corner of the table. Because it was one big table with everybody around it, right? And we kept looking at each other and going, but where does security go into here? Right?

**Matt Coles (42:57)**: Right. Yeah. You pull this thing down, you work on it. And now that at the end, you have something that you can ship.

**Izar Tarandach (43:02)**: Yeah.

**Matt Coles (43:03)**: Great. Where do you add like the security features? Where do you add the security defenses?

**Izar Tarandach (43:09)**: I think that it was a bit of a formative time for both of us because it informed so much that we did afterwards. Both continuous threat modeling and the work that we put in the book and all that. And I think that at some point I must have made a big mistake where I stopped seeing it as something that needs to happen and started looking at it as something that I can't understand how come it doesn't happen.

**Matt Coles (43:42)**: That's the cynical side of you there, Isar.

**Izar Tarandach (43:44)**: No, no, no, seriously. No, no, that's probably the naive side of me in there. And the more I spoke with architects and developers and teams, and people would look at me and like shake their hands and say, yeah, that makes perfect sense. But how do we do it? And then came the, they've, these, them, that checklists. And, and, uh, ITM and, and stuff like that. And okay, a bit of a gloating moment here, if you, if you all permit me. I, I, I hear other people now echoing the idea of threat model every story, so it, it, it must have resonated someplace with some people. But now, now I just can't shake the idea. I, I It's hard for me to see something that would not justify, if you work in an agile environment, not having threat modeling embedded as a foundational practice of your development team, of your product team, and perhaps offloading the more costly bits of the threat modeling activity The reporting, the risk management part, which is separate but works with, which is ranking the risks, figuring out the mitigations, but eliciting the threats. I can't in my head justify why that wouldn't be part of the Agile process anymore. So that the next Scrum Master shouldn't be asking the same question that Matt and I have been asking ourselves 14 years ago. How come there's nothing about security in this whole process?

**Matt Coles (45:35)**: Ask a product manager.

**Izar Tarandach (45:38)**: I even took that, what's it called? SAFE class.

**Matt Coles (45:43)**: SAFE class is right?

**Chris Romeo (45:46)**: Oh, dooms.

**Matt Coles (45:46)**: Dooms.

**Chris Romeo (45:47)**: I'm sorry.

**Matt Coles (45:48)**: SAFE Agile.

**Izar Tarandach (45:50)**: And I hope to see it there. And I saw mentions. I saw head nods. But still, it wasn't in it. It wasn't part of the process.

**Matt Coles (46:04)**: And with the invention of scaled agile, which is, you know, multiple agile teams working together.

**Izar Tarandach (46:15)**: There you go. You know, it's another one of those cases that, you know, if you save a bit every day, you're going to have, a bunch of money at the end of the day, at the end of the year, versus just take a week to play the lottery and hope that you get a huge windfall, right? So I, I don't know. That's when I— that's why when I see articles like this, my reaction in the beginning was, hey, this would work if it was X many years ago. Things have changed, like processes, delivery processes have changed. Even if you look into DevOps and all that supposedly good stuff, things have moved, right? So it's time for people to realize that, yeah, when you move things, perhaps you should take security with it.

**Matt Coles (47:08)**: And, and benefit, benefit of the doubt, the author of this article does say at the very end, threat modeling should be foundation of secure application, secure application design. And it needs to be practical.

**Izar Tarandach (47:21)**: Continuous, democratized, and embedded into agile workflows. I mean, you can't ask for more than that. I think that where we disagree is that I think that we are in a place where we can very well do these things, perhaps not ideally, right? But we have reached a point where you can do these things practically.

**Matt Coles (47:42)**: And we know that, we know teams do. I mean, it's not, maybe not universal, maybe it's not all of the developers. Let's not even talk about vibe coders and companies that are built on that type of approach, but it happens.

**Chris Romeo (47:57)**: Yeah. I think that's a good place for us to wrap up this episode at the conclusion of this article. And we found some common ground and we found some uncommon ground. I can't think of the right words.

**Matt Coles (48:11)**: We did, we didn't, we didn't find a Security Boulevard article though. Yeah.

**Izar Tarandach (48:15)**: No, no, that we did not find. That we did not.

**Chris Romeo (48:17)**: So that appears to have been an AI hallucination, which is something that happens these days in the world of AI. But folks, once again, thank you for listening to the Security Table.
