# The Cyber Trust Mark Debate

URL: https://securitytable.ai/the-cyber-trust-mark-debate/
Published: 2025-01-22
Duration: 2832 seconds
Season: 3
Episode: 2
Hosts: Chris Romeo, Izar Tarandach, Matt Coles

## Show notes and chapters

The Cyber Trust Mark, a new FCC program aimed at assuring the security of IoT devices is the topic of discussion today. We discuss various aspects of the Cyber Trust Mark, the history of similar initiatives like UL certification, and the challenges faced by consumers in determining the security of their devices. They also debate the merits and drawbacks of regulations like the EU's Cyber Resilience Act, the importance of secure-by-default design, and the limitations of relying solely on consumers or independent labs to ensure security. Throughout, they explore whether this new mark can genuinely make a difference or if it's just a rehash of old ideas.

  
  

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## Transcript

**Chris Romeo (0:09)**: Folks, welcome to another episode of the Security Table where we're already having madcap fun as we hit record. So we began with madcap fun and we're just going to continue right along with it. As always, I am joined by Izar Tarendas, who appears to be Out of focus when he was out of focus and lost and whatnot. But we'll get him, we'll get him back in focus. And Matt Coles, who is dressed for winter.

**Izar Tarandach (0:38)**: No, he, he is ecstatic.

**Chris Romeo (0:42)**: He's ecstatic. Spell that ecstatic.

**Matt Coles (0:47)**: Estatic.

**Izar Tarandach (0:48)**: E-c-static.

**Chris Romeo (0:53)**: Yes, that's correct. I, I was gonna say ex-SQB.

**Matt Coles (0:59)**: Tell me you have, tell me you have pets without telling me you have pets.

**Chris Romeo (1:02)**: Yeah, that's true. That is true. Um, since we believe in operational security here, none of us have pets, or maybe we all have pets. You'll never know.

**Izar Tarandach (1:14)**: Okay.

**Chris Romeo (1:15)**: The topic of conversation here is something called the Cyber Trust Mark. I believe I've said that correctly. Cyber Trust Mark, which, I mean, it sounds very impressive. Like, if you have the Cyber Trust Mark, you are safe and secure.

**Matt Coles (1:37)**: If you have the mark, you can trust cyber. That's what it is.

**Izar Tarandach (1:40)**: You are marked for security.

**Chris Romeo (1:43)**: Don't trust anything is what they used to say in the '60s, or don't trust anybody over 30, I think, or Oh, we've, we've moved on.

**Matt Coles (1:49)**: It's now, it's now verify and trust.

**Chris Romeo (1:51)**: Trust. Well, no, trust and verify was, has been around since 1980-something as a very popular term. But so what is the Cyber Trust Mark? Somebody lay out, since I just learned about it literally 15 minutes ago, but I tend to think I have known about it all along, which is, I, I, I always thought that it was our good friend Marc French, who Marc is the Cyber Trust Mark because we trust him.

**Matt Coles (2:20)**: Um, so, so what is the Cyber Trust Market? Uh, so it is now officially an FCC program, uh, Federal Communications Commission program for, uh, giving information, ensuring, ensuring the security of IoT devices and providing information to customers, uh, that they can use to ensure that they are following security best practices and making use of what the, the, the manufacturer or supplier of the, of the product offers. So the Cyber Trust Mark will come with, uh, some sort of testing process and, and, uh, and a set of criteria and a, um, and a handy dandy thing that customers can scan so they can get information about the product they're using.

**Chris Romeo (3:14)**: Uh, that'd be a QR code.

**Matt Coles (3:16)**: It would be a QR code. It would be a QR code. And I, and we know how QR codes work.

**Chris Romeo (3:20)**: So, um, no one's ever printed their own QR code sticker and stuck it on a box or, or made a drone QR code that people would scan during, uh, some, you know, laser light show. And who would go like laser light shows?

**Izar Tarandach (3:33)**: Yeah. No. And, and, and clearly everybody knows how to look at the QR code and, and know if it's a valid one and a new one, right?

**Matt Coles (3:39)**: Of course. Yeah. 'Cause it's, that's readily apparent to the, to the human eye.

**Chris Romeo (3:43)**: But it turns out that this is not new. This is, as you guys were telling me before we started recording, this is just a rehash of UL, which UL stands for what? I forgot.

**Matt Coles (3:58)**: Underwriter Labs. Underwriter Labs.

**Chris Romeo (4:00)**: Yeah. Cause I remember years ago when they started on this journey that they were going to certify IoT devices. I want, it's gotta be 10+ years ago when that whole thing kicked off.

**Matt Coles (4:12)**: It's about that.

**Chris Romeo (4:13)**: Yeah.

**Matt Coles (4:14)**: Well, when it started, yeah. But not when it went into, into effect.

**Chris Romeo (4:17)**: You're thinking UL?

**Matt Coles (4:17)**: Did it ever hit? You're thinking UL? The UL.

**Chris Romeo (4:19)**: Yeah.

**Matt Coles (4:19)**: UL 2900, uh, was present for some period of time, got some traction, but, uh, uh, I think it's, I, I don't know for sure, but I don't think it's got, uh, that's, I don't know if it's still continuing or not. That's a really good question. We should ask, uh, somebody or something.

**Chris Romeo (4:38)**: Well, there's, there's much bigger challenges to explore in the US Cyber Trust Mark. So where do you wanna go first? Should we trust Mark?

**Matt Coles (4:50)**: I don't know.

**Chris Romeo (4:51)**: Oh, Mark French, I trust. Uh, a Cyber Trust Mark based on the criteria that I've seen so far, I don't know that it makes a big difference in my world.

**Matt Coles (5:01)**: Well, so wait, go ahead. Sorry.

**Izar Tarandach (5:03)**: If it doesn't make a, a big difference on your world, Will it make any difference on the, on the world of consumers who are the, the, the target of this stuff?

**Chris Romeo (5:15)**: Wait, I'm not a consumer.

**Izar Tarandach (5:18)**: You are an educated consumer.

**Matt Coles (5:19)**: Yeah. You're, you're, you're in the, you're in the upper echelon there of know and care, meaning K-N-O-W, not N-O. Yeah.

**Chris Romeo (5:28)**: You don't care. Don't care.

**Matt Coles (5:29)**: Good point. Right.

**Chris Romeo (5:31)**: Yeah.

**Matt Coles (5:31)**: No, that's good.

**Chris Romeo (5:32)**: It's a good point.

**Matt Coles (5:32)**: It's, it's just that most consumers don't know and don't know enough to care.

**Chris Romeo (5:36)**: It's good that we recognize that in this conversation, right? Like we're actually not the target people of this because you think of the average person who's buying a wireless device, say they're not a tech person and say they don't really have a lot, they're not good with, they would self-describe as, I'm not really good with computers. They don't have any ability to choose a product. I mean, I shouldn't say that. They could randomly choose a product off the shelf, but they don't have any way to differentiate between the security goodness of product A versus product B, whereas we do, because we would look at all the documentation, we'd read Reddit posts about the security stance.

**Matt Coles (6:25)**: We'd watch, you know, our favorite YouTuber product review looking at this, right?

**Chris Romeo (6:30)**: Yes, we'd look at multiples of them and compare them and see, you know, is it—

**Matt Coles (6:33)**: but that user, that user base that you're talking about, it should be relatively easy for them to go out to look at product A and product B side by side and go, this one has a trust mark, this one has a recognition from the FCC and this one does not, and go, I will preface the one that has, you know, prefer the one that has the recognition for better or for worse, right?

**Izar Tarandach (6:53)**: But, but look, look at it this way. So what's the. The label is giving us, right? It's a QR code, which you're supposed to scan, and then it's going to give you information about secure configuration of this thing. So now I'm Joe Consumer. I go into Best Buy. I pick up two different products. I scan both of them. What's going to influence my choice here?

**Chris Romeo (7:23)**: Well, I mean, do they both have the mark?

**Izar Tarandach (7:26)**: They both have the mark 'cause they had to scan both of them.

**Matt Coles (7:28)**: Yeah.

**Chris Romeo (7:29)**: So then they both have complied with this set of criteria. And so I think in the general consumer's world, they're equivalent.

**Izar Tarandach (7:37)**: No, but what, what does the, the, the mark, scanning the mark take you to? Right? It takes you to, I'm guessing just a list of pro—

**Chris Romeo (7:47)**: like a, a certificate that says it was scanned. That's how we've done it in every other certification scheme.

**Izar Tarandach (7:52)**: But that's, that, that's the differentiation here. It takes you to a page with information that has to be easy to understand. Lord knows what that means. And it's, it should include how to change the default password, how to configure the device securely, whether updates and patches are automatic, and if not, how consumers can access them. The product's minimum support period end of date. So if I'm looking at both of those, in my mind as a consumer, non-educated one, I'm gonna go with, ah, this one looks better and it looks easier.

**Chris Romeo (8:27)**: Yeah. And, and that's really not solving for anything, right? No. Because the person who's out there that's gonna take this device, they shouldn't do anything to it. Like, no, the, the, the mark should result in a product that comes online that is secure by default. I got an idea. Why don't we create a pledge and have a bunch of people sign it and then they could just kind of self-validate by signing this pledge that they're gonna do all the right things. Wait, wait, wait, wait, wait, wait. Better at them.

**Izar Tarandach (9:01)**: That's, that's revolutionary. Could we get a government department to stand behind it?

**Chris Romeo (9:08)**: Maybe a four-letter agency. Maybe. Maybe even better.

**Izar Tarandach (9:11)**: Maybe, maybe.

**Chris Romeo (9:12)**: I think it will happen.

**Matt Coles (9:14)**: Maybe one that has security in the name.

**Izar Tarandach (9:16)**: But no, but we have to be—

**Chris Romeo (9:17)**: Yes, security.

**Izar Tarandach (9:18)**: No, no, we have to be honest because a bunch of know-it-alls are going to throw shade on it and we are going to hate it.

**Matt Coles (9:27)**: Wait, wait, is that us?

**Chris Romeo (9:29)**: I don't know.

**Izar Tarandach (9:29)**: And months after that, and months after that, in a puff of smoke, we are going to get notices of CVEs and breaches with companies that actually signed it. Yeah.

**Chris Romeo (9:40)**: Like, I don't know. Could that really happen in the real world?

**Matt Coles (9:43)**: Could it?

**Izar Tarandach (9:44)**: Could it ever happen?

**Matt Coles (9:44)**: No, it could never happen.

**Izar Tarandach (9:46)**: I think that it's one of those cases.

**Chris Romeo (9:48)**: Happened to Jobs, by the way.

**Izar Tarandach (9:49)**: Oh yeah, it did. We'll give you more about it later. But, uh, it's one of those cases where you're going to have companies looking at us and going, did I do that? But, uh, yeah, it's traumatic. But on the other hand, on the other hand, okay, so what I'm trying to get at is that Chris, you said that, oh, the QR code should take us to all kinds of certificates and certifications. That's what we've done before.

**Matt Coles (10:14)**: Awesome.

**Izar Tarandach (10:14)**: So they're trying to do something different here. My problem here is that all this different stuff that they're trying to do, all of it is spoofable.

**Chris Romeo (10:25)**: Well, and the challenge is they're putting the onus on the consumer, which we know the consumer is not going to go through 57 difficult steps of configuring the device. Secure by default means give me the device out of the box, bring it up in its default state. And then if I choose that I want to go configure it and loosen it in some way, that's my choice as the consumer. Now, personally, I don't think you should ever even give them that option, but that's just me.

**Izar Tarandach (10:52)**: And that's a great point because if you look again at what's coming in the documentation, how to change the default password, how about you can't configure this thing without changing the default password?

**Chris Romeo (11:01)**: That's how we solve default passwords.

**Izar Tarandach (11:04)**: How to configure the device? How to configure the device securely? How about not giving the option of it not being configured securely?

**Chris Romeo (11:11)**: Yeah. I mean, I was at Cisco in the days of Cisco 123. And when there was a mass development effort, I mean, this is going back a ways.

**Matt Coles (11:21)**: Hey, that is, that is 8 characters.

**Chris Romeo (11:23)**: And it's, I just want to say, I just want to say I wasn't Yeah, but there, but there was, but there was a mass development effort that went, that we went through to remove default passwords from the OS.

**Izar Tarandach (11:35)**: Yeah. And now it's Cisco123!! But you had to change it.

**Chris Romeo (11:39)**: You had to change it.

**Matt Coles (11:40)**: Capital C. Capital C. You had to change it though.

**Chris Romeo (11:42)**: We made it part of the bootup, the installation process where you had to then choose your password.

**Izar Tarandach (11:47)**: And it changes every 90 days.

**Chris Romeo (11:49)**: But we took out the, we took out the default password in it so you didn't, So if you chose to put in a bad password, that was your choice as a user, administrator of the device. It didn't come with it. So we took out the ability for you to have it. But what this Mark is talking about though is they're still going to have the default password, but you just have to tell people how to change it. Like that's ridiculous. Why would we even bother?

**Matt Coles (12:14)**: Think about the default. First off, think about the type of devices that we're talking about here, right? These are mass-produced, mass-market devices. Potentially, right, they're tens of dollars, hundreds, maybe hundreds of dollars, depending, right? Um, and, and some of them, it's probably, there are hard to use user interfaces, right? You may have a mobile app that is used to configure the system. And so it has to boot into a config, and it has to boot in such a way, you're not going to boot it right onto a network with a UI. Right? So let's think about, you know, if you think of like a, a smart speaker or, um, you know, a, a, I guess even a router to some extent, right? You plug that thing in, it has no UI. You have to connect to it somehow, right? So if it doesn't have a default password, if it doesn't, and I'm not careful here, I'm not arguing that this is a bad or good thing.

**Chris Romeo (13:09)**: You, I think you're arguing for default passwords is what I'm arguing.

**Matt Coles (13:11)**: No, I'm not. I, I'm just suggesting that there are some challenges with consumer devices.

**Chris Romeo (13:16)**: But you know how most people have taken care of it? Because I did it in multiple devices that I've installed in my house in the last couple of years. They use Bluetooth from the mobile app to temporarily set the thing up in a— so you can, we can argue the security nature slash architecture of that solution, but it's a proximity problem for an attacker. Like, the attacker's got to be within 500 feet of my house when I'm installing the device.

**Matt Coles (13:44)**: So I get some value or trigger a power failure so they can, you know, be driving by while, while your device is resetting. Yeah.

**Chris Romeo (13:51)**: Right, exactly. Even then, once it, but once it's set up, it goes into a mode where it'll just reboot, right? Like you couldn't even drive by and turn the power off and back onto my house and have the device. It doesn't go back into learning setup mode. Once it's set up that first time, it starts to, it goes into its normal, you can hard reset it by pushing a button on the side for 30 seconds.

**Matt Coles (14:09)**: Yeah.

**Chris Romeo (14:10)**: And then it would come back in that state.

**Matt Coles (14:12)**: There are ways to design these products, right? There are ways to design these products such that it makes it easy to do what we're talking about here. But these require, this requires effort by develop, by the designers. Um, and so I, so for a moment, actually, I want to, want to bring this back a little bit. Let's separate the Cyber Trust Mark, the, the label from the QR code. If the QR code is just an information delivery system, for here's information for the device and the Cyber Trust Mark is what actually customers should, consumers should be looking at to say, this went through some sort of validation process against a set of rules or a set of requirements, then, then it may be a little bit better. Devil's advocate here. Um, but, uh, but I 100% agree with Isar and both of you actually, that the rule should not have a default password. It should have a secure setup process.

**Chris Romeo (15:09)**: Right.

**Izar Tarandach (15:11)**: Exactly. And, and I think that the way that you put it, it becomes like the, the label that you have on, on cigarettes, right? Yeah. There's plenty of testing behind it. There's plenty of, uh, science behind it and people still keep smoking.

**Matt Coles (15:24)**: Well, even a, even a UL mark, let's, I mean, if you look at something like the, the Cyber Resiliency Act over in the EU, right? It's tied to their, to their, their regimen, right? And so when you see the mark, It's not UL, but I forget what the specific is.

**Chris Romeo (15:38)**: Yeah.

**Matt Coles (15:39)**: Um, but when you see that mark on the device, you know it's gone through some eval— some validation.

**Izar Tarandach (15:44)**: So that, that's what I wanted to talk about next. So we talked about the Cyber Trust Mark French, and now let's talk about the French Cyber Mark Trust, which is the Cyber Resilience Act, which is what they, they're doing in Europe right now.

**Matt Coles (15:58)**: Right.

**Izar Tarandach (15:59)**: And I, I think that Matt, you, you, you touch exactly on it. They are doing like mandating actual secure by design.

**Matt Coles (16:07)**: Oh yeah.

**Izar Tarandach (16:08)**: Actual things that people should do before their products go out.

**Matt Coles (16:12)**: With financial penalties to the organization if you don't. Exactly.

**Chris Romeo (16:15)**: We, well, we all know how good the government is at innovation.

**Izar Tarandach (16:18)**: Well, it depends on which, no, but this is not an innovation thing. This is things that we know.

**Chris Romeo (16:23)**: It's a squasher of innovation.

**Izar Tarandach (16:25)**: No, no, it's not.

**Matt Coles (16:26)**: No, it's not.

**Izar Tarandach (16:26)**: No, no, no. I'm going to disagree with you here. These are the things that we have been telling people for how many years? And now the government is saying, hey, you know what?

**Chris Romeo (16:34)**: Those guys are right. But when you— so introducing regulation, you're never gonna convince me that regulation creates innovation. It just doesn't.

**Izar Tarandach (16:44)**: That's the thing.

**Chris Romeo (16:44)**: Governments of the world do not create innovation. And if you have files—

**Izar Tarandach (16:51)**: but we are not talking about innovation here.

**Matt Coles (16:54)**: We are talking about their minimum best practices.

**Izar Tarandach (16:56)**: We, we are both— no, we are talking the, the innovation happens in the kernel of the thing. And to the Chompy bits that give you the service. But we have been for a long time saying, people, there's a number of basic security hygiene things that we need to do, we need you to do, no matter what you're developing. If it's the most innovative thing in the world, if it's the oldest thing in the world, we still need these security things to happen. So now the government is coming and saying, you know what, those guys are right, these things should happen. No matter what you're developing. So this doesn't hit innovation in any way, shape, or form.

**Chris Romeo (17:34)**: And it's never going to convince me that regulation is an enabler of growth, of product development, of anything.

**Matt Coles (17:43)**: What you're suggesting, Chris, though, is that if there is regulation, if there's no— so if, if we can't get— if companies don't do security on their own, meaning as part of innovation, they don't build these capabilities in, and the only way to solve that is to create regulation, then, and that will stop innovation. There's a, there's a very big contradiction there. You can never have security is what you're suggesting.

**Chris Romeo (18:10)**: So let's, let's see, let's look at a case study here. Let's look at an example.

**Izar Tarandach (18:14)**: Okay.

**Chris Romeo (18:14)**: Where do most tech products begin their lives?

**Izar Tarandach (18:20)**: Taiwan.

**Matt Coles (18:20)**: China.

**Chris Romeo (18:22)**: From a company perspective, not from a manufacturing perspective, from a company perspective.

**Izar Tarandach (18:27)**: Oh, you said that right.

**Chris Romeo (18:29)**: They start, so startup companies are what is the innovation engine of the technology world. You can say big companies are innovation creators, but they're, they're acquirers of innovation. Sure. Most big companies don't, don't, I mean, you can give me a, you can give me a couple of examples of—

**Matt Coles (18:46)**: Well, how, how big a company?

**Chris Romeo (18:47)**: Innovation.

**Matt Coles (18:47)**: What? When you say small companies, I mean, a couple hundred employees, a couple billion dollars.

**Chris Romeo (18:53)**: I mean, start most, if you pick any popular consumer product that's in the market today and they started as a 1 to 5 person startup company.

**Matt Coles (19:05)**: Sure.

**Chris Romeo (19:05)**: But 10 plus years ago, Apple.

**Matt Coles (19:07)**: Okay. If you take Apple as an example, right?

**Chris Romeo (19:10)**: I mean, Apple did start with Wozniak and Jobs in the garage, right? Like that, the other guy who sold his shares for $100.

**Matt Coles (19:17)**: What you're suggesting is every, every company is never, there's no company that is born into the, you know, massive giant size company.

**Chris Romeo (19:27)**: And regulation is when you're a 5-person company trying to build something and someone tells you, here's this regulatory act that you have to comply with and the penalties are billions of dollars, which it probably wouldn't be for startups, but it's—

**Matt Coles (19:41)**: CRA specifically is some percentage of your revenue.

**Chris Romeo (19:44)**: Percentage of revenue, right? But if, so the age-old problem that we've battled in product companies, all three of us have battled this, has been product feature innovation versus security hygiene. And there's always, in the early days of a startup, as much as it pains me to say, there's always gotta be a balance. Because if you come in and say, we are building, we are a security-first company and how we're building this new product, you will more than likely not get to market in a timely fashion to the point where you will more than likely not survive and not— so there has to be a balance. And so my whole challenge with regulation is you're putting potentially a draconian set of rules, depends on how you interpret the rules, on the innovation engine of our world. Now, if you told me that Cyber Resilience Act was a scalable thing that allowed me to build things and grow my maturity as I find product market fit inside of something that I'm building, meaning grow my security. Like I don't have to have all my, everything figured out. Like there's a level 1, level 2, and level 3. And level 1, if you're under $1 million in revenue, you gotta be a level 1, but it doesn't require your own embedded PKI inside of your solution because that's, could be a bad example.

**Matt Coles (21:11)**: I mean, I'm trying to think of one example of what I could do.

**Izar Tarandach (21:13)**: Chris, Chris, you know what? I, I, even if you are right, and I believe that you are right, I'm going to say that I don't care. Because, no, no, simply, it's very simple. Perhaps it is time. For us collectively to take a breather and say, we've been running a lot towards this market thing and see where we go. Information has almost no value now because people just go and say, another bridge, whatever. Right? So, yeah, perhaps it's time to take stock and say, are we doing the right thing here?

**Chris Romeo (21:52)**: And my dream was always that the market would weed out the bottom feeders. But unfortunately, I mean, to some degree it has, right?

**Matt Coles (22:03)**: At the enterprise level, yes.

**Chris Romeo (22:04)**: But not at the consumer level. But even like, think about like doorbells, like smart doorbells that I can buy now. There's one company that owns a big chunk of that market right now, and they're actually part of Amazon now. They were acquired by Amazon, Ring. And you can look at their architecture and you can, and they have a very solid approach to security. They're, you don't see them in the breach of the day type of news of things like, you know, but that's because it's their core business.

**Izar Tarandach (22:32)**: Nobody's going to buy a lock to their houses that doesn't offer that kind of, of security, even if they are not able to understand it.

**Chris Romeo (22:40)**: So then we don't need a Cybermark if, if the consumers are that educated about smart door locks.

**Izar Tarandach (22:46)**: No, no, no, no. But that's the point. That's the point. That, that's the expectation. If I'm going to Best Buy now and I'm buying, uh, I don't know, a sprinkler controller. Okay, dude, what, what, what you're going to do? You're going to put more water in my plants or less water in my plants? Yeah, I don't care about security. I don't care about this. I don't care about the other one.

**Chris Romeo (23:10)**: Right. I think that's the general state of the general consumer doesn't see we, we have an unfair advantage, right? And that we, we threat model for a living. And so, but when you, we see the threats in our, you and I, all of us would be like, somebody could DDoS this water controller and flood my whole backyard.

**Izar Tarandach (23:30)**: No, but wait, wait, that, that, that's the thing. That's the thing. That's the thing. It's not that we see the threats, we see the impacts.

**Matt Coles (23:38)**: Well, that's, it's a natural thing. You know what the threats are, you know what the impacts are, right?

**Chris Romeo (23:42)**: No, no, no, no, no, no.

**Izar Tarandach (23:42)**: It's a different thing. Because the consumer out there could be more educated about the possible impacts, even if they don't know what the threats are. The threats are a completely technical thing, but a consumer understanding what a piece of hardware that they bring inside their hall and their homes could possibly do to, to their security and their privacy. That's a different kind of education. And that's something that we have never done before.

**Chris Romeo (24:06)**: But my whole point is I want that smart sprinkler. To just be secure by default out of the box.

**Matt Coles (24:12)**: But you, but you want that to be, you want the organization, you want the companies that create that to be self-policing, which is the way it's been for—

**Chris Romeo (24:20)**: I want the market to police it ultimately. Well, that's the free market economy though.

**Izar Tarandach (24:25)**: But no, but, but that's, but, but again, that, that goes to the consumer because they move the market. If the consumer is not educated into what could possibly go wrong, right? Or, or how bad it is when something goes wrong, then they are not going to influence the market and that's not going to force companies to sell.

**Chris Romeo (24:43)**: But now, but now you want the government to put their hand into it and, and, and what level, what, what levers do you have?

**Matt Coles (24:51)**: I mean, so, you know, and, and again, right or wrong here, right? I'm actually, again, I'm not, I don't 100% agree. There, there is a, I think there is a place for regulation, but as long as it's not a stifler of innovation, but it's a supporter of innovation. And I think that they, they can go hand in hand personally. There is, there is a good, I think there is some precedence for that, but think about the Ring case that you just talked about, right? So a single startup that was Ring before Amazon bought it. If consumers, if, if some savvy consumers decided that, oh, this thing is detrimental to my my physical and, and, you know, and data health, whatever, you know, I had leaked privacy and, and allowed, you know, attackers to, you know, walk into my door without, without getting stopped by the doorbell ring or the camera. Not that that's happened or anything. That, you know, as a consumer, you'd have some leverage, right? People say, well, you know, you're, you're a 2 to 10 person startup and this product is just getting You know, gain market share. I'm going to go buy company X and not yours, right? And you have influence. As consolidation occurs and now Amazon, Amazon can take a loss on these things and consumers have less capability to influence the market. So what drivers do you have? What levers are there to influence companies to do the right thing from a security standpoint?

**Chris Romeo (26:20)**: I mean, if the, if. If the consumers in the market drove the bus here and actually said, and actually bought products, didn't buy crappy products, then the product, it would fix itself even for a company as big as Amazon. Because believe me, Amazon owns Ring and Ring has growth targets for this year that are tied to people buying more stuff. Installing more stuff in their house. That's how business fundamentally works.

**Matt Coles (26:52)**: That's how capitalism and this particular market works, right? Mm-hmm. Again, right or wrong, I'm not going to judge them going here, right? If they didn't have quarterly targets, would it matter?

**Chris Romeo (27:06)**: Right?

**Matt Coles (27:07)**: So, uh, if you were just pushing a product and you could take a loss, you could take a beating on it, right? And you didn't care because you had something else propping up your business, right? And Amazon already has AWS that probably brings in more money than—

**Chris Romeo (27:20)**: but they don't want to, I mean, they don't, business doesn't exist to lose money. So they're not going to take a, they're not going to let their, they're not going to drop their security guard down and build something that's, they also have a reputation attached to their, people buy, buy, use AWS because they trust the security controls and properties that they think they get. With AWS, right?

**Matt Coles (27:44)**: So, so that's a particular, that's a particular set of consumers that do that, right? So the consumer who's buying the $10 device out of, from Best Buy or from Costco or whatever, isn't the one with leverage unless you're talking about the entire potential customer base.

**Izar Tarandach (28:02)**: You, you are not going to get to a situation where you're going to open Amazon on a certain product and on the reviews you're going to say one star. They don't initialize their IV on their keys.

**Chris Romeo (28:13)**: That's what we're saying. We might. I wish we did, but I wish we would get there.

**Izar Tarandach (28:18)**: But that's not the—

**Chris Romeo (28:18)**: coming back to the general consumer though, right? That's the general consumer. They, the general consumer just wants something that works.

**Izar Tarandach (28:25)**: Matt is thinking about the reveal that he wants to say.

**Chris Romeo (28:29)**: Nobody will understand it. AI will just blot it out.

**Matt Coles (28:33)**: No, and you know, you know, I'll get a call from their, their incident response team or their, or their vulnerability response team. Like you could have reached out to us on Twitter.

**Chris Romeo (28:44)**: Security at said company.

**Matt Coles (28:48)**: We were not going to solve that.

**Chris Romeo (28:51)**: We're at an impasse. We're not going to, we're going to have to agree to disagree, which.

**Izar Tarandach (28:55)**: No, no, no, no. I don't think that we are so far. I mean, do you agree that the FDA is saying don't use yellow 360 because it causes cancer on food? It's a good thing?

**Chris Romeo (29:09)**: I don't even know what that is. So pick another.

**Matt Coles (29:11)**: Red number 5, right?

**Izar Tarandach (29:13)**: Yeah.

**Matt Coles (29:14)**: Some dye that has proven to cause cancer in humans. If the FDA says don't use that, either, either, either don't use it or you really shouldn't use it.

**Chris Romeo (29:24)**: But we're, we're crossing into another.

**Matt Coles (29:26)**: It's regulation.

**Chris Romeo (29:28)**: It's regulation. It's, it's medical in nature.

**Matt Coles (29:32)**: Oh, hold on.

**Chris Romeo (29:33)**: Hold on.

**Izar Tarandach (29:34)**: Oh, hold on. Somebody pinch Adam. Somebody pinch Adam.

**Chris Romeo (29:36)**: Hold on.

**Izar Tarandach (29:36)**: Timeout. So.

**Matt Coles (29:38)**: Do we remember the, do we, do we remember the concept of guardrails?

**Izar Tarandach (29:43)**: Yeah, I fell off of them.

**Matt Coles (29:44)**: Guardrails and paved roads, right? And regulation could either be a guardrail or a bump or a, either a guardrail or it could be one of those Jersey barrier things that force you into a lane, right? Mm-hmm. So we want the guardrails. We want the limits so that people don't, you know, they don't inadvertently go ahead and put something in a product that causes mass, you know, mass death and destruction or privacy loss and data loss. But we don't want to stifle the innovation. We want to allow them to allow companies to bounce off of those guardrails without getting seriously, you know, run off a cliff. You don't want the Jersey Barrier type regulation. It's what you're, what you said, which is what Most regulation is, which, right? So there's a balancing act, right? We want the guardrail regulation. We don't want the Jersey barrier regulation.

**Chris Romeo (30:37)**: So now we want the government to balance something.

**Matt Coles (30:41)**: No, we want flexibility. What we want is regulation to be, to be those guardrails.

**Chris Romeo (30:46)**: Oh, we know, we know the government is all about flexibility. I always send them an email on April 14th and say, hey, I'm going to send you my taxes next year. And they never respond.

**Matt Coles (30:55)**: You know, you take it to a, you take it to the street.

**Izar Tarandach (30:57)**: That's because you didn't send it last year.

**Chris Romeo (31:00)**: I should have sent it 100 years ago.

**Matt Coles (31:03)**: I know we're gonna get a ton of hate mail on this, on this episode, but, um, oh, I know that we're going to have at least one person in a treadmill out there screaming at Craig Saldaña.

**Chris Romeo (31:14)**: Okay, so let's bring this back around. We, that was a fun discussion of regulation. That's really not the issue. Ultimately, cyber, we kind of got a little bit off from, yeah, we went off the rails, our trajectory. The challenge I see with the Cybermark right now is in the re— just in looking at the requirements. And so I, I, I got down to page 50 of their release document where I think I found the requirements. And what they're saying is they're using NIST IoT product capability criteria, which is fine. NIST writes lots of good stuff. But the challenge I have with this is, I'll give you data protection. Here's what it says. The IoT product protects data store across all IoT product components and transmitted both between IoT product components and outside the product from unauthorized access, disclosure, modification. And then there's a paragraph on cybersecurity utility. The challenge here is we're not talking anything about, there's no, it's like, I, I, I could, I could protect it, I guess, by Caesar Cipher or DES or like, there's no, there's no standard here that says I would expect a set of product criteria to have a minimum encryption expectation. Like if you're not using AES, I think we can agree, if you're not using AES at this point, you're, you're, you don't care about security because there's really nothing else from a, what else would you use from a crypto perspective other than AES? So why not just say, hey, a minimum barrier to a Cybermark product that protects data is the use of the AES encryption algorithm.

**Izar Tarandach (32:48)**: The proper use of the AES.

**Matt Coles (32:50)**: Proper use, right. So, so now you're, now you're suggesting, now you're suggesting more than just the guardrail, right? So now you're setting a minimum limit, like how tight, how tight are the guardrails, right? So use strong encryption versus use this encryption.

**Chris Romeo (33:08)**: I spent a lot of time in my career working in the world of certification. And so I learned a lot about dancing because you can, 'cause I can dance around a requirement and make, I, I can, I can comply with a lot of requirements if you give me room to dance just by the way that I describe what I'm doing and things like that. There's, and that, that's always been one of the challenges in the world of certification is it's not. Ones and zeros. It's this gray area of, let me make an argument for why I actually comply with this. And so in this case, I think you need something. Who in the world of security is going to argue, who's going to say, no, we shouldn't use AES, we should use something else.

**Matt Coles (33:54)**: You're touching upon something else, and it's the important part of what the Cyber Trust Mark is. Trust. What's the value of the label? If you don't have that minimum. So in other words, if the goal, if the goal is consumers need something they can trust, they look at the label, go, huh, I think I can trust this. Well, why are you trusting it? If the label doesn't include using strong encryption, meaning AES-256 or better, then there's no trust, right? It's just a mark.

**Chris Romeo (34:25)**: There's no value in the label either.

**Izar Tarandach (34:27)**: Wait, wait, there's one thing that we haven't touched on. And it's important. Apparently the, the mark always also comes with a check by a trusted lab. Now we can question the validity of that thing and if they're going to positively trust, uh, check, negatively check, whatever, but they are trying to give a very, very specific mark, specific value of trust to carrying that mark.

**Matt Coles (34:56)**: But that's only if the rules, that's only if the requirements that are the things that they're validating against are meaningful and add value to that trust.

**Izar Tarandach (35:05)**: But we agreed that they are using NIST and NIST usually puts out good stuff.

**Matt Coles (35:08)**: Yeah, but NIST has PQC and stuff. I don't think the lab is going to be looking at post-quantum cryptography algorithms.

**Izar Tarandach (35:14)**: My problem, my problem is different. We, we, we do know the variation in quality and time that it takes to have a good pen test done. So this lab is probably going to be backlogged until wherever, right? And that's going to stifle, to stifle innovation, Chris.

**Chris Romeo (35:32)**: Yeah.

**Izar Tarandach (35:32)**: That's not always one of the thing itself.

**Chris Romeo (35:34)**: So if we look historically, like I said, I worked in certifications, both Common Criteria and FIPS 140 for a number of years. The lab bottleneck could never keep up with the rate of innovation that we were doing. So what did we do? We certified particular versions of software just to get on lists that people use to decide what they could buy. Now, granted, this was at the government level, so we're not, it's, it's a different world that consumer, but consumers aren't gonna be like, oh, well, I can't buy this if it's not on the list. That's the world that we lived in there. But the, there is value in the independent laboratory performing this assessment. The, the challenge is they have to automate it in some way.

**Matt Coles (36:16)**: It has to be like, uh, well, a lot of this is on, a lot of this is automatable.

**Chris Romeo (36:20)**: I mean, you could write scripts to check for, no, I'll give you a really, you know, a really geeky example of something that's really cool in FIPS 140. Okay. Probably, it's probably never been recorded on a podcast before, like something cool in FIPS 140. This is really on the, on the deep end of nerdiness, but FIPS 140 has these, I don't know if they do now, they used to, these algorithm tests. And so you basically exposed a testing harness in a test build of, of the operating system for whatever you were having, uh, whatever was the unit under test. And NIST had this, this harness, which would then send various combinations of key and ciphertext, and then you had to return the cleartext. And you, they had all these different derivatives and all these different different collections of data that they would send in and this automated tens of thousands of examples of various fuzzing. Yes. But, but it was, I mean, not, not so much fuzzing because it was known.

**Matt Coles (37:25)**: Oh, it was a, sorry. It was a good validation suite. It was a certification suite.

**Chris Romeo (37:29)**: Good values for everything. They didn't give you any junk in it. They gave, they always gave you a good key and ciphertext and said, tell us what the cleartext is or different derivatives of that.

**Matt Coles (37:38)**: Because it, because it has an, for any given input, it has an expected output.

**Chris Romeo (37:41)**: Yeah. But, but what I can say as a, as a 28-year security professional, I trust the algorithms that have been FIPS 140, that have been through that FIPS 140 test suite, right? Because you can't fake it. There's no way to fake it. It's crypto, right? Like there's tens of thousands of tests that are being run. You could maybe fake some of them, but you couldn't fake all of them to the point. So if something has that mark, PIPS 140, I trust those algorithms coming out of it because I know the rigor that went into it. Well, so here's the question.

**Izar Tarandach (38:14)**: Yeah.

**Matt Coles (38:14)**: So sorry, just to shortcut that a bit. If let's assume for a moment that all the tests that the lab could do could be automated and based on the information that they're providing, it almost certainly could. 99% probably at least. If instead of having a lab do the testing for these types of devices, these are $10, you know, if these are $10, $20, $30, $100 devices, if you had a certification suite that was posted on, you know, on GitHub, for instance, as an open source. So it was, it was open as to what the test validation process was and scripts to run it. And companies could self-certify. Would it hold the same value as going through a third party?

**Chris Romeo (39:02)**: I would say historically, 'cause there's been self-certification and that's, that's been an issue. It's been a topic of debate in this world for the longest people have been certifying things. And there are self-certifying programs even within the US government for certain types of like communication devices and whatnot. Right. You can run your own test suites and the, and the lab does, plays a lesser role in the independent.

**Matt Coles (39:29)**: But I think, I think you still, there's still the answer of, can you be trustworthy and non-independent or, well, so alternatively, the, if the, if the test suite is open and companies can run, so, you know, take a dozen product manufacturers from, you know, some, some country somewhere. That want to sell on Amazon and they go through the test suite and they generate data of their validation, could they submit to get the mark? And, you know, I'll just go with, hey, by the way, AI can probably take care of this.

**Chris Romeo (40:07)**: Yeah, I was thinking the same thing.

**Matt Coles (40:08)**: So, so, you know, maybe that's a way to, to eliminate the bottleneck of the rate of the guardrail regulation, right? Where the where the regulation can put guardrails so you don't fall off a cliff. Consumers can get some trust out of it. Put a pro— a validation process in place. You don't bottleneck it with a requirement through a, through an independent testing lab. And then make it an innovation-driving regulation, which still gives a, a, a floor to security, which is what we really want out of it.

**Chris Romeo (40:40)**: The one, the, the one challenge here is How do you trust the results?

**Matt Coles (40:46)**: That's why you don't— if it's open, if it's open, if it's an open concept of what the validation is and the data can be generated and submitted for the person or the organization that issues the mark, they could run through a validation of that data. And there are ways to, there are ways to secure that process.

**Chris Romeo (41:05)**: But you can cook that data though. That's the challenge, right? That's why the independent, that's why we, that's why we have independent third-party testing laboratories. Is because they're licensed by the, whatever entity is they're performing the testing for. And if they don't comply with a set of standards, they get their sort of, their valid, their license gets pulled and they can no longer do business in this space that they've built.

**Matt Coles (41:30)**: Right?

**Izar Tarandach (41:30)**: Absolutely.

**Chris Romeo (41:30)**: So they, so they have a, a vested interest in never cooking anything.

**Matt Coles (41:35)**: Right.

**Chris Romeo (41:36)**: If anything, they're more strict than they need to be is, is, is the challenge, right?

**Izar Tarandach (41:40)**: Right.

**Chris Romeo (41:40)**: Because their fear is that they're gonna lose their license.

**Izar Tarandach (41:43)**: I'm getting so depressed here.

**Chris Romeo (41:45)**: You know, that's what we do.

**Izar Tarandach (41:46)**: No, the, the, the more you guys talk, the more I notice that this whole thing stands on, on, on a, on a, what's it called? A castle of cards. I mean, we are just assuming, yeah, we, we are just assuming trust left and right and up and down and hoping that people are doing the best thing that they can do because they have to keep their livelihoods and whatnot. While at the same time we have the data showing variation of all this, this tests and, and we know how they are limited by budget, limited by time.

**Chris Romeo (42:20)**: And you want me to depress you even more? We need to depress you even more.

**Matt Coles (42:23)**: Yeah, go ahead, Chris.

**Chris Romeo (42:26)**: So there's a whole bottom 10% of any product market where companies just go and, there are, there are places where you can contract with to build you a piece of technology. You just tell them, I want a box, I want it to do this, and I want the cheapest possible COGS or cost of goods sold associated with it.

**Izar Tarandach (42:49)**: Yeah. Well, that's military logistics, right? You pay the most for the least.

**Chris Romeo (42:54)**: Go to, go to Amazon and search for, um, HD camera.

**Matt Coles (42:58)**: Anything, anything really.

**Chris Romeo (43:00)**: And you will find one for under $10.

**Matt Coles (43:02)**: Yes.

**Chris Romeo (43:02)**: And that one that's under $10, I guarantee you was, went through that channel I just described where a company said there is a, people wanna buy these things and they wanna spend the least amount possible so I can build something that's the biggest piece of garbage that barely does what the thing that they want it to do with the cheapest components and the least amount of software functionality in it. And I can sell a billion of 'em. On Amazon.

**Izar Tarandach (43:25)**: Look, I did the other day, I had to reconfigure my, I have one of those Wi-Fi Bluetooth enabled power things.

**Matt Coles (43:39)**: Things. Yeah, those things. Yeah.

**Izar Tarandach (43:41)**: You know, the outlets, the outlet thing.

**Matt Coles (43:44)**: Oh, a power strip. Yeah.

**Izar Tarandach (43:47)**: And I use it to not have to get up to my 3D printer to actually press the button and turn it on. So I had to reconfigure it because all of a sudden the system stopped. No, wait, it gets, it gets worse. It gets worse. So I had to try and reconfigure it because my Google Assistant stopped talking to it and wouldn't turn it on when I tell it to turn it on. So that led me to figuring out that the app that was used to configure the thing in the first place. doesn't work anymore. That doesn't support it anymore. Even though there is a QR code on the back of the thing that takes you to Google Market to install the app. Right.

**Chris Romeo (44:28)**: Okay.

**Matt Coles (44:28)**: Of course. What, what could go wrong there?

**Izar Tarandach (44:30)**: What could go wrong? And while I was checking the open source, uh, uh, uh, uh, options to set the, the, the whole thing again, I got to thinking. About the amount of things that I have here in this office that are connected to Wi-Fi. And what if by nature of just configuring them, I am actually sending my Wi-Fi password to a big database in the sky somewhere the east of here. And while of course the first thing that comes to mind is I'm not that important, I'm not that interesting, and nobody wants my particular Wi-Fi password. To do stuff. Once you start having access to those things in volume, then things get very complicated and different at the same time.

**Chris Romeo (45:19)**: You are the product. Yeah, but that's the, I mean, that is the ultimate challenge in dealing with personal privacy is that people are just like, eh, my stuff's, I'm not that important or whatever. Okay, then why don't you put a drop of blood on a slide, put that in an envelope and send that to that company. But wait, even before— so they have your, your full DNA.

**Izar Tarandach (45:43)**: Even before we get there, now we, we are jumping into a scheme that, as we said, it's going to put people in Best Buy looking at QR codes and scanning them. And we haven't even touched the, the threat where somebody just prints a number of those labels and goes to Best Buy and just smacks their own QR code on top of the QR code.

**Matt Coles (46:04)**: That can never, that can never happen.

**Izar Tarandach (46:06)**: Right? And, uh, like, I mean, this whole thing is so harebrained at the end of the day.

**Chris Romeo (46:14)**: I think we gotta leave it for now.

**Matt Coles (46:16)**: Yeah. Let's, uh, let's, we touched upon a part, a lot of deep topics. Yeah.

**Chris Romeo (46:20)**: Let's, uh, let's let this ruminate for a while. Maybe we'll come, maybe we'll, we'll, we'll pay attention to what happens with this over the next number of months and maybe we can circle back and do an updated conversation a little bit later. But I think for today, I think we have. Uncovered enough rocks, thrown enough stones, yelled at each other enough for one more episode.

**Izar Tarandach (46:41)**: And getting very, very, very sad about the state of things.

**Matt Coles (46:44)**: Yeah.

**Chris Romeo (46:44)**: Sorry, that wasn't our intent, but that's just security. What can I tell you? That's where we live and work.

**Izar Tarandach (46:50)**: All right.

**Chris Romeo (46:50)**: Thanks folks for tuning in to another episode of The Security Table, whether you're in Dublin, Ireland or Australia or standing on a treadmill. We hope you have a great day. Haha.
