# The Debate: Is the CIA Triad Truly Dead?

URL: https://securitytable.ai/the-debate-is-the-cia-triad-truly-dead/
Published: 2025-10-22
Duration: 1785 seconds
Season: 3
Episode: 18
Hosts: Chris Romeo, Izar Tarandach, Matt Coles

## Show notes and chapters

We’re debating an online article claiming that the CIA Triad (Confidentiality, Integrity, Availability) is a relic and needs to be updated for 21st-century threats. The discussion includes whether new properties like authenticity, accountability, and resilience should be incorporated into modern security models. And we delve into the use of analogies, system properties versus values, and the role of ethical considerations in cybersecurity. Listen along to our discussion on whether the foundational elements of security need a refresh.

[The CIA Triad is Dead](https://www.csoonline.com/article/4070548/the-cia-triad-is-dead-stop-using-a-cold-war-relic-to-fight-21st-century-threats.html) 

  

  
  

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## Transcript

**Matt Coles (0:11)**: Off a cliff, you mean?

**Chris Romeo (0:14)**: Hey folks, welcome to the Security Table. And that was an odd place to start the conversation. When Matt said off a cliff, no, no, it was in reference to what we're going to discuss. So joined by Matt Kohls, he's our Taryn Das, I'm Chris Romeo. We are looking at an article today called The CIA Triad Is Dead: Stop Using a Cold War Relic to Fight 21st Century Threats.

**Matt Coles (0:41)**: And of course we don't mean the 3-letter agency, we mean the 3-letter.

**Izar Tarandach (0:45)**: Yeah, we're like, okay.

**Chris Romeo (0:47)**: Yes. Question. What you would refer to as question 1 on the CISSP test. What is the CIA Triad?

**Izar Tarandach (0:54)**: What is the CIA Triad?

**Chris Romeo (0:56)**: But they've changed it now to, why does the CIA Triad exist? Confusion.

**Izar Tarandach (1:02)**: Very philosophical.

**Matt Coles (1:05)**: Indecision.

**Izar Tarandach (1:07)**: Awesomeness.

**Matt Coles (1:08)**: No, that's not it. Parole.

**Chris Romeo (1:12)**: Parole.

**Matt Coles (1:12)**: Snip. Parsley. Bird.

**Chris Romeo (1:17)**: All right, so. Where do we go from here?

**Izar Tarandach (1:20)**: What is the central proposition of this article?

**Matt Coles (1:26)**: Uh, that a, that a fundamental property, the fundamental properties of security no longer exist or are outdated.

**Chris Romeo (1:33)**: Outdated for modern cybersecurity, which—

**Izar Tarandach (1:36)**: But first I have to go meta here for a second and understand one thing. When will people understand that they cannot say blah, blah, blah is dead and then write something saying, let's extend blah, blah, blah. Because if dead, you don't extend it. It's dead. You do something new.

**Matt Coles (1:56)**: You have to think of the analogy. The tree in the forest dies, lays on the forest floor, and then from it springs new roots.

**Izar Tarandach (2:07)**: We have to have a conversation about how you do an analogy.

**Chris Romeo (2:09)**: I'm a tree farmer, not how trees work.

**Izar Tarandach (2:11)**: Remind me. Remind me. Analogies don't work like that.

**Matt Coles (2:17)**: Okay. The animal, the animal dies in the forest, lays there for a while.

**Chris Romeo (2:21)**: Another animal, another animal comes out, explodes out of it. Is that what you're saying?

**Izar Tarandach (2:27)**: Well, wait, isn't that how it works? All right.

**Chris Romeo (2:31)**: So anyway, welcome to the birds and bees lessons of the Security Table.

**Izar Tarandach (2:37)**: Hey, Cyberdykes.

**Chris Romeo (2:39)**: No offense, but anyway, I just don't understand.

**Izar Tarandach (2:42)**: I don't understand.

**Matt Coles (2:44)**: The AI agent dies in the container and from it springs— springs the human.

**Izar Tarandach (2:51)**: An AI agent dies in the forest. Does anybody hear a sound?

**Chris Romeo (2:55)**: Does anyone hear it scream?

**Izar Tarandach (2:56)**: Yeah. In space, nobody can hear a scream. Anyway, so let's go back to the CIA is not that dead. Mori Bond.

**Matt Coles (3:05)**: All right. Does everyone understand what the CIA triad is?

**Izar Tarandach (3:10)**: Confidentiality, integrity, availability.

**Matt Coles (3:12)**: Yeah. Core fundamental properties, right? Yeah. Everything's built on it.

**Izar Tarandach (3:16)**: Ever been. And it's one of those things like Stride. You can always like force things down to that acronym.

**Matt Coles (3:25)**: Uh, let's not use that analogy because I think that there are some things you can't, but that's okay.

**Izar Tarandach (3:31)**: Always for deferring values of always.

**Chris Romeo (3:34)**: Matt, did you write this article? Are you saying that the things that don't line up with it are AI, cloud, ransomware, deepfakes, and supply chain attacks?

**Matt Coles (3:42)**: No, that's not what I'm saying.

**Chris Romeo (3:44)**: I thought you might have been the author of the article and just didn't realize it.

**Izar Tarandach (3:47)**: No.

**Matt Coles (3:47)**: Yeah. No. No. Uh, I was just disagreeing with his article that, well, let's see, privacy. Doesn't fit straight?

**Izar Tarandach (3:59)**: No, no, I said always for changing values of 'always.' Always— it's "always" with an asterisk!

**Matt Coles (4:06)**: Yeah, like yesterday it's fine but today not so much...

**Izar Tarandach (4:10)**: Right?! But—but-but-but-but…but—the thing here: The article here is saying that really there isn't that—it's just let's extend this. So we have to do something about it.

**Chris Romeo (4:22)**: Somehow. It needs to be refactored.

**Izar Tarandach (4:24)**: Yeah. Is their argument. It needs to be refactored with authenticity, accountability, and resilience. That's part of the core. That's core. I'm just going to throw this one out there. Close your eyes and see the typical security team operating in the wild. Now, on top of what they do every day, day in, day out, And accountability and resilience. Notice that I left authenticity off. Accountability and resilience. But my only question is, seriously?

**Matt Coles (5:03)**: We need to take a step back. There's security principles and there's business principles.

**Izar Tarandach (5:10)**: And there's things that you have to get done on a day of work. So, yeah.

**Chris Romeo (5:15)**: So, What is accountability in this context? Like, hold on. Accountability is like, Matt, did you finish your TPS reports?

**Matt Coles (5:24)**: I think I'm going to have to have you come in on a Saturday. Yeah.

**Chris Romeo (5:28)**: Like, how do you, how does a technical feature or a system have accountability?

**Izar Tarandach (5:38)**: Clearly, clearly you can use tickets that book people back.

**Matt Coles (5:41)**: And why is it a security, why is it a security problem?

**Chris Romeo (5:45)**: Okay, so I mean, I get resilience. I get resilience. That's been a big topic. That's been a big topic for the last couple of years. Yeah, but that's a security general.

**Matt Coles (5:54)**: But that's a quality of a system.

**Chris Romeo (5:57)**: Oh, it's very challenging to reach, to say that you have resilience system.

**Matt Coles (6:02)**: It's a goal, it's an objective. It is not a fundamental security property.

**Izar Tarandach (6:07)**: Wait, resilience of what?

**Matt Coles (6:11)**: When you have a system that is resilient, it is capable of sustaining attack and continuing to operate. Right. Yes. Which means it's capable of having its CI and A compromised and still be able to operate. Yeah.

**Izar Tarandach (6:28)**: But when you say, when a system has the property of resilience, What is that system exactly? Are we talking, uh, product security? Are we talking, uh, operational security?

**Matt Coles (6:44)**: Are we talking— well, it doesn't really matter. It doesn't really matter, does it? I mean, if you have a, if you have a, let's take ransomware. So they use ransomware in the article. So if we have a system, for instance, that is doing data storage, a resilient system would be able to survive an attack against its availability of data. So if you have a single database on a single file system, that file system gets attacked by ransomware, the system falls over. You've lost your data. It's unavailable. A resilient system would have a ready, ready hot, a hot backup available to switch over to that isn't affected by the ransomware to continue serving services, even though it's been compromised, originally been compromised by ransomware.

**Izar Tarandach (7:26)**: What a bit cheeky. Just say that in our 3 people experience among the years, this resilience thing has always been something that surfaced in threat models and we never gave it a label because it was there, you know, hey, you got a single point of failure, you shouldn't have a single point of failure. Let's do something about the single point of failure.

**Matt Coles (7:47)**: Yeah, I mean, when what can go wrong, if you look at that and go, well, what happens if your data gets hit by ransomware? Is a reasonable question to ask, right? And then a threat of, I have a single point of failure because I only have one database and no backups. Yeah, sure. That comes out in threat modeling.

**Izar Tarandach (8:06)**: But we've been covering that with availability. We have been doing resilience and we've been calling it availability. So why do I need a new name?

**Matt Coles (8:14)**: No, no, we've been calling— So it's resilience. We've been calling availability the problem we want to avoid. We want to avoid a lack of availability. By building resilience.

**Chris Romeo (8:24)**: So they're complementary to each other.

**Matt Coles (8:26)**: They're complementary, but that one's of, one's of them's about the principle.

**Izar Tarandach (8:29)**: That's not what a complement, that's not how a complement works. Uh, if you, if you're trying to solve the lack of availability with resiliency, it means that availability, having availability is having resilience because you just added the lack of.

**Matt Coles (8:44)**: So you inverted that. Maintaining availability is resilience. But availability is still the fundamental property that you want to preserve. Right.

**Chris Romeo (8:52)**: So we're back to the original being better than the copy.

**Izar Tarandach (8:54)**: So why, why, why does the article need a new name for it?

**Chris Romeo (8:58)**: Well, cause that's how you get people to read your article.

**Izar Tarandach (9:00)**: Oh, that's why. Sorry. Now I got it. That was like— Now I got it.

**Chris Romeo (9:06)**: I got, I drank some truth serum this morning. No, no, no, no, no. Apparently it just kicked in. I'm like, whoa.

**Izar Tarandach (9:11)**: No, you just, you just revealed, you just revealed the fourth value. Marketing.

**Chris Romeo (9:17)**: Let me drink a little more truth serum.

**Izar Tarandach (9:21)**: It's the fourth value. All right.

**Chris Romeo (9:25)**: So Matt, they did mention privacy though. That was your argument about the CIA. Stride doesn't cover everything. No. They're complementary.

**Matt Coles (9:32)**: No, no. Stride doesn't cover everything.

**Chris Romeo (9:35)**: Oh, no, you, oh, you said Stride? I said Stride.

**Izar Tarandach (9:37)**: Yeah, because I, I, I added that much like Stride. Okay.

**Chris Romeo (9:41)**: I was, you know, reading things on the internet. Complementary privacy provenance compliance. I like that word provenance. It sounds very like suave. Yeah.

**Matt Coles (9:53)**: It's where data comes from. It's an integrity problem.

**Izar Tarandach (9:57)**: Isn't integrity a technical difficulty?

**Matt Coles (10:00)**: Well, yes, but authenticity is an integrity problem.

**Izar Tarandach (10:04)**: Right. But no, he is just like pining stuff on We know how fundamental principles work, right?

**Matt Coles (10:10)**: You could derive back to them. Right. They're usually at the root there. If you factor them, if you get the factors of something, you can—

**Izar Tarandach (10:21)**: But my point is, we also know how keep it simple works.

**Matt Coles (10:25)**: Wait, hold on. Wait, wait, time out. Time out. You're talking to a math major and a computer science major.

**Chris Romeo (10:31)**: Sorry. And— Sorry that you guys had that Bad experience in college.

**Izar Tarandach (10:36)**: Dude, I just squeaked by. I don't count.

**Matt Coles (10:39)**: And you know that computer science is like, all goes back to the math, right? All of the computer science stuff is all like math-based.

**Izar Tarandach (10:50)**: No, it goes down to turtles. It's turtles all the way down.

**Chris Romeo (10:54)**: Like Ninja Turtles or regular turtles? If it was Ninja Turtles, that would've been cool.

**Matt Coles (10:59)**: Regular turtles.

**Chris Romeo (11:00)**: Okay.

**Matt Coles (11:01)**: But they didn't have Ninja Turtles in the early days of computing, so, you know, according to the article.

**Izar Tarandach (11:08)**: Or did they, and they were very warheathen. That's right.

**Chris Romeo (11:11)**: Okay, so Matt, you got privacy listed under complementary. That was your argument against, you know, how Stride didn't cover everything. Is that a good thing, that privacy is listed under complementary here? Do we, is there a shining light amidst this article that we're just ripping on.

**Matt Coles (11:28)**: I'm gonna, I'm gonna say something bad and I'm gonna say something and it's probably gonna be bad, but privacy is not security.

**Izar Tarandach (11:36)**: Right.

**Matt Coles (11:37)**: But no, no, no, no, but yeah, no, no, no, no, no, no.

**Izar Tarandach (11:41)**: You're right. You're right. You're totally right. You're totally right. I agree with your conclusion.

**Matt Coles (11:43)**: And so fundamental security properties versus fundamental privacy properties are related, but not the same.

**Chris Romeo (11:50)**: So somebody didn't do their homework.

**Izar Tarandach (11:53)**: But wait, if you're going, I'm going to throw a different one in here. If you're going to extend the CIA triad and make it, what's a foreign, I don't know, 50-ender?

**Matt Coles (12:07)**: Quad? Quad?

**Izar Tarandach (12:10)**: I don't know, I'm sure there is.

**Matt Coles (12:11)**: Quadratics?

**Izar Tarandach (12:12)**: Anyway. Quadratics? If you want to add things to the CIA triad, I would vote flipping for privacy and safety. Those are my two goals. But hold on. Hold. Oh, hold on. And what? Wait, wait, wait. Stop the presses. Why, why, why, why are we adding? Why are we adding things? Let's add ethics too. Yeah. Yeah. Let's put ethics in there too.

**Chris Romeo (12:34)**: Don't we have that?

**Izar Tarandach (12:36)**: No. Under contextualism. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Let's break the whole thing. Yeah. All right. All right. Back up. Matt's head is—

**Chris Romeo (12:47)**: you ever seen the movie Scanners? Matt's head is about to explode.

**Matt Coles (12:51)**: He's like, I feel, I feel like an episode. I feel like the— what is it? Um, it's not Terminator. It's, uh, he goes to the red planet. Schwarzenegger. Um, my mission here is Running Man. No, not Running Man. The one he goes to the red planet, but he's really in a dream. Oh, but total recall, total recall, feature.

**Izar Tarandach (13:12)**: Spoiler alert. He was dreaming the whole time. I never finished the movie.

**Matt Coles (13:19)**: Oh. Did you see that?

**Izar Tarandach (13:20)**: Did you see that they're remaking Running Man?

**Matt Coles (13:24)**: I hope it's better than the remake of Blade Runner. Anyway, it's not called— so, so, all right. So why, why am, why am I about to have an aneurysm this morning? You know that I've talked about the three-legged stool for a long time, right? This three-legged stool of system properties, security, privacy, and safety being the three parts of the stool. Right, that was more than three.

**Chris Romeo (13:53)**: That was more than three pieces.

**Matt Coles (13:55)**: No. Security, safety, and privacy. I can count the three, right? And then— I can't. And then within that, Security has its own properties. There happen to be 3 or more as we, as we're discussing here, right? And so, privacy up, security has confidentiality, integrity, and availability as its core. Privacy has other properties and safety has yet other properties that are at its fundamental core, right? And so, the, the 3-legged stool of, it's kind of like the Iron Triangle, but it's really just the 3 legs of the stool that holds up a system: security, privacy, and safety. Security is about protecting the system and keeping it functional. Privacy is maintaining the integrity and confidentiality of data for a user, or about a user, I should say. And safety is making sure that the system causes no harm to individuals. They have, they are all interrelated, they rely on each other, but they do not are not the same.

**Izar Tarandach (14:59)**: I am going to offer you, uh, what was it? Complementary view. What if, what if we got to the conclusion, while I agree completely with what you just described, my problem is with the word property. Okay. Because we keep saying that systems have to exhibit the property of. And that brings us to how do we prove the property being there? How do we prove the system exists? Is it enough for the system to show it's 90% of its systeminess to have the property, right?

**Matt Coles (15:39)**: Well, the CIA tried to try it on principles.

**Izar Tarandach (15:46)**: They are also called properties in NIST. Okay. So the step that, the jump that I wanted to make was exactly to take what you just described as the tripod, which I think it's a great analogy. One like some tree dying in the forest.

**Matt Coles (16:07)**: The tripod, there you go. All right, I was thinking of the three-legged stool, the tripod makes it a lot easier to set up.

**Izar Tarandach (16:12)**: No, no, no, sorry, sorry. I meant, I meant, no, no, no, I meant the three-legged stool, 'cause you can actually, put things on top of it and build more.

**Matt Coles (16:19)**: But, but tripod works too, and it's a lot easier to say.

**Izar Tarandach (16:22)**: Yeah, but it goes to a point. It's, it's not— you put, you put things on top of it, you put— no, no, the, the, the stool is better.

**Chris Romeo (16:30)**: The stool— maybe you're not using tripods right.

**Izar Tarandach (16:33)**: Yeah, plus, you know, stool, we can take it a lot of places anyway. But my, my point is, what if instead of properties we looked at things as values, right? So exhibiting a property to, in my head, could be totally wrong, and I probably am, goes straight into implementation. But if you bring things back to values, when I'm designing something, I'm keeping the value of CIA, safety, privacy, and ethics. That's the one that I wanted to add to my to my soup, my letter soup, because we know that there's a lot of system designing going out there that is taking into consideration the best interest of its users or whatnot. And I hear Brooke talking a lot about the ethics of stuff and it really opens my ear. He has something very strong there. So my whole point is that by bringing, bringing things into values rather than properties, we change the dialogue a bit. And rather than aspiring to some property being exhibited, we can now, we can now make value a central part of the design of the system and force it to go into implementation. It could be just, uh, you know, word, wordplay. In my head, it rings true.

**Matt Coles (18:09)**: Yeah, I don't disagree with you. I'm just looking up for, I had a running conversation with something about privacy and security basis. There's legal bases for things and ethics is part of that, has to be part of that, right? And so there's duty of care. I was just looking that up. Yes. So duty of care of system design, of a system, and this duty of care obviously predates computing systems, but it applies to them, right? So at some point, there was an expectation that a system designer would exhibit some sort of duty of care with respect to the system. And its capabilities and how it operates. And beyond that, I don't know much about that. If anyone's a legal scholar, they can feel free to chime in. But yeah, there's something that underpins all of this that may or may not include ethics.

**Chris Romeo (19:17)**: So basically, duty of care means if you, that you have to care about what you're building?

**Izar Tarandach (19:25)**: Isn't duty of care first do no harm?

**Matt Coles (19:30)**: Well, I guess if you're building a weapon system, you would violate that, but you could still have duty of care.

**Izar Tarandach (19:37)**: Okay, first do no harm to our guys? Yes.

**Matt Coles (19:42)**: I think it's don't screw over your customer.

**Izar Tarandach (19:45)**: Yeah, yeah, that's where I was going with that. Lord knows we don't see that a lot nowadays.

**Chris Romeo (19:54)**: I'm asking a legal scholar that I know. Okay, a responsibility to act with reasonable care to avoid causing harm to others.

**Izar Tarandach (20:09)**: Yeah.

**Chris Romeo (20:10)**: So this is, this is what we should have been doing for the last 25 years building products.

**Izar Tarandach (20:16)**: This is what I want to believe I was doing for that amount of time. Unfortunately, uh, it's not shared.

**Matt Coles (20:24)**: Yeah. Okay, so here's an alternative, an impli— um, a way of saying that, Chris. Duty of care is a legal obligation to take reasonable measures to protect others from foreseeable harm related to their modeling. Well, yes. Because you want to prevent harm. Now, harm, if you look at harms, like, especially if you look at NIST's Risk Management Framework, which is a, which is outdated, I know they're working on that.

**Chris Romeo (20:51)**: I'm gonna be honest, I try not to.

**Izar Tarandach (20:53)**: Yeah, you shouldn't. Yeah, you don't.

**Matt Coles (20:56)**: But the harms are important. They're not personal, they're not, they're not always personal harm, right? Yeah. It could be harm to the business, it could be harm to the mission, it could be harm to health. Sure, business continuity, disaster recovery. Yeah. All those other core things that we want to maintain when we build systems.

**Izar Tarandach (21:15)**: Yeah. So, Chris, I would go and say that no, threat modeling is not duty of care. It's one way to carry it out. But how many times have we seen that we speak to people and say, you know what? This is fine from a security standpoint, but I don't think that we should be doing it. No, no, no, we need to do it. The business requires it. So, Where does that fall into the duty of care thing?

**Matt Coles (21:40)**: Uh, your customer comes first, I think, right? Uh, so in other words, harm, harm to the business, you have a choice to make. And I guess that's your ethics discussion, right? Exactly. You know, if they, if they say, build me something that will kill everyone who uses this, you have a choice to make.

**Izar Tarandach (21:59)**: My name is Kevorkian.

**Matt Coles (22:02)**: Well, I mean, unless you're building an assisted suicide facility. Yeah. Right? I mean, that, this, it goes to the purpose of the system that you're building.

**Izar Tarandach (22:13)**: But that's where the value thing comes to me. It's 'cause the property is something that's absolute. You have to, this thing has to be, has to keep confidentiality. But now if I translate that from, property into a value, this thing will keep confidentiality if confidentiality is something that's important for me, my customers, and my system, and my business, and all that stuff. So things become a bit more fluid, I think. But on the other hand, it brings them back to design and one step away from implementation.

**Matt Coles (22:57)**: Was that it? I think so.

**Izar Tarandach (23:01)**: I hope so. Been talking about it for a while.

**Matt Coles (23:04)**: We'll just give you a little bit. So are you saying that if you say it often enough, it must be true?

**Izar Tarandach (23:09)**: It works for everybody else.

**Matt Coles (23:10)**: That's, that's, isn't that, isn't that the fundamental core of marketing?

**Izar Tarandach (23:16)**: Oh my God. If you bring that to the fundamental core, then we are going to go into some dark, dark waters.

**Chris Romeo (23:23)**: Wait, so Isar is now a marketer?

**Izar Tarandach (23:27)**: Wow. As Mel Brooks would put in History of the World Part One, oh, a bullshitter. Have you bullshitted this way?

**Matt Coles (23:38)**: So we suddenly went from PG to PG-13, is that what you're saying? Yeah. Oh, what? We just went from PG to PG-13.

**Izar Tarandach (23:45)**: Oh God. That's, that's— We've been dropping those for a while.

**Chris Romeo (23:50)**: It's about time. About time. Okay. So if we kind of wrap this—

**Izar Tarandach (23:56)**: Oh, go ahead. We're wrapping? No, no. Just back to the article. I mean, the thing that killed me in the article after reading was that basically it says that security teams are overwhelmed by many frameworks. ISO, NIST, GDPR, AI Act, etc. Let's add one more model and call it a meta-framework.

**Matt Coles (24:20)**: But how does that—

**Izar Tarandach (24:23)**: Yeah.

**Matt Coles (24:23)**: That's different than changing the fundamental properties of computer security. Yes. And how did—

**Izar Tarandach (24:34)**: Oh, look, they're drowning. Let's drop some more water on their heads.

**Matt Coles (24:40)**: Wait, wait. How? Do you wanna, do you wanna, do you wanna just drop them a buoy that happens to be a, a concrete brick? We can add gravity to the mix.

**Izar Tarandach (24:49)**: I mean, no, if you're going out to solve, if you're going out to solve a problem, people, there's a very, a very simple method, way of solving problems. You define the problem, you propose a solution, you show that the solution works, ta-da, problem solved. But changing the— It'll create more problems. Changing the problem.

**Matt Coles (25:06)**: Well, whether you're, whether you're not, The thing is, well, then it's a misleading article because a framework to maintain CI&A can be done without changing CI&A. Yes. True. We can add a meta-model, a meta-framework for all the frameworks that exist when all those frameworks are geared around maintaining confidentiality, integrity, and availability.

**Izar Tarandach (25:36)**: Let me ask a rhetorical question here. Do you guys remember any—

**Chris Romeo (25:42)**: We don't need it. Rhetorical questions don't need an answer.

**Izar Tarandach (25:45)**: Any meta framework that ever helped you?

**Matt Coles (25:51)**: I have no answer for you.

**Chris Romeo (25:56)**: I have no idea what he's talking about. At least he said rhetorical question, so I don't have to provide an answer that doesn't even address what he was talking about.

**Izar Tarandach (26:06)**: No, seriously, have you ever heard of a metaframework that helped you do better the other frameworks, the meta-sizes, whatever?

**Chris Romeo (26:17)**: No, can't say that I have.

**Matt Coles (26:21)**: Oh, um, alrighty.

**Chris Romeo (26:24)**: So. What do we do with this?

**Izar Tarandach (26:26)**: Now you get to work. Sigh.

**Chris Romeo (26:31)**: I mean, is this just dribble? Is this just dribble that we're reading? Do we waste like 30 minutes talking about something that's just dribble?

**Matt Coles (26:40)**: And so, uh, Brandon, English, look, I, you know, there's a, there's something in here, but they, but the message is wrong. I, in my opinion, at least, right? But. They, this is the throw the baby out with the bathwater problem, right? It's, we, something is broken, but we don't know what, so we'll take it down to the core and throw it all away and start fresh.

**Izar Tarandach (27:03)**: But that's the thing, it's not throwing everything away. Putting a bandaid on the thing and building a pyramid on top of it.

**Chris Romeo (27:10)**: Yeah, but under layer 1 core, he managed to work in zero trust and SBOM. Both. That's a lot of acronyms.

**Matt Coles (27:18)**: Oh wait, wait, that's another time. How many times does we talk about it here? Wait on the core, on the core what WTF SBOM.

**Chris Romeo (27:33)**: Well he said authenticity is the engine for the authenticity yeah and then under the accountability to ensure accountability security practices must extend into the software supply chain enforced by practices like SBOMs.

**Matt Coles (27:45)**: SBOM doesn't do that.

**Izar Tarandach (27:47)**: Oh, Matt, come on. Wait, wait, wait, wait. SBOMs don't do everything.

**Chris Romeo (27:51)**: You can't even say it with a straight face. I tried. I was like, I'm going to be, I'm going to be serious and try to like argue the other side. I couldn't do it after 3 seconds. SBOMs don't do everything.

**Matt Coles (28:02)**: Yeah. SBOM is not the solution to everything.

**Izar Tarandach (28:05)**: And, and by the way, let's talk about hardware someday.

**Matt Coles (28:09)**: Um, So anyway, well, it's a— S-Bomb is not the solution to everything. How? Hold on.

**Chris Romeo (28:17)**: How's it caught another, another under layer 3? The number 2, a breach like Equifax in 2017. Dude, you can't use Equifax as an example anymore. It's the year 2025. It was 8 years ago. Like, there's, oh man, come on. Okay.

**Matt Coles (28:38)**: A technical failure, but a contextual collapse. Yeah, that's great. The technical failure is what we care about. And it was a failure of confidentiality and/or availability. Like, come on. You go back to the core fundamentals. What? All right. Anyway, sorry. I vote we throw this thing out. Off my soapbox, sitting on my stool.

**Chris Romeo (29:01)**: Yeah, this is, this, there's nothing here. There's no nugget here. There's, there's— No, this one is gone. There's just a, an attempt to take something and twist it to get people to read an article.

**Matt Coles (29:12)**: And maybe for next time, we can talk about the companion article that goes with this that says, well, fundamental security properties are broken because AI agents exist. And we'll leave that as a teaser, maybe for next time.

**Chris Romeo (29:23)**: And I'll just, I'll have to, I'll have to look up what that means. All right. Well, folks, thanks for joining the Security Table. Live long and prosper.
