The US National Cybersecurity Strategy -- Pillars One and Two
With Chris Romeo, Izar Tarandach, and Matt Coles
The Security Table gang continues our discussion about the United States National Cybersecurity Strategy, released in 2023. We cover pillars one and two, defend critical infrastructure, and disrupt and dismantle threat actors.
About this episode
The Security Table gang continues our discussion about the United States National Cybersecurity Strategy, released in 2023. We cover pillars one and two, defend critical infrastructure, and disrupt and dismantle threat actors.
We talk about the importance of defining critical infrastructure and the responsibility of both the private and public sectors in protecting it. We also mention cybersecurity requirements to support national security and public safety and the challenge of getting various agencies and organizations to work together. Finally, the hosts ponder whether social media platforms could be considered critical infrastructure, and they conclude that critical infrastructure comes down to safety, security, and public welfare.
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Transcript · 71 min conversation
0:14Chris Romeo Hey folks, welcome to another episode of The Security Table. This is Chris Romeo. I'm joined by Matt Coles, Tanya Ward, and Isar Tarendash. We're recording this episode on St. Patrick's Day, and so we were enjoying a little St. Patrick's Day cheer. That came out wrong. We're experiencing a little bit of St. Patrick's Day cheer before we began the episode. But we are recording this on St. Patrick's Day. And what is in the big question is what are in these glasses?
0:44Matt Coles What are you drinking there, Chris?
0:45Chris Romeo Yeah, I'm nothing. I have to keep that. I have to keep the focus here because if any of you all just fall over, I have to keep talking. That's the rule of the show here. Again, again, again. Well, We started last episode talking about the National Cybersecurity Strategy that the US government put out. We had lofty goals that we were gonna crank through it. We finished the introduction in our last episode. And so I'm gonna put forth a lofty goal again for this episode to say, I have faith. I think we can at least get through one pillar, maybe a few of them. I think there's a few pillars that are gonna be more interesting to us based on our experience and kind of where we fit into the industry. Others we may not have as much comment about. So let's jump right in with pillar 1, Pillar number 1 in this National Cybersecurity Strategy, and Pillar 1 is referred to as Defend Critical Infrastructure. It's tough to argue with that, isn't it? It's tough to argue with the need to defend critical infrastructure.
1:44Izar Tarandach We can rename it as the Kumbaya Pillar because it's just talking about bringing everybody together under one wonderful roof where everything is going to be defended. But yeah, it's hard to defend against It's hard to say anything against defending.
1:59Matt Coles I guess it really comes down to what, what are they considering in scope for critical, for critical infrastructure. But other than that, I agree with you. Although this has again been said for years, right? With all of the different agencies and all the different, and both public and private and, and sort of in between. Uh, and you have federal, you know, federal, um, defense and non-defense networks and, and, and organizations. Nobody likes to play well together, right? So it'll be exciting to see how that all comes together. It really does all come together.
2:35Tanya Ward Yeah. I think your point is right on about how do you define critical infrastructure. We're no longer in this world where, you know, you— everything that we build and everything that we have out there kind of is all these different pieces coming together. So while, you know, the private sector provides a lot of amazing things to our citizens, at some point I feel like the responsibility literally on the private sector is moving. Literally, the government's kind of coming in and, you know, trying to take a little bit more control over protecting these, not just the private sector, but also the public sector as well. Because if you take, for example, let's take a pipeline or water systems, most of the technology potentially instituted within that are probably coming from the private sector, right? Technology companies. So I'm like Matt, very curious to understand what breadth does that have across when we, when we define critical infrastructure, but also what does it mean when they say establish cybersecurity requirements to support national security and public safety? Because I think that's going to have a trickle effect into the private sector in a, in a, in a big way.
3:44Chris Romeo Yeah, let me read you a statement that I— and this is a direct quote from the National Cybersecurity Strategy on page 7. The American people must have confidence in the availability and resilience of this infrastructure and the essential services it provides. Seems like, once again, that's a tough statement to argue with.
4:04Tanya Ward Like, it makes sense.
4:05Chris Romeo We want— we expect that when we flip the light switch, we have electricity to our homes. We expect when we turn on the water that water comes out of the faucet and it's clean clean and not radioactive or has any other destructive properties. Yeah.
4:20Matt Coles No, interestingly enough though, if you look at page 8, they call out oil and natural gas pipelines as part of that critical infrastructure too.
4:28Chris Romeo Yeah, sure.
4:29Matt Coles Right. So there's public service offerings.
4:31Tanya Ward Exactly. Yeah.
4:32Matt Coles Like water and sewer and whatnot. And then there's what America generally uses as services from corporate, from private corporations that provide critical services to the entire you know, population. And, and so that's where, you know, it, obviously there is a, well, somewhere there is a definition of what critical infrastructure is. Um, and so basically I think they're coming down to everything that is, is of general use to the general population that people rely on to live their daily lives.
5:05Izar Tarandach So TikTok.
5:07Matt Coles Well, I guess in, well, I guess if you follow along with the latest TikTok, TikTok news, right? About, uh, We're going to stop allowing TikTok if depending on who's involved with the company in the backend. Well, is the transfer of data through an app that has lots of competitors in the marketplace critical infrastructure?
5:38Chris Romeo No way.
5:38Matt Coles I mean, we wouldn't consider it that way, but maybe it is. I don't know.
5:42Chris Romeo Maybe in 20 years, as new politicians that are younger kind of make their way up, they might argue that that's critical critical infrastructure. I don't see anybody arguing today.
5:51Matt Coles I mean, is Twitter critical infrastructure today?
5:53Chris Romeo Well, that's definitely critical infrastructure. That's where I get all my news from. I mean, come on.
5:56Izar Tarandach No, that's infrastructure that's very critical. That's different.
6:00Chris Romeo It's true.
6:01Tanya Ward Actually, it's an interesting concept, like social media platforms. Are they considered critical?
6:07Chris Romeo Yeah, I would, I would guess probably not just because, you know, would our lives be better if they all of a sudden went away?
6:14Tanya Ward Yes. Critical, I think, comes down to those three things. Doesn't it come down to safety? What is it that the Maslow kind of psychological factors? Right? It's safe, like water safety. And I'm sure there's another one that I'm missing, you know, growing up.
6:30Izar Tarandach I remember a quote by a science fiction author. I'm sorry, I just drawn a blank, but it was something like humanity is 4 days of electricity without electricity away from cannibalism or something like that.
6:43Matt Coles Neal Stephenson, I think, might have written that. It might have been, it was either him or Gibson. So one of the two, maybe.
6:49Chris Romeo I don't know for sure.
6:50Izar Tarandach No, I think it's one of the old classics, like It was Asimov or Ray Bradbury. But anyway, those were the simple times, remember?
6:59Tanya Ward Yeah.
6:59Izar Tarandach And like, just electricity was enough to draw us back to cannibalism.
7:04Tanya Ward My dad used to walk to school too, right? Now we have buses.
7:07Matt Coles Uphill both ways in the storm, right?
7:09Chris Romeo In the snow.
7:10Tanya Ward So I have a question, right? So one thing that I read within that section was somewhat of It drew my attention where it kind of calls out like there was a lack of mandatory requirements and that's resulted in adequate and inconsistent outcomes. Do you believe today that we really do have a lack of mandatory requirements? And what does that mean? Does it mean, because like we do have standards, we do have, you know, all of these different, you know, whether it's in the public or private sector.
7:42Chris Romeo I think it's industry dependent.
7:44Matt Coles Yeah.
7:44Chris Romeo So we've, like, I've kind of done a tiny bit of work around the world of electrical utility and seen some of the page, some of the books of regulations that they have to comply with and seen the audit processes and everything that goes with that. But I wouldn't say that that same rigor is applied to every discipline, everything that we consider critical infrastructure. This is just, Nuclear Regulatory Commission has some very specific requirements, and then there's some electrical requirements that come in from that as well. So I can't speak to all of the industries, but I think electrical has a solid set of mandatory requirements because I've, you know, been on the edge of working with them.
8:30Matt Coles And that's, that's like NERC, right? NERC.
8:32Chris Romeo Yeah. NERC CIP. Yeah.
8:35Matt Coles But is that regional, right? So I mean, critical infrastructure, I mean, when you talk especially about electrical grid, Right? You have the US and then you have Texas, right? And parts of Oklahoma, I think, is in there somewhere. And I imagine you have Hawaii being distinct and Alaska being distinct. And so it's not necessarily universal, is it?
8:56Chris Romeo I think NERC is universal. I think that's a federal thing.
9:00Matt Coles Okay.
9:00Chris Romeo So it's, yeah, you have to comply with that in the energy world. But once again, energy is only one piece. I wouldn't say a tiny piece, but it's one piece of critical infrastructure. You know, I'm not aware of, and it may just be because I haven't looked at it, I don't know what happens in water. Do you have specific water requirements?
9:18Matt Coles I don't know. I think, imagine, I imagine you have safety requirements for things that have, that have safety impact like transportation systems, water systems, you know, buildings certainly. Although whether that extends to all parts of those systems is probably interesting, right? What's critical to the functionality that you need versus what's differentiation or new or, you know, in corporate interest.
9:48Chris Romeo Yeah.
9:49Matt Coles But I don't think— I think the answer to Tanya's question is we don't have consistent practices. We don't have necessarily specifically a body of required, like mandatory required requirements or controls. And I think just looking, you know, looking at some of the, some areas like, you know, for medical devices and things like that, which granted are probably outside the scope of critical infrastructure proper, there's a lot of wiggle room, right? If we think about things like Common Criteria, for instance, as a sort of analogy here, there are requirements, but there are requirements and there are options. Yeah.
10:35Chris Romeo Common Criteria is not the answer to— Yeah.
10:37Matt Coles I'm not saying— No, no, not saying it is.
10:40Chris Romeo I spent 5, I spent about 10 years of my career around Common Criteria, so I know it's not the answer to anything that you want to drive outcomes.
10:52Matt Coles I mean, we could look at FedRAMP too, right? As another, it's, again, it's a regimen. It is not necessarily a body of of requirements, right? 800-53 gives us a set of controls, but even within that set of controls, not everything is required and there are always options for implementation.
11:10Chris Romeo Yeah. So I got a quote, another quote here I want to read you from section, uh, this is from strategic objective 1.1, which we've been talking about, establish cybersecurity requirements. And let's see if anybody's eyes light up with this quote. In setting cybersecurity regulations for critical infrastructure, regulators are encouraged to drive the adoption of secure by secure by design principles, prioritize the availability of essential services, and ensure that systems are designed to fail safely and recover quickly. How's that for goals?
11:42Matt Coles That's great. Awesome.
11:45Izar Tarandach Love the goals and also checkboxes.
11:48Chris Romeo Yeah, but I mean, when you think about like, this is effectively taking threat modeling and adding it— they didn't call it threat modeling because secure by design, you could argue, kind of sits above the discipline of threat modeling or maybe side by side with it. But these are, if this can translate into something that's in reality, it's a very powerful set of things that I think we would all agree those are things that we're driving in corporate America, you know, as far as requirements for engineering teams.
12:19Tanya Ward Well, so, sorry, I have a quick question on that. But do you think that we, when we think about society, or even just even in our profession, do you think that we have enough people who are trained in those things? Because when I read this section, when I think about, you know, it goes back to your prior conversation that we had discussed around potential jobs, what we're seeing out there. I'm seeing an increase more on kind of risk management type positions. I mean, go look at LinkedIn. I mean, you search, it's like InfoSec, and then you look at what you've just said which are fundamental pieces to really help build resiliency into the thing, like the systems that we're putting out there. Do you feel like this will, this will drive for more jobs potentially in that space, or do you think it will— because the enforcement adoption is also mentioned.
13:14Chris Romeo Yeah.
13:14Tanya Ward Would that drive for still more kind of risk management type, you know, what you call it, compliance type positions.
13:25Chris Romeo Izar, what do you think on that one?
13:27Tanya Ward He's thinking.
13:28Izar Tarandach Governments rise to the level of the bureaucracy that they can afford. So at the end of that session, you have enable regulated entities to afford security. So meaning we're going to raise taxes so that we can pay for all this stuff. At that time, with all that Tanya said, there's going to be more of a bureaucracy and more people running around with checklists and more of people who unfortunately are trained by the least beater and are going to get that quality of training. But actually, to go what to what Chris was mentioning before, and it's been a hard week, so if I'm BSing, throw something on my head. But wait, no, I lost my train of thought.
14:17Matt Coles Well, while you're thinking that train of thought, can I jump in here for just a sec?
14:23Izar Tarandach Yes, please.
14:24Matt Coles So, I'm gonna say this and don't hurt me. When you're starting from nothing, a checklist is a great idea.
14:35Izar Tarandach Yeah. Right?
14:37Matt Coles I mean, we know from experience, like if we look at, well, using threat libraries as an example, Threat libraries are fixed in time lists of things that you need to look for, and it makes it easy to adopt. And so if you have nothing else, a checklist works great. The problem is how do you avoid staying there? And so I don't disagree with you, I guess, in part about the bureaucracy. My challenge, I think that the challenge I think is not necessarily if you read that as that they'll increase taxes because they'll have to raise the bar. I wonder if they're going to make a decision as a regulator or as an auditor. There's a strong argument for, well, we can't go to market if this costs too much and therefore reduce the security, not raise it or limit the security, not necessarily raise it. And so the checklists, a checklist alone is not bad. The audit, the cost discussion may cause an artificial limit would be the concern. I would bring up there.
15:43Tanya Ward And checklists are dynamic too. I mean, when you—
15:47Matt Coles since when?
15:48Tanya Ward Well, they have to be. I mean, if you go through a checklist, the intent is you have a checklist because you're driving for a particular outcome, okay? And then if you realize that you're not hitting that outcome, then you have to figure out, okay, do we need to change the checklist, right? I mean, this is in anything that you see. Like me as an EMT, I have a protocol or a checklist that I have to follow. Every year that's updated. Because things change, you learn things, you have this continuous improvement that feeds back into it to be able to constantly change it, right? So it has to— if they're static at some point— go ahead. It's all right. Go ahead. You think they're static?
16:31Izar Tarandach No, I think that you're totally right, right? And, but you said the thing there, as an EMT, you have checklists that change every year. You are not going back and checking 3 patients ago if you're doing the things that the new checklist tell you to do. So going back to Chris's point, and this is the train that I lost back then.
16:52Tanya Ward You got it! You found it!
16:53Matt Coles Choo choo!
16:54Izar Tarandach It was a big train. Having the security by design in there, it's great. It's forward-looking. And it's exactly what Tanya says, right? We're going to update checklists and do better in the future. But I think that we forget the governments. I'm sorry, I used to be cynical. Now people just see me as a realist. Governments, they move really, really, really, really slow, right? About 6 months ago, I read that the US Air Force was having a hard time because some of their very, very, very sensitive systems needed floppy disks to run and nobody makes floppy disks anymore.
17:35Tanya Ward Exactly.
17:35Izar Tarandach What's the point? What's the end without a soundboard? What's the point of saying secure by design is going to save us when so many of these systems that the infrastructure depends on are still in the '60s, some in the '50s, and they are not going to be replaced or refreshed anytime soon?
17:58Chris Romeo But I mean, what's the alternative? Doing nothing?
18:00Izar Tarandach No.
18:00Chris Romeo Our alternative is to do nothing and just fall into complete insecurity of everything that we have.
18:08Izar Tarandach No, but I'm saying it's great that they have all this forward-looking stuff. It's stuff that we have been harping on for what, 10, 20 years, right?
18:18Chris Romeo Yep.
18:18Izar Tarandach It's great that they finally heard us. So yeah, from now on, we're going to do the right things. It's going to cost pretty penny more to go back and fix what's in place right now, right? I remember— I'm sorry, I'm going down a memory lane today that's horrible. There was that gentleman that wrote a PhD thesis, I think, on fiber optics infrastructure, communication infrastructure or something. And as soon as he finished his presentation There were too many men in black outside and your thesis is now classified because it deals with holes in the infrastructure. Hmm. I am fairly certain that this actually happened. It might be just an urban legend. I think I, I seen documentation that says that it actually happened. And up to some years ago, security by obscurity was a big part of the, uh, of defending the infrastructure, right?
19:16Chris Romeo Yeah.
19:16Izar Tarandach Like either people don't know how this stuff works or we are really, really careful that this stuff is not exposed anywhere.
19:23Chris Romeo Yeah. That was a different age though, right? Yeah. That was pre-Shodan, right? Shodan changed the game on security by obscurity because you can't hide anymore because multiple entities are scanning everything in the IPv4 space and then reporting and indexing large data sets of what those things are.
19:47Izar Tarandach Yep. So, I don't know, I'm very happy with what I'm seeing. I'm very hopeful with where it's going to. But I'm just wondering, hey, what about what's already there?
19:57Matt Coles It's generally, I agree with you, it's generally good practice. Secured by design, I mean, we're not the first to do it, to drive it, but it's definitely a good thing. I guess, Earlier somebody mentioned, I think Chris, you mentioned about threat modeling sort of being after the secure by design discussion starts. I think we have a good place, right? Threat modeling is of course a way that you do use to verify or validate the things that are done in your design to make sure that your design is secure and stable and whatnot. I wonder if the auditors will have the ability to understand and, and like, will there be a full set of capabilities of people to be able to understand how you design, especially in some of, some of these very complex systems? Presumably they would have to do it today, but now there's more of an, gonna be more of an emphasis for this, right? So it'll be good to see that get more prep, more prevalence in the, in the system development lifecycle. I do want to call out, actually, since we're still in Section 1, I want to call out on page 9 a couple of statements. So the first one around the Secure by Design, you read the sentence just before it. The one I'm highlighting here is regulations will define the minimum expected practices or outcomes. But we encourage further efforts beyond expectations, beyond the— to exceed those requirements. I always wonder if that actually works in practice, right? Does— do people— will organizations, especially those that are under time constraints and budget constraints, as everyone often is, is above and beyond ever viable.
21:55Chris Romeo Tanya, what are your thoughts on that one?
22:00Tanya Ward I'm pondering. Do you think it's viable is the question. I mean, when you look at that whole section, there's a lot of things that kind of stand out. I think it's viable if there's incentives. If it really drives a market shift, if it becomes a competitive advantage. And I think that's some of the clear things that when we talk about, when we look at the pillar, going back to your point, you know, they do talk about potentially incentivizing, you know, and trying to encourage the right behavior, right? Which is obviously secure by design, all the things that you brought up. So I do think it's doable, right? But obviously at the end of the day, you know, ultimately everything comes down to the dollar, the dollar sign. And that's going to be a driving factor in a lot of whether these things get implemented. And I can't, you know, I, I, you're going to think I'm crazy when I say this, so I'm going to say this and then please, every, well, I, I can't, every time I read, I keep thinking about, you know, the cars and the crash ratings that you have, like there's always going to be a minimum set of requirements everybody absolutely have to meet, right? Airbag deployment, like being able to have all this sort of stuff, right? You know, to protect the car, but then there's these other things that you can add to further protect, you know, like the safety of the vehicle when you're driving it, like blind spot checks, all this sort of stuff. And I can't, I can't, I keep thinking that's the way my head thinks when I think about this section.
23:30Chris Romeo And that's market innovation though, right? Like in the auto space, those blindside detectors aren't required yet. They will be in the future, but there's a commercial market of innovation that's driving that. The challenge here is we're talking about government entities. That have no incentive to innovate from a commercial— something someone can compete. I mean, we know we have some competition in certain parts of the utility world, but it's basically from what I've seen, at least in the area I live in, there's no competition for anything in the utility space.
24:05Izar Tarandach But wait, last week, last week we closed by saying that, hey, government is going to lead by example and that's enough of an incentive because everybody will want to fall back and do the right thing, right?
24:15Matt Coles You're referring to the RD&D, right? The research and development and demonstration?
24:19Izar Tarandach That's the discussion that we had of, okay, so the government here is saying, yeah, we're going to lead by example. Good for you. Right there.
24:26Tanya Ward There is a section on modernizing the federal system. And hey, we got a cool acronym, ZT.
24:35Izar Tarandach Yep. No, I think that the part of the incentivizing is definitely the most important here. And, uh, the, the, the comparison with the, the, the crash regulations, I think it's, it's, it's really apt. But, uh, I think that my point is that those minimum regulations, perhaps they're not going to— that what is the minimum level? It's what's supposed to save your life in the event of a crash, right?
25:07Chris Romeo Yeah.
25:07Izar Tarandach The blind spot is when you, you, the, the, the blind spot detection is when you take one step further and you say, okay, I'm not going to save my life in the, in, in the event of a crash. I'm actually going to avoid the crash.
25:21Tanya Ward Yeah.
25:21Matt Coles Prevent the crash.
25:22Izar Tarandach Prevent the crash.
25:23Chris Romeo Right. But in this case, we're talking about minimum expected cybersecurity practices or outcomes because we're talking about a universe of federal systems. That have to be brought up. And so when I first read that, I kind of bristled a little bit because I was like, minimum? You know, we're hardcore security engineers. We don't do minimum. We push the envelope. We're ASDS level 17, right?
25:46Izar Tarandach Like, here's where the minimum comes in. And this page 9 is giving us a lot to talk about, huh? So you have in the paragraph before the last, where federal regulations are in conflict duplicate, duplicative, or over— overly burdensome. Can somebody please read this thing? Regulators must work together to minimize these harms. Okay, I think that that sentence goes straight to the why the minimum, because the only way that all these different agencies and different agendas are going to agree ultimately with something is if it's the bare minimum.
26:24Chris Romeo I mean, if you came in and said that this was, that every agency was gonna be at the maximum level, you, you're already, you've already failed. Oh, no, no, no, no, no. Failure's already, you've already hit failure state. There's no recovery.
26:36Izar Tarandach No, pay attention to the, pay attention to the sentence. It's not talking about everybody being at some level. It's talking about the regulations and the fact, recognizing the fact that sometimes, sometimes we get regulations that are in conflict.
26:48Chris Romeo Yeah.
26:48Izar Tarandach Or that they duplicate each other.
26:49Chris Romeo True.
26:50Izar Tarandach Right? Or that, overly burdensome. It's too hard to do it. How many times in our security careers we haven't— we have heard somebody say, oh, you're right, but it's so hard to do that, so I won't do it.
27:02Matt Coles Well, and actually, that's really important, right? I think the language here is very critical. It's critically important to understand it, right? These harms refer to what's mentioned in the first paragraph around regulations minimize cost and burden of compliance. So conflicting, conflicting regulations or either overlapping or conflicting regulations increase costs because you need to interpret which one or both are going to apply. If they're mutually exclusive, you can't do both. And so what do you do?
27:37Tanya Ward Right?
27:38Matt Coles Do you punt? Do you try to implement them both? You have some really hard choices to make. And then the burden of compliance and regulation and implementation And so by minimizing conflict and duplicity and whatnot, you minimize costs. That doesn't mean eliminate costs. That just means reduce inefficiencies in the system.
28:04Tanya Ward Do you really minimize costs? Like when you think about, I mean, take a regulation, take about the amount of money that it takes to kind of put a regulation together. And then the enforceability potentially of that regulation for a company, like for even in the private and public sector.
28:24Matt Coles But the word is important, right? Sorry, the word minimize is important here. It is not to make it as cheap as possible. It's not to make it cheap. It is to make it consistently expensive. Meaning if I have 800-53 and some other regulation, I'm just going to throw out two documents, Regulation A and B. In order to implement A, it will cost a certain amount. To implement B, it will cost a certain amount. They conflict. It increases the cost, makes it more burdensome. If you only have one, whatever it costs to implement Regulation A is the minimum cost, right?
29:06Tanya Ward So how much does SOC 2 take to implement?
29:09Izar Tarandach Wait, that's how you end up with $400 hammers in a Pentagon, right? Because that's the one that the government decided that you're going with.
29:18Chris Romeo Yeah.
29:19Izar Tarandach So, Tanya, sorry, you were going to say something.
29:20Tanya Ward I was just going to say, like, how much does SOC 2 take to implement?
29:25Chris Romeo Depends on where you start from.
29:28Tanya Ward I mean, quarter of a million, half a million.
29:30Izar Tarandach I mean, what's the size? What's the—
29:32Chris Romeo Yeah, I mean, just an outside spend, that's probably what it costs. Before you do any internal resourcing.
29:39Matt Coles That's upfront. That's not even operational costs, right?
29:41Chris Romeo Yeah, correct. That's just to go through the process with outside services.
29:46Tanya Ward So, does regulations— so this, I mean, you're all way more knowledgeable than me in this space because you're, you know, you are. I'm curious. So does— if this was to come into fruition, going back to what you had said, Matt, that you know, minimize the cost and burden of compliance, enabling organizations to invest resources, building resiliency, and defending their systems and assets, I think is what's called out. What about the small companies? Like, how do they afford it? Like, will they be able to compete in this market?
30:19Chris Romeo I mean, that's, that's the last one here: enable regulated entities to afford security.
30:24Izar Tarandach Oh, but that's not the small company. That's not the small company. That's the regulated entity. So it's government talking about government.
30:31Chris Romeo So I guess when you're talking about, Tania, about small companies, how do small companies—
30:36Tanya Ward going back to public utilities, right? The public sector, like those that serve not necessarily government. Well, I guess, you know, I'm maybe not got, you know, the public sector where it's maybe not government owned, like going back to electricity, like all the different companies out there.
30:52Chris Romeo I think the way I read this—
30:53Tanya Ward they're trying to build out or even think about Solar, like solar power, right? And delivering that.
30:59Chris Romeo The way I read this is those are part of critical infrastructure. And so like this last section, enable regulated entities to afford security. I don't know how they're actually gonna, they're noting that as an issue.
31:14Izar Tarandach This whole paragraph is basically just mean expect more taxes. That's all it's saying.
31:21Chris Romeo Perhaps.
31:22Izar Tarandach It's, we're going to, to have to have money to fund all these initiatives. And yeah, we're going to go into Congress and what's the thing? Uh, administration will work with Congress to develop regulatory frameworks that take into account the resources necessary to implement them. Meaning more money, more taxes.
31:40Tanya Ward Yeah.
31:41Chris Romeo They're trying to level the playing field in smaller, I think with smaller utilities and whatnot here. Um, we decided right off the bat this wasn't going to be a political discussion. So we're not going to— I don't want to get into—
31:56Tanya Ward No, no, no.
31:56Izar Tarandach Actually, to me, this doesn't fall into politics. To me, this falls into the education that I needed last time around. Okay, you have this strategy, you're going to work with Congress in the long term. What does that mean? Right? Yeah. You're going to enact laws and for how long are they good and how are they funded? That's my blind spot.
32:15Matt Coles Yeah. I wanna take you back on the SOC 2 discussion just because, well, it's cloud related, there's something in here. I'm gonna stick on, stick on page 9 because it's, I think it's really exciting and interesting. Well, I think it's interesting, maybe not exciting. Uh, the statement here, cloud-based services enable better and more economical cybersecurity practices at scale. We could debate that whether or not cloud actually makes more economical cybersecurity sense.
32:49Chris Romeo I mean, let's debate it. I'm in favor of how they wrote the sentence here. Sounds like you might not be.
32:55Matt Coles No. Well, let's hear it.
32:56Chris Romeo So, what's the thought there? When you're thinking about, and I've got a, this is a live example. I'm working, I'm not gonna say who, but I'm working with a company who, or, you know, I've heard this story But when you think about like what AWS does for you, like let's just use AWS. You could substitute Azure, GCP. I'm not recommending AWS. Yeah. You think about what I get when I build a new application or let's just say a new system. Let's even step above and say we're building a new product or system that may have multiple applications. There are certain things that the cloud provider just is turned on by default for me now. Like, and default services that are available. For example, take a Key Vault, right? 10 years ago, I don't even think we had a Key Vault in the application space. Now, it's as easy to use a Key Vault from my cloud provider as it is to create some other crazy place I'm going to put my passwords where they're insecure. It's actually easier to use AWS's Key Vault. You could say the same thing for a lot of different capabilities that are provided there from like data at rest encryption. It's literally turned on by default in S3 now. And I have to go in, it's harder, it takes more work for me to go disable the security basic features that are being provided by the cloud provider. And so that's why I feel like this is a good statement that, and I feel like it's true.
34:22Matt Coles And you think they're better than anything you could build on-prem?
34:28Chris Romeo Yeah, I do think it's better because all the challenges of on-prem Right? Like, I need— how many people does Amazon have? Once again, I'm using AWS just as an example. How many people does Amazon have in AWS that are working to build that critical service for me and secure it?
34:47Izar Tarandach Oh, wait a second.
34:48Chris Romeo It's not loaded into my head.
34:49Izar Tarandach 1,000 less now. Another second, 1,000 less now. Okay.
34:58Chris Romeo But the point is, for me to build, let's just take a file storage service. Let's just, I'll speak generically. For me to build something that on-prem from a security perspective competes with what I could get from a cloud provider would take me 100 times the amount of money.
35:16Izar Tarandach Yep.
35:16Chris Romeo Because they're baking that into their cost as well. When I buy secure file storage, they're baking in, I'm only paying for a really small percentage of what it costs for them to develop it.
35:27Tanya Ward Yep.
35:29Matt Coles Now, I will call out, as I read that sentence, it's interesting the way that it's worded is they use the word but, not and.
35:38Tanya Ward Right? Yeah.
35:40Matt Coles Cloud-based services enable better and more economical cybersecurity practices at scale, but they are also essential.
35:48Izar Tarandach Wait, where are we?
35:51Matt Coles Last paragraph of the Established Cybersecurity Regulations to Secure Critical Infrastructure, page 9.
35:57Izar Tarandach Oh, okay.
35:58Matt Coles Second sentence.
35:59Chris Romeo I don't know that I would read that much into an individual word at this point. Like, I think it's whether it's but or whether it's and, I think it's, it doesn't, I think we might be going too deep in the weeds. We might be trying to interpret too much meaning out of—
36:14Matt Coles I just wonder if it was misworded, misprinted. Now the next sentence I think though is critically important also. The administration will, and by the way, Chris, thank you for your perspective. I agree in part. Right? I think a follow-on question might be, do you consider AWS or GCP critical infrastructure?
36:33Chris Romeo I think you have to at this point. Like when the East region of AWS went down, a lot of other services disappeared. And it's only going to become, as our critical infrastructure is more and more embedded with technology, an East Coast outage in 10 years will look a lot different from a critical infrastructure perspective.
36:57Tanya Ward Yeah. And they do talk about that later in the document around infrastructure as a service as well, right?
37:04Izar Tarandach Yeah.
37:05Matt Coles So, but this, this very next statement though, the administration will identify gaps in authorities to drive better cybersecurity practices in the cloud computing industry and work with industry to close them. So I know Izaak called out Big Brother in our last session.
37:25Izar Tarandach Sure.
37:25Matt Coles Is this your, is this, is this your Big Brother moment? The government's saying, I want, we're gonna identify those authorities that, that drive security practices in cloud computing, not restrictive to critical infrastructure, it seems.
37:41Izar Tarandach My question here is, and just from an initial reading of it, What amount of transparency are they expecting from industry and third-party services and all that stuff in order to be able to establish these things?
38:02Tanya Ward Can we not forget though, within that section there's a lot of emphasis on collaboration. I think this goes back to your initial point, is our— you opened up by saying this section is a kumbaya, was it? And I think we can't discount that. I think Strategic Objective 1.2 talks about this public-private collaboration. There's a whole collaboration going on here. And understanding that in order to be better, there needs to be more information sharing, there needs to be capitalizing on the strengths from each side of the house in order to really respond at scale, right, to threats coming up.
38:44Chris Romeo Yeah.
38:45Tanya Ward And so I think we can't discount that. Like throughout the document, there's so much emphasis on collaboration that that's what makes me excited. Like it's not a case of working in isolation. It really is forming these groups to better help. And, you know, even whether it's the, you know, Security Risk Management Agency going into these different areas and kind of helping. So I think there is a regulation aspect, but I think at the same time, there's a tone that's like, we're here to kind of partner share, information share, you know, to really figure out what maybe what some of these in those areas where there isn't minimum requirements established to work together to figure out what that would be.
39:24Izar Tarandach Yeah, I don't want to take the air off your balloon.
39:29Tanya Ward I've already filled it up, you can't catch me. My birthday party.
39:44Izar Tarandach No kidding. But I'm gonna give you a gift right now.
39:52Tanya Ward I'm gonna give you a gift.
39:55Izar Tarandach We keep reading this stuff and we keep thinking to ourselves or even saying out loud I am not a lawyer. And the more I read, the more I ask myself, oh my God, why not? Because in the long map of this collaboration thing that you're so happy about—
40:13Tanya Ward well, you talked about it at the start, Kumbaya. You opened it.
40:17Izar Tarandach You don't say that I'm behind it. I just said that it's— but the fact is that the only people who are actually going to do a lot of money out of this are lawyers. Because think about it, what happens— you guys gave me a schooling on the market forces involved last week. So what happens if the government now comes to somebody in industry and says, okay, we have to collaborate, and in order for us to collaborate, you have to do A, B, C, and D. And now they'll come and say, oh, but that's too cumbersome or costly for us. We can't do that. Now, this is not a government agency, so they're not covered by the enable regulated entities to afford security.
41:01Tanya Ward Yeah.
41:01Izar Tarandach They're just saying, I don't have the profit margin to actually do the things that you're asking me to do. I would have to revamp all my systems. Wait, wait for it. Wait for it.
41:09Tanya Ward Wait for it.
41:10Chris Romeo Wait for it.
41:10Izar Tarandach So now the government, so now the government is going to exert pressure and say, if you don't do these things, then you can't work with us.
41:17Chris Romeo That's been happening.
41:19Izar Tarandach But we're talking about infrastructure here.
41:23Chris Romeo I mean, FedRAMP.
41:23Izar Tarandach So, it's not like they can say, oh, we're going to get our electric— no, electricity, yes. Oh, we're going to get our water from somebody else, right?
41:30Chris Romeo True. But I mean, Matt mentioned FedRAMP earlier. Like, this is already a defined practice with working with the federal government. Like, you either comply with the requirements at whatever minimum level they have, or they go somewhere else, or they take their business elsewhere.
41:45Izar Tarandach Or they have somewhere else to go No, that's the point.
41:48Chris Romeo You're saying with critical infrastructure.
41:49Izar Tarandach Critical infrastructure, as critical as it gets, why is it critical? Because there are not a lot of options. Sometimes there's only one.
41:58Tanya Ward You know, you've made me think, and it's another thing I'm thinking. When you read through this whole section, I don't see anything about the government trying to kind of, and maybe it is in other sections, I have to go back. Where there's, I mean, obviously to your point, it's gonna take a lot to implement this, putting lawyers aside, but going back to, I think, 3 podcasts, we talked about a shortage, right? A shortage in the industry when it comes to functions and jobs that need to, like, we need to fulfill. Where in the document is it talking about the government kind of having better connection with, well, maybe it is through the partnership between public and private, but to be able to drive for more skills to be able to support support this.
42:39Chris Romeo There is a section, I don't remember which pillar it sits in, actually, yes, I do. Pillar 4, Invest in Resilient Future, 4.6 training, it covers the need to train more people in cybersecurity-related disciplines. So they do call it out. It's a good ways down in the document from here though. Okay, so we've spent a lot of time on Pillar 1 in Strategic Objective 1.1. So we got to get to 1.2. We're not even in 1.2 yet. We haven't even crossed that boundary yet.
43:12Matt Coles Well, so I was going to jump ahead and start talking about the kumbaya moment. I want to jump ahead to page 13.
43:18Chris Romeo Let's do that. Let's go to page 13.
43:21Matt Coles So one thing I think that it calls out, and I think we talked a little bit about it last time, but I really, I would really love to see this come together. Collectively defend federal civilian agencies. Yeah.
43:37Chris Romeo Yeah. Right.
43:38Matt Coles This is, this is huge. Right.
43:39Chris Romeo Yeah.
43:40Matt Coles You know, everyone, everyone from themselves, I know, you know, the DOD and, and, and really, you know, hardcore, hardcore internal, you know, non-civilian agencies have a lot of resources. They already do information sharing.
43:54Tanya Ward Right.
43:54Matt Coles And, and in the industry you have ISACs, right? Which provide real-time information, threat intelligence sharing, and and whatnot, but, but nobody's sharing infrastructure or personnel or, or tech, you know, techniques that, that they can apply directly. I mean, they, they go to the ISAC and they say, oh, how do I, how do I deal with this threat that I see? Or is this, you know, indicators of compromise that I'm seeing, you know, real? But they're not necessarily providing more direct, you know, more direct assistance. And I think that if this were to come to pass, if maybe I'm reading a bit more into it than, than I should be, but I think, but as I read this, Having the ability to— everyone is now responsible, right? We are— there is an agency that is potentially the weakest link, and it's the connected agencies that now have a shared responsibility for that thing not going under. And that's really important, right? That's— everyone needs to work together because everyone's in it. Because if they lose, we lose.
44:54Tanya Ward Well, totally. I mean, 180%.
44:58Izar Tarandach But you know what, Matt? I, I, I agree with what you said totally, but I ask myself if as civilians we are not starting to see indicators that that may be changing. And I choose to believe at, at deeper levels with, for example, the way that the NSA stepped out from the shadows and started collaborating all over, both with training and they even had like cyber summer camps now. And we know that they do publish indicators of compromise, threat intelligence, all that good stuff. So I choose to hope, because I see it as the only way forward, that the people who are responsible for this stuff took a page out of, unfortunately, 9/11 and figured out that sharing information is important and as quick as they can share in here, it's going to make a difference. So I, I, from one side, I share totally what you just said. From the other, in this specific case, I'm choosing to be an optimist. Yeah, we hope that the signs that we have seen mask something much bigger.
46:11Chris Romeo Yeah, that's good stuff.
46:13Matt Coles And this is directly— this, this section directly relates— obviously it calls it out in the very tail end of this section The second paragraph, right? Around the executive order, our favorite topic, SBOM, the cybersecurity, the SSDF, you know, Secure Software Development Framework. And so all of these things that in part provide a sort of a minimum regulation or minimum requirements, but also are conducive to information sharing. So, yeah.
46:42Tanya Ward That's, that comes so I mean, if you were living in a little, like your own little island, you know, it would be, we are living in a global economy, global world where, you know, cyber threats are, there's no, there's no, there's no bias in terms of where, well, maybe there is, but there, I mean, it's borderless. So you have to share information.
47:06Chris Romeo Definitely.
47:08Tanya Ward You know, sorry, go ahead.
47:09Chris Romeo I was gonna say Tanya gets the last word. We're gonna move to pillar 2. Pillar 1, we're checking that on the bottom. Pillar 1, check. We have addressed it. We have discussed it. We have debated it. Let's move on to pillar 2, disrupt and dismantle threat actors.
47:26Matt Coles So throw defense out the window. Now we're going offense. Yes.
47:28Chris Romeo Now we're going after people. We're just, we're just getting in the car. We're driving around. We're going after our adversaries.
47:35Tanya Ward It's a good thing. I mean, is that—
47:36Matt Coles Here comes the question.
47:37Izar Tarandach Where are we driving to?
47:39Chris Romeo Wherever they are. So wherever we think they are.
47:43Matt Coles I'm gonna throw out a term.
47:45Izar Tarandach Wait, that comes to the question, who are they?
47:47Matt Coles Well, that's exactly—
47:48Chris Romeo I mean, this is the hack back.
47:51Matt Coles This is the attribution problem.
47:52Chris Romeo I feel like we've dated it, debated this. This was a big debate. I wanna say what, maybe 10 years ago when a lot of people were coming out with, we need to go after the people that are trying to get into our systems. And then I was always on the side of, yeah, but do you know that that's not somebody spoofing some other system to make you go to another, to attack another third party that doesn't have anything to do with it? And so, you know, there is a—
48:20Matt Coles You ever watch Swordfish or—
48:22Chris Romeo Yeah, philosophical debate here at the highest levels of what does disrupt and dismantle threat actors actually mean from a government's perspective?
48:31Izar Tarandach I'm sorry, but on the first paragraph, the thing took a big jump from philosophy to very much Hollywood stuff. When you put into parenthesis that the efforts to be integrated include kinetic and cyber, you just upped the game a lot.
48:56Chris Romeo Okay, I'm gonna plead ignorance. And I'm not afraid to say I don't know what kinetic means in this context.
49:02Izar Tarandach Kinetic means anything that has actual energy, things that they're breaking.
49:10Chris Romeo Okay.
49:10Izar Tarandach That means kinetic. So a bullet is kinetic. 2,000-pounder bomb is kinetic.
49:15Tanya Ward Okay.
49:16Izar Tarandach So basically what this is saying is, hey, if we think that you are hacking, we can bomb you.
49:21Tanya Ward Ooh.
49:21Chris Romeo Okay. I didn't get that. Interesting. That doesn't— I didn't read that. I didn't understand. Wow. That does raise the stakes quite a bit in this statement.
49:30Matt Coles It's not the first time that this has been brought up though, right? This is the first, this is, I think maybe one of the first times it's been codified, not codified, but as a policy, I think it's the first time.
49:39Izar Tarandach I could be wrong. I think as a policy, it's the first time. I think there's been a lot of discussion, especially around what we raised before, attribution and all that and how difficult it is. In terms of like morally what it would mean to, to bomb someone. But there have been precedent actually of this happening across the world.
49:59Matt Coles Well, like they actually call out that the federal government has already been engaged in these types of activities, right? And some of them has also targeted financial infrastructure used for illicit activities.
50:11Izar Tarandach But I, I think that kinetically, this, this would be the first time to say, hey, this is something that's in the That's in the arsenal.
50:22Matt Coles I don't think it's the first time. I think it's the first time we've seen it on paper, like in a consistent way, but people have talked about this for quite some time. Oh, I hope they did.
50:30Izar Tarandach Yeah. I hope people talked a lot about this.
50:34Matt Coles Now, here's a question for Kinetican, because I think we talked about it a little bit last time. There's one thing about attacking, taking out a, say, a scam call center or taking out other attacking systems. Obviously, this all comes down to smart bombs and people on the ground and all that sort of stuff that we probably don't want to talk about. But what about things like turning off networks or pulling licenses or preventing public, non-public organizations and organizations and operations from functioning properly. Kinetic is not just simply attacking an outside target. Right.
51:29Chris Romeo And that starts to make me think about the ownership we discussed in the last episode, the ownership of the internet. And it comes up in a later, it comes up in, I think, the resiliency section. Yeah. And 4.1 about who owns the internet. But to your point there, does the United States government have the ability to take a country off the internet? Say you're not on the internet anymore? Technically, no.
51:51Izar Tarandach They do. No, the ability, they do ability.
51:54Chris Romeo But does the United States government own the internet? I would say no, the United States government does not have ownership of the internet.
52:01Izar Tarandach No, but when you can do it through operational means, then it takes a different thing. So there's this discussion going on now about the, the gas lines that got interrupted.
52:13Matt Coles The Nord Stream pipeline.
52:13Chris Romeo Yeah.
52:13Izar Tarandach Because of Ukraine.
52:14Tanya Ward Mm-hmm.
52:15Izar Tarandach Nobody knows who did it. You can say who had some benefit out of it, right?
52:21Chris Romeo Yeah.
52:21Izar Tarandach But there are a lot of actors that could have done it. My thing with what you just said is what's the scope?
52:27Tanya Ward Scope?
52:27Izar Tarandach I mean, if I get bad traffic coming from North Korea, what is the scope of the operation against it? Do I take North Korea off the grid? Do I take the city where I feel like the traffic is coming off the grid? Do I take the block, the building, the house? Right.
52:48Matt Coles Well, and at what point, right? I mean, you could sever the undersea cable that goes you know, between Korea and mainland, well, or another land, right? But that doesn't cover all the routes.
53:04Chris Romeo Yeah. We're quickly drifting into the Minority Report, like, type of— For real.
53:11Tanya Ward I was about to make that comment. You can tell we're sitting with threat modelers here, man, because you're going for the worst case scenario ever.
53:18Izar Tarandach Hey, hey, this is Tom Clancy.
53:20Tanya Ward I mean, I never, maybe I'm the internal optimist, but I didn't read so much into that. When I read this section, it kind of for me was broken up into 3 areas, but the one that you were talking about, you know, how do you actually be a disruptor to the attacks? I mean, I think the key call out there is how do you make it more challenging and more expensive for these, you know, whether cyber criminals or whatever it may be to author these types of campaigns. And a lot of that comes down to you have to kind of harden what you have, like the infrastructure. How do you build resiliency into that? So I felt there was a lot of key things that, you know, they called out was hardening, you know, zero trust, obviously not too sure if that will fully solve the problem. Also learning. I mean, the biggest way we get better, I mean, evolution tells us even humans are constantly evolving, is just, you know, we learn, you know, from our lessons learned and being able to take those lessons quickly and apply more protective or preventative techniques, particularly at speed and scale.
54:24Izar Tarandach So, big deal on the street.
54:25Tanya Ward I'm thinking, oh my gosh, we're gonna, you know, if something's done to us, I think it's more like, how do we disrupt the campaigns? Because literally there's an economic aspect to it. There's also a kind of, you know, a national security, right? I mean, and then there's also the public like me, my mom, my, you know, especially people who are in their older ages who may be more vulnerable, right, because they don't understand. Like they get maybe a phishing campaign that seems genuine and suddenly ransomware is on their machine kind of stealing all of their information.
54:58Izar Tarandach Yeah, that's the introduction.
55:01Matt Coles Can I just, I want to plug, if folks are not familiar with what we're talking about here, there's a good series of YouTube videos that folks can go watch. There's a couple, there's a couple different groups that have been producing these videos. The one I would just mention if I can is, so a gateway video is through a friend of Mark Rober, who did a YouTube video series with another group that does scam call center disruption tech videos. They actually talk about what the scammers are doing and how and what actions they took to disrupt the, the, the scam activities.
55:46Tanya Ward Oh, that's hilarious.
55:47Matt Coles And, and, and so, but it's, I mean, it's just a small, just a small view into the wider problem here of what the challenge is and how a disruption campaign. So the, you know, it's mentioned here, disruption campaign needs to be sustained and targeted.
56:00Chris Romeo Mm-hmm. Right.
56:02Matt Coles Targeted meaning attributed, you know, reach the people who— reach the people in organizations that are actually attributed to and actually are the ones causing the problem. And sustained, meaning it's not sufficient to just make it a one-time effort. You have to do it continuously because, you know, long story short, these call center campaigns especially pop up, they operate, and then they— and if they get shut down, they pop up somewhere else, right? And you have to continue putting the pressure, otherwise you're not going to really address the problem. That requires constant threat intelligence and lots of personnel, right? You have to have regular, regular analysis, regular detection, people to do this disruption campaigns and a full court press of people.
56:52Tanya Ward This is a kumbaya, isn't it? But that, that's why I think in that whole section it talked about the Emotet bot as well and how working with, you know, Netherlands, Germany, Lithuania, Canada, all these different different, you know, countries to be able to kind of shut that down.
57:10Chris Romeo Yeah, and when I think about this whole section, you know, I think we had some good conversations about kind of some of the higher-level things that I honestly just missed in— because I didn't understand the terminology. But I mean, there's not a lot to argue with. Integrate federal disruption activities, public-private collaboration, increased notification of victims, you know, when victims are getting— prevent abuse of infrastructure. I've only got, I know I only chuckled on 2.5.
57:40Izar Tarandach Yes.
57:41Chris Romeo Counter cybercrime, defeat ransomware. Oh, we could have, if only we had been at this moment, like now we have the guidance and we have the ability to defeat ransomware because it's in the National Cybersecurity Strategy. Now we can finally put ransomware to bed. Like this isn't, yes, they're doing a lot of good things, but like a National Cybersecurity Strategy doesn't defeat ransomware. Bigger than what's on the page here.
58:09Matt Coles And I think that's the goal, right? That's not, "This will solve this." It is, "That is our objective." That's how I would read this.
58:17Izar Tarandach To that objective, unpopular opinion here. What's so big about ransomware? Why is ransomware such a big deal? Isn't the fact that Somebody got access to my data to the point that they can encrypt it, meaning they got access to my data to the point that they can basically do anything with it. Isn't that worse?
58:42Tanya Ward Well, I think that when it comes, when it comes to actually protecting civilians, when you think about a hospital, like that is a big deal. If you're a cardio, like if you're about to go to surgery and you try to look at all the information about a patient and suddenly you don't get access to it, That's starting to impact people's lives.
59:00Matt Coles Well, I think that the important one—
59:02Tanya Ward It is a big deal.
59:03Izar Tarandach I don't need to ask for money if I just erase it. The effect is the same.
59:09Matt Coles But the important part here is that ransomware is a common, easy to create, easy to deploy, and easy because we collectively, software developers, et cetera, make it possible and that businesses have spun up about having attack frameworks that make it easy for an attacker to go and create these things that cause long-term disruption, right? They cause long-term and hard to recover from. Now, yes, you could just delete, right? But it's the result of the ransomware that's the problem, right? It's the long-term very difficult to recover nature of the attack, right? I like to use it as an example, you know, just for, just sort of as an analogy here, buffer overflows, right? What's the best case scenario from a buffer overflow? A crash, because you know what happened, right? The worst case though is that somebody uses that overflow to do code injection, to do something else, right? And so ransomware, ransomware could do a lot of things because you have granted it initial access and it has full control to do whatever it wants with your data. So if anything, the fact that it encrypts and asks you for money for a decryption key, whether or not that key works, it's a different matter, but you at least know it happened.
60:35Chris Romeo Sure.
60:37Izar Tarandach But I think that going back to what you say, I think that you touched straight into the heart of the question. It's something that's visible. You can put it in the news. You don't have to explain too much to people what happened.
60:49Tanya Ward Yeah.
60:50Chris Romeo I mean, the root of it is cybercrime, right? Like they said, counter cybercrime, defeat ransomware. Ransomware is just a vehicle for cybercrime. When ransomware goes away, the cybercriminals aren't all gonna disappear. Oh, well, we can't do ransomware anymore. We're gonna go get real jobs and just work 9 to 5 in Silicon Valley.
61:08Izar Tarandach That's a real job.
61:09Chris Romeo Yeah, true. It is. I mean, it's become like, to Matt's point, it's become a cottage industry. Where there are startup companies and there are developers. There's, you know, there's a whole ecosystem out there. Yeah, there's a whole marketplace for buying ransomware. My point is ransomware is the current vehicle they're using. Defeating ransomware does not defeat cybercrime. People will think up some other thing that'll come next. And I just chuckled at it because it's such a high— it's such a big statement. Oh, defeat ransomware. Like, I mean, like, we can all get behind it, but do I think Do I think the National Cybersecurity Strategy is really gonna defeat ransomware in the next 5 years? No, I don't.
61:48Tanya Ward So can I ask a question on that? So this is kind of going back to basic economics, right? Supply and demand, okay? So if you have these attacks and you are paying, 'cause that's literally going back to your point, you know, you have criminal or, you know, cybercriminal organizations that are making money out of this. What struck me as kind of interesting is the government didn't really put a position on whether paying it was, was considered like whether there was going to be any regulations coming into play to kind of—
62:20Izar Tarandach They did.
62:21Matt Coles They did actually.
62:22Tanya Ward Yeah. It wasn't very clear. I felt it was pretty much on the fence.
62:25Matt Coles Page 18, last paragraph. Um, for this, ultimately the most effective way to undermine the motivation of these criminal groups is to reduce the potential for profit. For this reason, the administration strongly discourages the payment of ransomware.
62:40Tanya Ward Discourages. Discourages.
62:41Matt Coles Well, they can't outright disallow it, right? They can't tell a private organization, don't pay, right? The hospital network that is trying to recover its systems immediately because it has patients in the operating room isn't going to take an order like that.
62:58Chris Romeo Yeah.
62:58Tanya Ward Right. Well, they talk about addressing the abusive work conditions. Currency, right? For— right. So they also talk about things that we can do to prevent it. They talk about we can certainly put law enforcement out there to be able to disrupt these ransomware, you know, infrastructure and attack actors. But there isn't— it's, it's a discourage. So going back to your point, Chris, you know, we're still going to see it because people are going to still— I feel like you can do all these things But if there's still a level of payout, like, I mean, that's the game. That's, I mean, that's, that's, yeah, you have to make it more expensive.
63:37Chris Romeo So you have to make ransomware more expensive so there's not a profit for the people that are doing it. And so they'll, but then they're going to go try to find something else to generate.
63:49Matt Coles Now I do want to, I do want to say I would have liked to see a stronger word and I'm going to, I'm going to nitpick on a word here again. Right? At the same time, victims of ransomware, whether or not they choose to pay, should report the incident to law enforcement or other appropriate agencies. Now, that seems like a very simple statement, right? They should, they should do that. Ideally, I would've liked to have seen a little bit something stronger there about, and again, in this, in this sort of civil, in this coordinated defense, shared defense posture, that the government will, and the agencies involved, will provide a mechanism for, explicitly provide a mechanism for reporting and coordinated action and not just, oh yeah, if you feel like it, let us know. So we might, may or may not do something about it.
64:41Chris Romeo Yeah, I'm with you. Because I have to report. If I see, if I'm driving down the street and I see a crime commit, committed, I have a legal— I have a legal responsibility to report that crime, right? I mean, the general kind of rule of law in, at least in the United States of America, like there is both a moral obligation to report the crime and a legal obligation as well. Like I can be found as an accessory after the fact or before, like if I know a crime was committed, after the fact and I didn't report it, I could potentially be charged as a co-conspirator because I had— and I'm not a lawyer, I'm using a bunch of legal words I heard on TV to try to make it sound like I know what I'm talking about here. But I think that's the case here. Like, I like your idea though, Matt, at the end of the day, must report the incident to law enforcement. That's the only way you get good data is if you have all, as much of the data as possible.
65:40Matt Coles But I want to be careful that we need that reporting to actually make sense, right? So today if you get, If you get scammed, you know, for a while, you know, there's these DOT scams where people are trying to claim unemployment in your name. If that happens, you're supposed to, you know, report it to law enforcement. Well, you go to your local town and you report it and they give you a police report and that's it.
66:04Chris Romeo Yep.
66:05Matt Coles Right? Nothing, there's no central coordination. There's no, well, there may be in the backend, but you know, we don't necessarily see it. As a civilian. And so, but wouldn't it be nice if that notion of shared defense and coordinated defense, it's ultimately at the end of the day, it's an event that has occurred, right? It's an event in a SIEM, in a security incident and event management system where the civilians who are impacted by it are not part of the data collection process. And I know I said data collection and that's a bad word here in the US, but but ultimately it's an event that occurs that is another data point in that trail.
66:45Izar Tarandach Yeah.
66:45Matt Coles It's a breadcrumb. And if you don't know about it, then, yep. And the defense capabilities are only, only so effective.
66:54Chris Romeo Yeah.
66:54Izar Tarandach Matt, just look at the Better Business Bureau, right?
66:57Matt Coles Mm-hmm.
66:58Izar Tarandach You go in there, like people get scammed all the time. They go into there, they, they submit, submit a complaint. You go into a specific page of a spe— a specific business, you see like Trillion complaints. We collected the data. It's in a central place.
67:12Matt Coles Well, that's right. You can't just collect the data. You have to do something with it.
67:15Chris Romeo But yeah, right. Yeah.
67:17Izar Tarandach But what do we do with this data?
67:19Matt Coles I put it, make it as part of the coordinated defense posture, right? That's what I was, that's what I was suggesting. It would've been nice to see some, not just simply words on, on page, but actually make it part of the rest of the strategy that this data makes sense.
67:33Izar Tarandach Yeah.
67:33Matt Coles Yeah, right.
67:34Chris Romeo Yeah. You think about all the benefit that's come from the information sharing. Somebody mentioned it earlier. The ISACs, for example, have opened up a whole new world of companies and organizations knowing what the threat is against them because they can coordinate with what their peers are seeing. Like, that's valuable. And that all comes down from data. If we don't have this data, if you don't know how many people are actually paying ransoms, You don't know, it's harder to know whether you've, have we defeated ransomware? We don't know if we don't have the data. It starts with the data.
68:07Izar Tarandach So you're thinking more in terms of NTSB than BBB, than Better Business Bureau.
68:12Chris Romeo Yeah. I mean, it's an incident. You're just, you're providing a way that you're making mandatory reporting of incidents because there is a crime involved in it. Like technically they should have notified somebody to the effect that there's been a crime committed against them.
68:28Izar Tarandach Yeah.
68:28Chris Romeo And so, that's all I'm asking for. And so, any final thoughts before we wrap up this episode with Pillar 2 and call Pillar 2 checked off as well? But I want to make sure if anybody has any Pillar 2 things that you were like, "I had to talk about," this is your final opportunity.
68:46Izar Tarandach Well, if you're hacking something and you see a black helicopter on the— The window, run.
68:51Chris Romeo That's good advice just in general for life. If you see a black helicopter anywhere near you and appears to be hovering, run.
69:01Izar Tarandach Run.
69:01Tanya Ward You know, this is like the ransomware, the black helicopter, then it'll come as something else, right?
69:08Chris Romeo We need some vehicles to pick up these cyber criminals. Yeah, we do.
69:13Izar Tarandach I, the whole talk about ransomware took me to a different place completely unconnected to the policy and everything. So how many times must have happened that somebody got attacked with ransomware, decided to pay, got the, the key, and as soon as they put the key in, it doesn't work because there is a bug in the decryption?
69:35Matt Coles Quite frequently.
69:37Izar Tarandach So either we have the best programmers in the world writing the decryption part of those things, or the worst. And we just don't hear about it. I never heard about it.
69:46Chris Romeo I miss the days when they used to store the keys in a file on the file system. So if you knew where to look, you could just find the decryption key. And all they did, you sent the money and they just told you where the file was on the file system that had the key in it.
70:01Matt Coles Yes, but then, but then they got fancy and they, and the recursive algorithm re-encrypted that.
70:05Chris Romeo Yeah, yeah, lots of, lots of challenges there. Well folks, thanks for joining us here around the Security Table. We got through We got through Pillar 1, we got through Pillar 2. I'm gonna call that success, and we'll come back next episode. We'll pick up with Pillar 3 where there's a lot more product security, application security, software security stuff for us to discuss and debate. So tune in soon to hear part 3 as we dive into Pillar 3 and beyond.
Transcript supplied by AssemblyAI. It may contain transcription errors.
Originally published as The Security Table. Part of the AI Security Table archive.
